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INTRODUCTION 
This M.A. thesis offers a broad understanding of the 
ff0rigln and Failure of the Maoist Revolutionary Strategy in 
West Bengal!l# The stronghold of the Maoist revolutionaries 
was the area of Naxalbari, which is located in the northern 
part of West Bengal. Because of its location the entire 
movement is fenonn as the Maxalite Movements -which, within 
a short span of the tine, spilled and spread over to other 
areas of the country^ 
Because the Maxellte Movement ¥as the end product of 
a series of splits which took place within the Communist 
movement of India during the past fev decades, it vill be 
useful in this Introduction to offer to the reader a short 
survey of these developments to enable hi© to orient himself 
in the naze of Communist Parties, groups, factions, strategies 
and policies to which these splits gave rise. 
The first split within the Communist Movement of India 
took place in 1964 when the Communist Party of India (CPI), 
the maternal body and matrix from -which all subsequent Communist 
Parties have originated, divided and gave birth to the second 
Communist Party of India, called Marxist, under the acronym 
of CPI(K). The split of the CPI stemmed from the internal 
history of the party and fro® issues that were largely 
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indigenous to the Indian scene. The principal dilemma related 
to the tactics and strategy that should be adopted towards 
the Congress Party — the degree of accommodation or antagonism 
to be directed towards it. The fact that both the foreign 
and domestic policies of the Indian Government had won 
increasing approval from the Soviet Union between i960 - 5? 
added further complications for the CPI. But overlaying these 
problems ¥ere certain basic indigenous considerations — the 
diverse origins of the party units in various states of India 
and the varying social origin of the party members •— factors 
%ihich contributed extensively to the differences bet¥een various 
State Party Units• The CPI did not escape the pervasive 
influence of Indian regionalism, which affects every party 
in India* It also shared the problems of factionalism so 
common in Indian politics* 
In an immediate sense, the single most Important factor 
contributing to the breakdown of the CPI had unquestionably 
been the death of Ajoy Ghosh, the Secretary General on 
January 13, 1962. For ower a decade Ghosh succeeded in keeping 
in check the ¥arioos contending forces within the Party* His 
successor, S»M.1» lamboodiripad, clearly eschewed the extreme 
tendencies of both right and left and placed himself firmly 
in support of the pragmatic and flexible policies ¥hich had 
enabled Ghosh to rebuild the Party after its post-independence 
ad¥entori'?t period of 1948 - 53. 
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In sp i t e of Namboodiripad's best e f f o r t s , the CPI was 
s p l i t i n to two p a r t i e s i n 1964, forcing Namboodiripad to 
a l l y himself, a t l e a s t temporarily, with the l e f t i s t s . 
Prime Minister Hehru's death in May 1964 had brought new 
leadership to the fore i n both the Congress Party and the 
Government. The moderate wing of the CPI, no¥ under S.A. Bange, 
j u s t i f i e d i t s pos i t ion of extending p a r t i a l support to the 
Congress Party and the Government on the bas is of government's 
s o c i a l i s t po l i c i e s and tendencies. 
The or ig ins of the 1964 s p l i t in the CPI predate both 
the Sino-Indian border dispute and the Sino-Sovlet ideological 
conf l i c t which emerged i n the period of 1959 - 62, though 
an i n t e r a c t i o n of the tw> can be said to have hastened the 
s p l i t . The Sino-Indian border dispute was i t s e l f to become 
an i s s u e i n the 3ino-Soviet ideologica l c o n f l i c t s . Secondly, 
the Sino-Indian border d ispute had a close p a r a l l e l i n the 
Sino-Soviet border dispute -which was to escalate l a t e r and 
the Soviet leadership had every reason to f ight to r e t a i n 
i t s influence over the CPI. 
Thus the Sino-Indian border dispute and the 3ino-Soviet 
ideologica l conf l ic t together in te rac ted on a complex pa t te rn 
of differences that had already existed i n the CPI. The 
dominant leadership of the CPI found i n the Sino-Indian border 
dispute an occasion, and i n the Sino-Soviet ideologica l 
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confl ict an al ibi* for forcing a s p l i t to s u i t i t s i n t e r e s t s • 
At the time of the Chinese aggression id th India i s 
1959 and i n 1962 there v;as a heated controversy vitta regard 
to the a t t i t u d e of the CPI towards China* k strong minority 
did not consider China as aggressor and j u s t i f i e d a l l hsr 
claims. The r e s o l t nas that in 1984 at Tenali i n Andhra 
Pradesh the Party was o f f i c i a l l y divided between two d i s t i n c t 
groups —• l e f t and Eight — each claiming to be the t roe 
represen ta t ive of the people and having the r e q u i s i t e 
re¥olot ionary programme* The moderates retained the old 
name of the CPI, while the r ad ica l s adopted the name of the 
CPI (Marxist) , or the Cpi(M). 
However, the process of d i¥is ion did not end there 
and h is tory repeated i t s e l f with the Andhra group of the 
CPI CM) gi¥ing b i r th to yet another extremist and mi l i t an t 
Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist5, or the CPHM-LK 
This happened ^hen the extremist groups id thin the 
CPI(M) at a meeting i n Calcutta on fovenber 18, 1967, 
took a decision to form a third Communist Party of Ind ia , 
the CPHM-L) s t r i c t l y on Maoist l i n e s , knovn also as the 
Naxalite Movement, which ^ould achieve a f tPeople fs democratic 
revolution through building mi l i t an t r o r a l bases and extending 
then to enc i rc le the c i t i e s " . They made i t c lea r , both by 
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the i r action and through the i r l i t e r a t u r e , t ha t they would 
propagate Mao f se - t ang f s thoughts and act ion to crea te 
more Naxalbaries* They were unanimous on one point t ha t 
the Baxalite Movement which has been flbetrayedff by the 
CPl(M) should guide a l l revola t ionary action in rural areas, 
because the CPI(K) posed an obstacle in the nay of revolution* 
They f e l t tha t by adhering to the parliamentary road the 
reformist Communist Pa r t i e s i n India had allowed a formidable 
blood-debt to accumulate over the years , and that the time 
had now come to s e t t l e th i s blood-debt by a new revolat ionary 
act ion under the leadership of the new Party• 
Instead of se lec t ing any other region of India for 
the study, 1 have decided to focus upon West Bengal to 
examine the causes of the revolut ionary movement organised 
there by th is nen Communist Party of Ind ia , the CPI(M-L)* 
The reason i s that I have been deeply concerned with the 
socio-economic conditions of the people, p a r t i c u l a r l y those 
¥ho are l iv ing In the remote t r i b a l areas i n the h i l l s * 
While other authors have focused upon the p o l i t i c a l and 
Ideologica l aspects of the movement^ 1 have concentrated 
upon the i a i e d i a t e problems of the people• 
The study a lso emphasizes the socio-economic d i s p a r i t y 
¥bieb led these people to adopt the Maoist revolut ionary 
s t ra tegy for solving the i r economic problems* While the 
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Congress Government at the Centre was making every ef for t 
to help these people through a se r ies of publ ic po l i c i e s 
and welfare schemes aimed at a gradual and peaceful change, 
the l a x a l i t e s re jected th is and i n s i s t ed tha t a Moist 
revolut ionary movement must be organized i n order t o over-
throw the ex is t ing p o l i t i c a l system i n the whole of Ind ia 
and replace i t n&th a Chinese type of p o l i t i c a l system. 
However, -while these revolu t ionar ies fa i led to a t t a i n t he i r 
main goal, t h e i r movement had the most profound impact upon 
the Congress Government at the Centre by forcing i t to design 
far more r ad i ca l and effect ive socio-economic po l i c i e s to 
deal with poverty, hunger and inequa l i t y on an a l l - I n d i a 
b a s i s . A great deal of my a t t en t ion sha l l be focused upon 
the impact which the Waxalite Movement bad upon the i n i t i a t i o n 
of a whole se t of new public po l i c i e s devised by the Central 
Government. 
A big surpr ise for me has been the r e a l i z a t i o n tha t 
othor authors have fai led to give a comprehensive account of 
the problems faced by the t r i b e s , the poor peasants , the 
landless labourers , the students and the youth i n general . 
I t seems to me tha t these authors have placed too much 
emphasis upon the theore t i ca l and ideologica l aspects of 
the movement, and upon various in t e rp re t a t ions of the Marxist 
theory, and th? t i n fac t they have fa i led to provide us with 
the r e a l understanding of the actual soc ia l conditions exis t ing 
? 
i n those areas , which r e a l l y gave r i s e to the movement• My 
ovn approach, therefore , sha l l underplay the theory and 
ideology and, ins tead , concentrate upon the socia l and 
economic conditions as the mater ia l base of the movement• 
The thes i s i s diYided in to s ix broad bat c learly 
marked oat chapters f each of them attempting to discuss 
the important aspects of soc ia l , economic and p o l i t i c a l 
developments in West Bengal* 
The f i r s t chapter has been divided i n to four sections* 
The f i r s t sect ion describes the po l i c i e s of the Commabist 
Party of India from the beginning of the World War I I i n 1939* 
In t h i s period the Party* s po l i c i e s ¥ent through several 
stages of development* In the f i r s t s tage , from 1939 
to 1945, the leadership was making every e f for t to nin 
popular support* In the second periodj nhieb began i n 1945, 
the Par ty decided to emerge as the main opposit ion force 
against the Congress Government* The third period nas 
i n i t i a t e d in 1948, nhen lander the leadership of B.T. Hanadive 
the par ty was seeking a P r o l e t a r i a n revolu t ion 1 ! based 
tapon Russian experience of 1917• When Mao Tse-tung overthrew 
the Kaomintang r u l e in China i n 1949, the Communist Party 
of India adopted the Chinese model of revolut ionary action 
and organised an "armed agrarian uprising11 i n Telengana, 
nhich marked the fourth period in the evolution of the 
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po l i c i e s of the Party* The f i f th period was i n i t i a t e d 
by i n s t ruc t i ons from Moscow in I960 to the effect tha t 
the par ty shoald give up the armed s t r agg le i n the v i l l a g e s , 
emerge from i l l e g a l i t y and adopt a new se t of po l i c i e s 
which would enable i t to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the parliamentary 
processes and the f i r s t na t ional e lect ions to be held i n 
1952* fbe most important decision was taken by the Party 
leaders i n 1956, which i n i t i a t e d the sixtfcj period of the 
Party1 s p o l i c i e s , a move towards peaceful t r an s i t i on to 
Communism• But there was a very strong opposition from a 
small number of the par ty members to th i s pol icy , which I 
have decided to cover i n various sect ions of the same 
chapter* 
The second sect ion of chapter 1 w i l l highl ight the 
causes of the r i f t g , which developed within the CPI. I t 
M i l deal with the problem of Bevisionism versus Revolution, 
the disagreement between I remlia and Chairman Mao Tse-tung, 
the impositton of the Pres iden t i a l r u l e upon Kerala, which, 
for the Communists, was a clear ind ica t ion tha t the 
parliamentary method for achieving p o l i t i c a l power was not 
dependable* F ina l ly , 1 wi l l deal with the India-China 
conf l ic t and i t s impact upon the po l i c i e s of the CPI* 
In the thi rd sect ion of chapter I wi l l discuss the s p l i t 
of the par ty i n t o two separate p o l l U c a l groups, the new 
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par ty ca l l ing i t s e l f the Communist Party of India (Marxist) 
of CPI(K). I wi l l discuss the effects of th i s s p l i t upon 
the Communists of West Bengal i n a separate sec t ion . The 
fourth sect ion wi l l deal with the Communist po l i c i e s in 
West Bengal, and with the influence which the Chinese 
Communists are alleged to have had on them. 
In the second chapter I wi l l discuss the s o c i a l , economic 
and p o l i t i c a l dimensions of the problems i n West Bengal. 
Other authors have not done t h i s . For instance J . C J o h r i , did 
not attempt to discuss the influences of external factors upon 
the Maoist revolut ionary s t ra tegy , nor did he deal with the 
geographical loca t ion of the area and the problems of t r i b a l s , 
poor peasants and s tudents . Also the programme of the Naxalites 
has received l i t t l e a t t en t ion i n his s tudy. Almost the 
same pa t t e rn has been adopted by Mohan Ram i n his work on 
2 
the Naxalite movement. The work of Biplab Bas Gupta, who 
spent four months i n West Bengal and completed a book 
3 
en t i t l ed The Maxalite Movement, i s also inadequate, because 
he did not focus upon the problems of the t r i b a l s and the 
peasantry, while these two sections of the Indian society 
were the basic components of the movement. He f a i l s to r a i s e 
the question as to why the l a x a l i t e Movement was launched by 
the ex t remis t s . After examining these s tudies and other sources, 
I have decided tha t I wi l l analyse the soc ia l base of the 
Naxalite Movement both i n i t s agrarian and t r i b a l aspects . 
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The th i rd chapter wi l l describe the establishment 
of the Communist Par ty of India (Marxis t -Leninis t ) , or 
CPI (M-L). The fa i lu re of the Naxalites to adopt a v iab le 
and r e a l i s t i c p o l i t i c a l programme, as well as the reasons 
for the emergence of fac t ional s t ruggle , wi l l also be my 
focal po in t s . 
The fourth chapter w i l l attempt to close the important 
gap which ex i s t s in the above ci ted l i t e r a t u r e on the 
Naxali te Movement, and which i s a l so evident i n the recent 
4 
study by banker Ghosh. My main ef for ts here wi l l be to 
discuss the emergence of the Bangla Congress i n West Bengal, 
to bring to the fore the e l ec to ra l p o l i t i e s in tha t S ta te , 
and the eagerness of th i r t een p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and some 
independent candidates to form a coa l i t i on government not 
against the r ad i ca l Communist elements but against the 
Congress Government. This chapter wi l l point out the success 
which the revolut ionary upsurge seored when the cons t i tuent 
p a r t i e s launched competition to gain more popular support, 
and how th i s began to polar ize these Naxal i t ies in r e t u r n . 
Although the study of Marcus F. Franda attempts to discuss 
the e l ec to ra l p o l i t i c s , i t does not, however, provide 
suf f ic ien t information on the Maoist revolut ionary movement, 
because his main in t en t ion i s to explain the h i s to ry of the 
5 
Communist Movement i n West Bengal. Also Bhawani Sen ^ p t a 
devotes a small por t ion of his work to the Haxali te Movement. 
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In view of t h i s , my thes i s wi l l make an attempt to c lose 
t h i s gap. 
The f i f th chapter wi l l be devoted to the analysis 
of r o l e of the Central Government i n suppressing the 
Naxalites a c t i v i t i e s i n the S ta te . None of the above 
mentioned authors deals with t h i s aspect . My treatment 
of th i s problem f a l l s i n t o the following sec t i ons : 
(a) ef fect ive use by the government of p o l i t i c a l instruments; 
(b) the po l i ce operations and the i r contr ibut ion to the 
des t ruc t ion of the movement? (e) the ro le played by the 
agrarian reform to control the problem through lega l and 
effect ive d i s t r i b u t i o n of land; (d) the main shortcomings 
of the agrarian reforms and how th^se shortcomings could 
be removed. 
The s ix th chapter wi l l ascer ta in the reasons for the 
f a i l u r e of the Maoist revolut ionary s t ra tegy in West Bengal. 
The Conclusion wi l l attempt to answer the question of 
whether the col lapse of the agrar ian revolut ion i n India 
i s a temporary fea ture , and whether, when and under what 
conditions th i s might be revived. 
F ina l ly , while a h i s t o r i c a l and desc r ip t ive aoproach 
has been adopted for the treatment of mater ia l from chapter I 
to chapter ¥, i n chapter VI an ana ly t ica l i n t e r p r e t a t i v e 
12 
approach is atteapted in order to explain the interplay 
of various factors responsible for the failure of the 
Naxalite revolutionary movement in West Bengal• 
13 
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Chapter I 
THB ORIGIN OF THE GOMMOHIST PARTY OF IIDIA 
(MABXIST) 
1 . The CPI and i t s Po l ic ies 
The Communist Par ty of India (CPI) i s one of the 
oldest Communist Pa r t i e s i n Asia. Because adequate work 
has been done on i t s p o l i c i e s , pe r sona l i t i e s and growth i n 
1 
the ea r ly period, t h i s study wi l l deal only with these 
p o l i c i e s of the pa r ty which r e l a t ed to the or ig in of the 
Naxali te Movement. 
The period i n which the po l i c i e s of the CPI became 
more s ign i f i can t i n the p o l i t i c a l s e t up of India began from 
1939, when World War I I broke out, the CPI's leadership 
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declared tha t i t was an "Imperial is t War**. With the entry 
of the Soviet Union i n t o the War they declared that i t was a 
"People's War" and therefore India should cooperate with the 
3 
Br i t i sh Government. Because of t h i s , and owing to CPI 
support for the war e f fo r t s , the Br i t i sh Government l i f t e d the 
ban which had been i n force for near ly twenty years upon the 
a c t i v i t i e s of t h i s Party and encouraged i t to take up arms 
and jo in i n the war against the F a s c i s t s . 
14 
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On August 9, 1942, when Mahatma Gandhi launched the 
"Quit India*1 movement for achieving the independence for 
the country through peaceful means, the Communist Party 
opposed not only th i s movement but a lso a l l Congress Party 
4 
a c t i v i t i e s against the B r i t i s h . The Congress opposition 
to the Muslim League's demand for a separate homeland for 
5 
the Moslems was character ised by P.C. Josh i , the Secretary 
6 General of the CPI, as a "sectar ian arrogance". As Bhawanl 
Sen Gupta has said the p a r t y ' s stand on th i s i s sue was that 
"wherever the Moslems are i n an overwhelming majority i n a 
contiguous t e r r i t o r y " , they have the r i g h t to Mform the i r 
7 
autonomous s t a t e , and even to separate i f they so desire**. 
A remarkable change i n the CPI's po l i c i e s took place 
i n 1945, when the Br i t i sh conducted e lec t ions for the 
Provincial Assemblies and the pa r ty decided to con tes t . To 
give a clear expression to i t s p o l i c i e s , the leadership 
published an e lec t ion manifesto. The manifesto said tha t 
Ind ia was a s ing le p o l i t i c a l un i t and i t embraced the idea 
of represen ta t ive government. The leaders also believed 
tha t the i r par ty would replaee the lehru government by a 
People 's Democratic Government through a parl iamentary 
8 procedure i n due course. 
When Joshi was engaged i n building an image portraying 
the CPI as a p a t r i o t i c force, the country was going through 
16 
serious i n t e r n a l d is turbances . These disturbances were 
the s t r i k e s of workers, communal r i o t s between Hindus and 
9 Moslems, the mutiny i n the Navy, e t c . 
Because of these developments, some leaders within 
the CPI v isual ized tha t the ex is t ing climate was most 
su i tab le for the par ty to launch a revolu t ion , for which 
10 
s t ra tegy a conceptual framework was provided by A.A.Zhadanov. 
The leader of t h i s revolut ionary wing of the Party, 
B.T. Hanadive, j u s t i f i e d th i s revolut ionary course by 
saying tha t India bad at ta ined no r e a l independence and 
tha t Br i t i sh r a l e was replaced by a new and far more 
e f fec t ive colonialism i n the form of Anglo-American 
11 
imperial ism. In view of th i s he urged tha t the par ty must 
give up i t s pro-Congress p o l i c i e s , propagated by Josh i , 
and must use the s t r i k e s to transform them in to revolut ionary 
actions i n order to break up the Congress government. 
The c ruc ia l clash between these two po l i c i e s took 
place during the Second Congress of the CPI, held i n 
Calcutta from February 28 to March 6, 1948. Here, a la rge 
number of the par ty members hailed Banadive* s version and 
12 
branded J o s h i ' s po l i c i e s as r i g h t i s t revis ionism. Joshi 
was removed from the post of Secretary General and 
B.T. Banadive replaced him. 
17 
In formulating new policies for the party, Banadive 
based himself on two factors. One, as we have seen, was 
the workers' s tr ikes in the urban areas. The second 
factor was the Telengana (Andhra Pradesh) peasant's 
insurrection. The Communist-led movement in Telengana 
13 
was essential ly a nat ional is t movement against Princely 
rule in the State. When India struggled for her independence 
the at t i tude of the Nizam of Hyderabad was pro-Brit ish. 
When India won independent status the Nizam refused to 
grant freedom and electoral franchise to bis people with 
the resul t that the people launched an armed uprising 
against him. 
Anyway, Banadive laid primary emphasis upon the 
struggle in the c i t i e s rather than in the countryside. 
Though he said that the revolution would be led by the 
prole tar ia t in the c i t ies based on Bussian revolutionary 
tac t ics , this struggle would sp i l l over to the vil lages 
where the peasantry would enthusiastically support i t . 
He thus advocated a two-class all iance for launching 
revolution in India, an alliance between workers and 
14 
poor peasants. 
However, Banadive* s strategy of two class alliance 
failed because the isolated s t r ike in the country failed 
to merge into a general s t r ike , and this failed to sp i l l 
over in to the countryside. But the revolutionary act ivi ty 
18 
i n Telengana took the shape of a strong armed upr i s ing . 
By Ju ly 1948 the loca l communists had l ibe ra t ed 
35 2,500 v i l l ages and se t up the i r own adminis t ra t ion . On 
September 13, 1948, the Southern Command of the Indian 
16 Army marched i n t o Hyderabad and took control of the S ta te . 
After t h i s operat ion, the Government of India published a 
booklet en t i t l ed Communist Crimes i n HyderabadT which 
provided d e t a i l s of the Communist a c t i v i t i e s i n the S t a t e . 
I t i s s ta ted tha t from August 15, 1946 to September 13,1948, 
the Communists murdered near ly 2,000 persons, attacked 22 
po l ice out -pos ts , seized and destroyed v i l l a g e records , 
manhandled a l a rge number of v i l l a g e o f f i c i a l s , burnt 
custom out -pos ts , captured 230 guns, looted or destroyed 
paddy and robbed cash and jewellery worth more than a 
17 
mi l l ion rupees. 
While the p ro l e t a r i an revolution i n the c i t i e s fa i l ed , 
the r e l a t i v e success of the agrarian s t ruggle in Telengana 
had a profound impact upon the Communist Par ty . At a 
meeting of i t s Central Executive Committee i n May, 1950, 
Banadive was replaced as Secretary General by B. Bajeshwar 
Bao who argued tha t the revolut ionary assau l t upon the 
government must be based upon tbe se l f -support ing agrarian 
armed upr i s ing . Bao supported the Chinese " l i n e " i n 
revolut ionary s t r a t e g y . Under his leadership the Central 
19 
Executive Committee adopted a reso lu t ion tendering an 
apology to Mao Tse-tung for "u t t e r ly wrong, i r r e spons ib le 
and slanderous c r i t i c i s m s " made by the old P o l i t i c a l Bureau 
18 
and withdrew these c r i t i c i sms unreservedly. 
However, the s t ruggle within the Communist Par ty 
was not over yet , because the new leader believed tha t 
i t would be poss ib le to win p e t i t bourgeoisie i n the towns, 
and the middle c lass peasants i n the countryside, for 
the i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the revolu t ion . I t was during 
this confrontation between Banadive and Bao tha t the CPI 
received i n s t ruc t i ons from the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union through R. Palme Dutt of the Br i t i sh Communist 
19 
Par ty a t the end of 1950. Dutt suggested i n his l e t t e r 
tha t the CPI should change i t s po l i c i e s and make every 
e f fo r t through which the na t iona l bourgeoisie could be 
brought i n t o p a r t y ' s fo ld . Moreover, the par ty should 
adopt parliamentary means to oppose the government 
p o l i c i e s . While these suggestions were welcomed by Ajoy 
Ghosh, Rao re jected them. Thus an i n t e r n a l c r i s i s s e t 
within the CPI, which could be solved only by an i n t e r -
vention from outs ide , as explained by Ghoshs "Today the 
r e a l i t y i s tha t nobody i n the Indian Par ty can resolve th i s 
c r i s i s . I t was the i n t e r n a t i o n a l comrade who pointed out 
our mis takes . Since we are not agreed on the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , 
20 
only they can help us". 
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Early in 1951, four prominent communist leaders, 
S.A. Dange, R. Rajeshwar Rao, A.K. Ghosh and Basavapunniah 
visi ted Moscow for consultations. After returning home, 
A.K. Ghosh succeeded Rao as Secretary General in the spring 
of 1951. The most outstanding feature of the new policies 
was to ca l l off the Telengana insurgency. Instead, the 
party decided to make use of the Indian parliament for 
opposing the "government's reactionary pol ic ies" and to 
achieve i t s objectives through electoral process. Vie tor 
M. Fie has r ight ly observed that "the CPI displayed a 
remarkable f l ex ib i l i ty in visualizing that both the 
parliamentary and non-parliamentary forms of straggle were 
21 
to be used for meeting i t s objectives". 
According to this new strategy i t would be a four 
class alliance of the workers, peasants, middle class and 
the national bourgeoisie which would replace the Congress 
22 
Government by the People* s Democratic Government, and 
accordingly, the CPI launched i t s electoral campaign in the 
f l f s t general elections of 1962 in independent India. 
The resul ts of the elections were surprising. In 
the liok Sabba (lower House of the Indian Parliament) the 
CPI won 26 seats , opposing the Congress Party which 
controlled 364 out of total 512 seats . 
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Also in the elections to the State Legislative 
Assemblies the CPI scored significant successes which 
indicated i t s increasing influence. The party established a 
People's Democratic Front in Andhra Pradesh. In Maharashtra 
i t concluded an electoral alliance with the Left Socialists 
and with Kamgar Kisan Party. In West Bengal, Bihar and 
Orissa the party concluded an electoral alliance with the 
Forward Block (Marxist); in Uttar Pradesh with the 
Revolutionary Socialist Party; in the Punjab with the Lai 
Communist Party; in Tamil Nadu with the Toiler 's Party and 
the r i g h t i s t Dravida Kazhagam. In Kerala, the CPI organised 
the United Front of Leftists by enlist ing the cooperation 
of the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party and the Revolutionary 
23 
Social is t Party. The following table shows the CPI position 
24 
in the State Legislative Assemblies. 
INDEX No. I 
3 t a t e
 seals STgySei Won *«">«**«* 
Andhra Pradesh 329 108 
Assam 105 18 
Bihar 318 22 
Gujarat 158 8 
Haryana 61 1 
Himachal Pradesh 50 4 
Karnataka 211 20 
77 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
21.8 
2#8 
i . i 
0 .5 
* # 
4.4 
1.5 
Continued . . . 
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Kerala 
Madhya Pradesh 
Maharashtra 
Orissa 
Punj ab 
Bajasthan 
Tamil Nadu 
Uttar Pradesh 
West Bengal 
128 
338 
301 
140 
110 
189 
202 
430 
205 
N.A. 
22 
51 
33 
35 
5 
52 
109 
89 
58 
0 
7 
7 
6 
1 
10 
4 
33 
N.A. 
0.6 
3.4 
5.6 
6.1 
0.7 
7.9 
3.1 
10.4 
* Percentage of the to ta l valid votes in the State 
polled by the par ty ' s candidates. 
** Less than 0.5 per eent. 
In four States — Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, West 
Bengal and Tamil Nadu, — the CPI emerged as the second 
largest party in the Legislative Assemblies. I t was in 
the l ight of these remarkable electoral successes that 
the leadership of the party reviewed i t s policies in the 
Third Congress, held at Madurai, from December 27, 1953 
to January 4, 1954. Here the CPI not only reaffirmed i t s 
policies of building the united front of the Leftist forces, 
but also decided to enlarge this tinited front by including 
the middle classes and the national bourgeoisie, in order 
to transform i t in to a broad People's Democratic Front. 
This front, the party believed, would be able to replace 
25 
Nehru's government. 
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During 1954, two important developments took place 
which convinced the leadership of the CPI that a broad 
People 's Democratic Front, embracing also the nat ional 
bourgeoisie, could r e a l l y be b u i l t i n Ind i a . The f i r s t 
development was the i n t ens i f i c a t i on of the leftward trends 
i n I n d i a ' s foreign pol icy; the second development was the 
i n i t i a t i o n of the same trends i n domestic p o l i c i e s . 
I t was i n April 1954 when the Planning Commission 
of the Indian Government requested a l l the Sta te Governments 
to draw up f ive-year development programmes for v i l l a g e s , 
taluks and d i s t r i c t s , with special emphasis upon the 
increase of a g r i c u l t u r a l production and fur ther growth 
26 
of r u r a l i ndus t r i e s and cooperative assoc ia t ions . 
Simultaneously, Nehru made noteworthy statements 
tha t his government would follow a pol icy of peace, 
n e u t r a l i t y and non-alignment, and i n order to implement 
th i s pol icy he c r i t i c i s e d the United States for building 
27 
up a regional defence system i n Asia namely SIATO. On 
June 28, 1954, India extended a hand of fr iendship towards 
28 
China by signing an agreement of the 'Five P r inc ip le s ' 
and of peaceful coexistence i n New Delhi. Daring bis 
v i s i t to China i n the same year, Nehru remarked that 
Mao Tse-tung was a "great warrior , a great revolut ionary, 
a great builder and consolidator" , adding tha t %ay he 
24 
29 
now be a great peace maker a l so" . During June and 
Ju ly 1955, Nehru received a warm fr iendly reception i n 
Moscow. I t was in 1955 that India and the Soviet Union 
signed an economic agreement to the effect that Russia 
30 
would build the Bhilai Steel P l an t . As a condit ion i t was 
agreed that the Plant would be under the publ ic sector i n 
order to reduce the effect iveness of the p r i v a t e sec to r . 
At the Fourth Congress, held a t Palghat (Kerala) 
from April 19 to 29, 1956, the CPI careful ly scrut in ised 
the leftward trends i n the domestic as well as i n the 
foreign po l i c i e s of the Nehru government. By that time 
the Indian foreign po l i c i e s were " c e r t i f i e d " as progressive 
by the Soviet Union and China. Ghosh, who had j u s t 
returned home from Moscow af ter attending Twentieth Congress 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held i n 
February 1956, proposed far more f l ex ib le po l i c i e s to the 
Central Executive Committee of the CPI. 
As a r e s u l t , the par ty p r a c t i c a l l y abandoned 
revolut ionary approaches and proclaimed that i t would 
s t r i v e for peaceful t r ans i t i on to socialism and then 
communism i n Ind ia . In order to a t t a i n th i s goal the 
pa r ty would place emphasis upon the s t ruggle for ' t he 
strengthening of democracy i n every sphe re ' . I t must 
f ight for the democratization of the Sta te apparatus 
25 
and extension of the r i g h t s and powers of a l l popularly 
e lected bodies, the loca l se l f government, d i s t r i c t 
31 
boards and so fo r th . 
Every poss ib le attempt would be made by the CPI 
to po la r ize the forces both within the government and 
Congress Party, s p l i t t i n g them i n t o r ad i ca l and conservative 
wings, and then cooperate with the l e f t wing of the 
Congress Par ty . As a next step the CPI would purge the 
conservatives from the f ront , saying tha t th i s development 
would open the way to the People 's Democracy in I n d i a . 
With th i s broadly defined s t ra tegy the CPI entered 
the second general e lec t ion i n 1957 and i t s e l e c to r a l 
32 
performance was as follows s 
INDEX NO.II 
State ^ l 1 S°M,iBt^r ' *£* *%' Percentage* 
seats by the CPI the CPI ° 
Andhra Pradesh 
Bihar 
Haryana 
Himachal Pradesh 
Karnataka 
Kera la 
Madhya Pradesh 
300 
318 
61 
12 
208 
126 
288 
230 
60 
1 
4 
20 
100 
25 
37 29.5 
7 4.9 
0 ** 
1 8.9 
1 1.9 
60 23.5 
2 1.6 
Continued... 
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Punjab 
Rajasthan 
Tamil Nadu 
Uttar Pradesh 
West Bengal 
86 
176 
205 
430 
<#o^ 
50 
24 
54 
90 
104 
3 
1 
4 
9 
46 
17.7 
3.0 
7.3 
3.8 
18.3 
* Percentage of the t o t a l val id votes in the Sta tes 
polled by the t o t a l p a r t y ' s candidates. 
** Less than 0.5 per cent . 
The CPI l o s t 40 seats i n the Legis la t ive Assembly 
i n Andhra Pradesh, but added 13 in West Bengal. Remarkable 
success was a t ta ined i n Kerala, where af ter obtaining 60 
s e a t s , the CPI formed a government under the Chief 
Ministership of E.M.S. Namboodiripad. 
By the Fif th Congress of the CPI, held a t Amritsar 
i n April , 1958, the leadership was confident that the 
parliamentary takeover as in Kerala could be a t ta ined also 
i n other s t a t e s . I t was a t tha t session tha t , for the 
f i r s t time, the pa r ty accepted the perspect ive of a poss ib le 
peaceful t r a n s i t i o n to Communism i n the country. The par ty 
declared tha t a unique s i t ua t ion i n the en t i r e world was 
created where, due to the phenomenal advance of popular forces 
and of the s o c i a l i s t camp, p o s s i b i l i t i e s exis ted for a 
peaceful t r a n s i t i o n to communism. There was no need for 
27 
c i v i l wars or insurgent movements to advance communism i n 
35 
th i s world of the atomic weapons. 
2. Rif ts within the CPI 
(a) Revisionism versus Revolution 
The f i r s t sign of po la r iza t ion i n the leadership of 
the CPI appeared in 1945 when P.C. Josh i , the Secretary 
General of the par ty , pleaded for a new se t of p o l i c i e s . 
He decided tha t the par ty would contest the e lec t ions of 
1945 for the Provincia l Assemblies. This led to fac t iona l 
d i f fe rences . One fact ion j u s t i f i e d Josh i 1 s assessment, 
while another fact ion opposed the e l ec to r a l s t r a t egy . 
Besides tha t , both fact ions had opposite perspect ives for 
achieving power. They were agreed that the Indian parliament 
would be a bourgeois dominated i n s t i t u t i o n . But one held 
that p a r t i c i p a t i o n in this would be useful , whereas the other 
contested i t . The Communist e l ec to ra l f a i lu re i n 1945 
probably enhanced the disenchantment of some of i t s members 
with the parl iamentary process . 
We s h a l l r e c a l l that i t was the time when the Congress 
P a r t y ' s p res t ige was very high, and i t was recognised as the 
major vehicle fif nationalism with a long h i s to ry of 
s t ruggle for the sake of the country 's freedom. The CPI was, 
on the other hand, dubbed as an agent of an external power. 
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The Muslim League simultaneously claimed to be the 
voice of the en t i r e Moslem community of Ind ia . The CPI's 
pos i t ion with regard to the Pakistan question caused i t 
much embarrassment. I t did not support p a r t i t i o n but urged 
a federat ion of n a t i o n a l i t i e s . This was acceptable 
nei ther to the Congress nor to the Muslim League. While 
the Mjslim League denounced Communism, the CPI l o s t support 
i n the n a t i o n a l i s t camp by constantly urging Congress -
34 
Muslim League pac t . 
In that cl imate, B.T. lanadive, G.M. Adhikari and 
Ajoy Ghosh carefu l ly attempted to develop revolut ionary 
po l ic ies for the CPI. But they fa i led due to the lack of 
revolut ionary bases . Indeed, the question needs a t t en t i on : 
tha t while the country was passing through a revolut ionary 
s i t u a t i o n , marked by s t r i k e s and the Royal Indian lavy 
Mutiny, s ide by s ide with the communal r i o t s , why th i s could 
not lead to out r ight revolut ion? In th i s regard we needed 
a deep study to understand the specif ic nature of these 
d is turbances . For ins tance , the communal r i o t s grea t ly 
divided the working people and paved the way for p a r t i t i o n 
and r e l i g ious chauvinism i n the country. The s t r i k e s 
were almost a l l for the economic demands of workers and 
such demands a l so underlay the Royal Indian Navy Mutiny. 
Wider p o l i t i c a l object ives were not involved. 
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Without r e j ec t ing J o s h i ' s hypothesis, B.T. Ranadive, 
A. Ghosh and G.M. Adhikari perceived the solut ion i n the 
Leninist framework of the bourgeoisie parliamentary system. 
According to Fainsod, Lenin said tha t , Bas long as the 
masses had fa i th i n parliament, Communists must engage i n 
parl iamentary a c t i v i t y , not to strengthen the parliamentary 
35 
way, but to des t roy i t t t . By th i s time the two opponents, 
Ajoy Ghosh and G.M. Adhikari, subscribed to Joshi 1 s 
po l i c i e s while B.T. Hanadive could not see eye to eye 
with Jo sh i . 
B.T. Ranadive seemed much impressed with the c a l l of 
A.A. Zhadanov that the Communist pa r t i e s of Asia should 
overthrow the governments of the newly-independent as well 
36 
as no t -ye t - f ree countries through force or armed upr i s ing . 
Thus Ranadive put forward his standpoint by which India was 
f u l f i l l i n g both the c r i t e r i a tha t i t was merely a so-cal led 
independent country. In the l i g h t of this argument he 
believed tha t Br i t i sh domination was replaced by a new 
and far more ef fec t ive neo-colonialism i n the form of 
37 Anglo-American imperialism. He emphasised tha t the 
immediate task for the par ty must be to overthrow the 
Congress government as soon as poss ib le instead of 
accepting the paths earmarked by the Congress t o achieve 
p o l i t i c a l power. 
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Following these r i f t s , the Second Congress of the 
CPI a t Calcutta which met from February 28 to March 6,1948, 
appeared as a batt le-ground for the Joshi group versus the 
Ranadive group on the i s sue as to what s t r a t egy should be 
adopted to achieve p o l i t i c a l power. There were two ways 
for the consideration of the l eadersh ip : i ) the parliamentary 
process , and ( i i ) p ro le t a r i an revolu t ion . Ranadive, who 
led a powerful group within the party, launched a successful 
coup d1 e t a t against Joshi and became the Secretary General 
of the pa r ty . The v ic to ry of Ranadive was the v ic to ry of 
the t a c t i e s of p ro l e t a r i an revolut ion under the leadership 
of the working c l a s s . However, the r o l e of the peasants was 
supposed to be only aux i l i a ry . 
Within a shor t span of time, the Chinese Revolution 
of 1949 ereated confusion among the Indian Communist 
r evo lu t iona r i e s . The Andhra group within the Par ty , led 
by P. Sundarayya and R. Rajeshwar Rao, asserted tha t 
Mao's concept of "New Democracy" should be followed i n 
Ind i a . I t pointed out that "our revolut ion i n many respects 
d i f f e r s from the c l a s s i c a l Russian Revolution and was to 
38 
a great extent s imilar to t ha t of Chinese Revolution*'. 
By th i s time the po la r i za t ion had entered i n t o a more 
c ruc ia l s tage . P.C. Josh i , who had opposed Ranadive's 
pol icy , found himself i n disagreement with the Andhra group. 
Thus, within the par ty three groups had been formed: 
31 
a) Lef t i s t , b) Right i s t and c) Cen t r i s t . In May 1950 
Ranadive was replaced as the Secretary General by 
Rajeshwar Rao. This represented a r e j ec t ion of the 
Russian type revolut ion i n India and acceptance of the 
Maoist revolut ionary s t r a tegy for the CPI. To implement 
the Andhra Thesis, Rao const i tu ted a new Central Committee 
of the par ty consis t ing of nine members of which four 
were to be from Andhra Pradesh. 
Befiore the f i r s t general e lect ions of 1952, the 
c e n t r i s t fact ion was led by Joshi and S.A. Dange. I t 
f e l t tha t conditions in the country were not r i pe for 
launching Maoist revolut ionary s t r a t egy . But the l e f t i s t 
fact ion, led by Rao, was s t i l l defending i t s thes is tha t 
the country was ready for armed upr is ing based upon 
the Chinese revo lu t ion . The c e n t r i s t s a t ta ined a strong 
pos i t ion within the par ty , and replaced Rao by Ajoy Ghosh 
on Ju ly 1, 19&1, as the Secretary General of the par ty . 
The new leader had put forward his observations tha t the 
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country was not yet ready for armed revolut ion and 
emphasised tha t the par ty should wait for the r e s u l t s of 
the f i r s t general e l ec t ions . The argument of Ajoy Ghosh 
became qui te acceptable to the other members of the par ty 
when the par ty appeared as the seeond l a r g e s t par ty in 
40 
Parliament a f t e r e l ec t ions . The p a r t y ' s cadre saw tha t 
the most appropriate road for achieving p o l i t i c a l power 
would be through parliamentary means ra ther than armed 
revolu t ion . 
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The thi rd s tage of evolution of the s t ra tegy of 
CPI sharply in t ens i f i ed shor t ly a f t e r the adjournment of 
the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union, held a t the Kremlin i n February 1956. A d i f f i c u l t y 
was occasioned by the Kremlin l i n e on the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
a peaceful t r ans i t i on to communism i n India and Moscow's 
outlook towards the Nehru government. The Chinese 
delegat ion led by Mao Tse-tung at the Congress had 
disagreed with the Kremlin's assessment and remained 
firm in the view that Nehru was the leader of the Indian 
bourgeois c l a s s . The Chinese saw tha t the transformation 
to socialism or communism i n India would not be poss ib le 
without overthrowing the Nehru government through a 
revolut ionary s t r a t egy . 
As the a f t e r - e f f ec t , however, the l e f t fact ion of 
the par ty was not publ ic ly committed to the Chinese t he s i s , 
but i t stood far from the Kremlin pos i t i on . The argument 
was ra ised by the l e f t fact ion tha t the par ty may have 
chosen the road to communism through the parl iamentary 
process of the cons t i tu t iona l changes, but s ide by s ide 
the revolut ionary forces must be ready to launch a 
41 
revolut ion i f the ru l ing c lasses r e s i s t ed such ehange. 
I t was the time when the second general e lect ions 
were near, as they were to be held in 1957. The leadership 
of the par ty launched an e lec t ion campaign i n a l l i ance 
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with other l e f t i s t forces . As a r e s u l t of th i s the par ty 
gained a dramatie v ic to ry i n the Kerala State and formed 
a coa l i t ion government led by the CPI. The following index 
42 
shows the par ty pos i t ion at the d i s t r i c t l eve l i n Kerala . 
INDEX No. I l l 
D i s t r i c t s 
Alleppey 
Cannanor e 
Ernakulum 
Kottayam 
Kozhikode 
Malabar 
Palghat 
Qui Ion 
Travanc ore-Cochin 
Trichur 
Contested 
by the CPI 
13 
10 
12 
8 
12 
46 
14 
13 
64 
8 
Won 
9 
7 
4 
3 
3 
12 
10 
10 
*M*j 
6 
Percentage* 
43.0 
42.7 
37.9 
29.2 
17.1 
36.1 
40.8 
41.2 
37.8 
32 • ! 
* Percentage of the t o t a l va l id votes in the S ta te 
polled by the p a r t y ' s candidates. 
Despite the p a r t y ' s e l ec to r a l v ic to ry i n Kerala, 
the l e f t fact ion within the CPI continued to oppose the 
idea that i n India peaceful t r ans i t i on to communism 
would be pos s ib l e . Ultimately, the conviction of the 
l e f t i s t s became qui te firm when the Central Government 
34 
imposed P res iden t ' s Rule over the State and dissolved 
the Assembly on Ju ly 31, 1959. The reac t ion of the 
l e f t i s t s was published in a Communist journa l s t a t i ng tha t , 
" th is government cannot be removed by parliamentary methods. 
43 
Let us follow the teachings of Mao Tse-tung". 
(b) Attack of China noon I n d i a : 1968, 
The border l i n e between India and China became a 
cont rovers ia l i s sue i n the l a t e 1950s. The Chinese 
government had claimed more tban 50,000 square miles of 
I n d i a ' s t e r r i t o r y as a pa r t of China (Map l ) . Somehow, 
u n t i l 1959 the differences between the two neighbouring 
countries cbtfld not be ca r r ied to the b a t t l e f i e l d . 
In 1955 there was a minor r evo l t i n Tibet , engineered 
and led by Khampa tribesmen. The leader of the revo l t 
44 
was the Dalai Lama who v i s i t ed India in 1956-57 and sought 
p o l i t i c a l asylum but eventually preferred to re turn to 
Tibet . After the a r r iva l of Dalai Lama in Tiber the 
45 
r e v o l t became more in t ens i f i ed i n Ju ly 1958. The Chinese 
government suspeeted that the Indian government was 
a s s i s t i ng the rebe l l ious Tibetans to keep i t s hold over 
what i t regarded as Chinese t e r r i t o r y . Suddenly, and 
af ter signing the ' l i v e Pr inc ip les of Coexistence, 
Cbou I n - l a i put forth his country 's claim to about 50,000 
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square miles of t e r r i t o r y i n India*s possession. 
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The f i r s t serious clash between the two countr ies 
occurred on October 20-21, 1959. The Chinese pa t ro l l i ng 
so ld ie r s penetra t ing i n t o the Indian t e r r i t o r y cal led 
Chang Chemo Talley i n southern pa r t of Ladakh. In th is 
c lash nine Indian pol ice personnel were k i l l ed and ten 
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were captured by the Chinese. 
The Indian Communists were now divided i n t o two 
schools of thought, one led by Ghosh, j u s t i fy ing the 
Indian government's standpoint and the second led by 
R. Rammurti, A.K. Gopalan and I.M.S. Namboodiripad, 
declar ing tha t any Indian "aggression" would be opposed by 
48 
the par ty , should i t take p lace . A s ign i f ican t statement 
came from S.A. Dange in the session of the Lok Sabha (Lower 
House) on October 24, 1959 who said , "I want to t e l l my 
Communist Par ty fr iends in China tha t you are pursuing a 
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wrong l i n e and must rev i se i t " . The d i sun i ty within the 
CPI was exposed by him in these words, "I do not want 
to conceal the fac t tha t I d i f fe r from any par ty on t h i s 
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i s s u e " . 
During th i s period the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union supported India and on October 31, 1959, 
Kbruschev suggested that China should be generous in 
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s e t t l i n g her d ispute with Ind ia . Following the comments 
of the CPSU, the CPI ealled i t s session a t Meerut on 
36 
November 14, 1959 and adopted a pro-government r e so lu t ion , 
which was in support of the Indian governments* stand towards 
the Chinese government. The leadership i m p l i c i t l y accused 
the Chinese of aggression and said tha t the " t r ad i t iona l 
border" i n Ladakh should be accepted by China and the area 
of the MacMahan Line i s now a p a r t of India and should remain 
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i n I n d i a . This pos i t ion was not the unanimous view of a l l 
the Communists p resen t . Moreover, the West Bengal Party un i t 
brought serious charges against the leadership , pointed out 
flaws and vetoed the reso lu t ion presented by the Central 
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Party leadersh ip . 
In the Sixth Par ty Gongress, held a t fijayawada on 
April 16, 1961, the leaders de l ibe ra t e ly ignored the 
cont rovers ia l Sino-Indian border i s s u e . Though the l e f t i s t s 
agreed with the approach of the par ty to conc i l i a t e a l l 
the opponents .within the par ty , a la rge number did not 
appreciate i t . Z.A. Ahmad, a member of the CPI's P o l i t i c a l 
Bureau said i n a statement on Ju ly 20, 1962, " . . . the CPI 
was not i n favour of describing the Chinese incursion i n t o 
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Indian t e r r i t o r y as aggression". 
I t was much l a t e r , on November 1, 1962, that the 
National Council of the Party severely condemned the 
Chinese aggression. While the reso lu t ion was passed by an 
overwhelming majority, a group disagreed, and i t s three 
leading l e f t i s t s , Jyot i Basu, P. Sundarayya and H.K.S.Sur j e e t 
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resigned from the Central Sec re t a r i a t . 
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In mid-November 1962, the Government of India 
began a s e l ec t i ve crackdown on the CPI lef t -wing, a r res t ing 
over 957 top and middle cadres of the Party i n almost 
a l l the s t a t e s by January 10, 1963. Signif icant ly , 
Namboodiripad, who was taken i n t o custody on November 22,1962, 
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was released one week l a t e r . By mid-December 1962, there 
were ind ica t ions that the CPI front organizations had for 
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the most pa r t e i t he r declined or disappeared. From 
December 9, 1962, to January 6, 1963, Dange went abroad 
on an "explaining mission" in which he v i s i t e d both Moscow 
and London. Reportedly, i n Moseow, Khruschev s t rongly 
c r i t i c i s e d Dange for f a l l i ng "easy victim to the chauvinism 
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of the reac t ionary forces" . 
I t i s a t th i s juncture , ear ly 1963, tha t a r ad ica l 
transformation took place within the Par ty . In the wake 
of the Chinese invasion, the West Bengal un i t had been 
se r ious ly affected by the l a rge - sca le a r r e s t s of i t s members. 
The Central Sec re ta r i a t , therefore , took steps to c rea te a 
Provincial Organization Committee which superseded the formal 
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State Party u n i t . 
On March 9, 1963, the Chinese Communist Party 
unleashed i t s s t rongest at tack up to that point on the CPI. 
I t published four e d i t o r i a l s i n People 's Daily e n t i t l e d 
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"A Mirror for Rev i s ion i s t s " . 
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I t spec i f i c a l l y charged Dange with : ( l ) replacing 
the theory of the class s t ruggle by the slogan of c lass 
collaborationismf (2) replacing p ro le t a r i an socialism 
by bourgeois social ism; <3) defending the d ic t a to r sh ip 
of the bourgeoisie and the landlords ; (4) giving unconditional 
support to the Nehru government i n i t s po l i c i e s of hir ing 
i t s e l f to United Nations imperialism; and (5) of trampling 
underfoot the friendship of the Chinese and Indian people 
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and act ing as buglers for Nehru's anti-China campaign. 
3 . The Spl i t Within the CPI : 1964 
The res ignat ion of the three most important l e f t i s t 
l eaders , Jyo t i Basu, P. Sundarayya and H.K.S. Surjeet 
was the f i r s t demonstration against the r e v i s i o n i s t and 
anti-Chinese po l i c i e s of the CPI. However, the s p l i t 
was not completed ye t . I t was a c lear ind ica t ion for the 
pa r ty leadership that the s p l i t would take place i f the 
par ty would not abandon the way i t was fol loMng — i t s 
pro-Kremlin and pro-Nehru government p o l i c i e s . 
The death of the Secretary General of the Party, 
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Ajoy Ghosh, on January 13, 1962 added one more controversial 
i s s u e to the problem of par ty uni ty . There was an 
apparent competition among three groups: the r i g h t i s t , 
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the l e f t i s t and the c e n t r i s t , each of them was trying to 
es tab l i sh i t s bold over the par ty for the Implementation 
of i t s p o l i c i e s and s t r a t e g i e s . The controversy reached 
i t s climax regarding organisat ional matters when the 
National Council ca l led i t s session on April 29, 1962. 
I t had amended the p a r t y ' s cons t i tu t ion to the effect that 
there would be a pa r ty Chairman and a Secretary General 
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instead of the Secretary General as the ease was before. 
S.A. Dange, a r i g h t i s t t rade unionis t leader , became 
the Chairman while the post of the Secretary General went 
to S.M.S. Namboodiripad, a c e n t r i s t leader of the pa r ty . 
He a l so took charge of the Communist Par ty organ, the 
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New AgeT as the Chief Edi tor . But soon, af ter having two 
important pos t s , he could not agree with Dange's r i g h t i s t 
po l i c i e s and resigned from both pos t s , while r e t a in ing his 
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membership i n the Central Executive Committee of the par ty . 
The post of Secretary General remained vaeant and the 
pa r ty moved towards a r i g h t i s t path under the Chairmanship 
of Dange. 
For the l e f t i s t s and for a number of the c e n t r i s t s 
there was no a l t e r n a t i v e except the removal of Dange from 
his o f f ice . On April 11, 1964, when the National Council 
ca l led i t s session a t Delhi, the opponents made every ef for t 
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to expel Dange from his o f f i c e . Ahtough the i ssue of Dange's 
l e t t e r s was the second number on the agenda, the opposite 
group i n s i s t e d tha t i t should be discussed p r io r to other 
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I s s u e s . Those l e t t e r s which were to be discussed were 
wr i t ten by Dange a long time ago in 1920s when he was 
i n pr ison under the Kanpur Conspiracy for attempting to 
overthrow the Br i t i sh and to es tab l i sh a communist 
government in the country. Dange assured the Br i t i sh 
a u t h o r i t i e s that he would be loya l to the government i n 
ease he was released from j a i l . 
The Current weeftly of Bombay published the l e t t e r s , 
which were preserved i n the National Archives of Delhi, 
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i n March 1964. The anti-Dange group branded Dange a 
t r a i t o r . However, though the i s sue did not receive p r i o r i t y 
for discussion, the opposite group not only demanded that 
i t should be taken i n the f i r s t place but also demanded 
tha t before going i n t o d e t a i l s Dange should vacate the 
Chair. Dange out r ight re jec ted both the demands. As a 
p r o t e s t , t h i r t y two members of the pa r ty under the leadership 
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of Namboodiripad walked out from the par ty meeting. 
Discipl inary act ion was taken by the National Council against 
them, by which seven members were expelled while twenty f ive 
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were suspended from the par ty on Aparf.1 14, 1964. 
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The d issen ters called t he i r f i r s t session a t Tenali 
from July 7 to 11, 1964 and Jyot i Basu, on behalf of 
other members, declared that "We are the Communist Party 
of India - We do not recognise Dange's group as the Communist 
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Party of Ind ia . We are out of i t " . He a lso announced 
that the next session of the par ty would be held a t Calcutta 
on October 31, 1964. Now the s p l i t had been completed and 
a new Communist Party emerged i n India , which was named 
••the Communist Party of India (Marxist)- CPI(M(n. 
4 . Formation of the CPI(M) i n West Bengal 
This topic of discussion ne^ds a br ief h i s t o r i c a l 
background of the Communist movement i n West Bengal, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the post-independence per iod. 
I t w i l l be reca l led that i n 1947 the Secretary General 
of tbe par ty surrendered to tbe Nehru government and made an 
appeal i n favour of evolving a par ty l i n e based upon an 
a l l i ance with the "progressive elements" of the Congress 
Par ty . Strong opposition to th i s came out from the West 
Bengal par ty un i t i n the form of a r e so lu t ion . The West 
Bengal Communists declared tha t the un i t would not follow 
the i n s t ruc t i ons of the Central leadership and would 
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r e - e s t a b l i s h l inks with people to f igh t the Nehru government. 
They had c i rcu la ted a pamphlet i n which they bad ins t ruc ted 
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the Communists of tbe Sta te to "turn your guns and bayonets 
on the Congress Fa sc i s t s , a r r e s t the hated o f f ice rs , se t f i r e 
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to the whole of Calcutta and the whole of Bengal". 
As we have noted i n previous pages, a f ter a couple of 
years the leadership of the par ty decided tha t the CPI would 
contes t tbe general e lec t ions of 1952. This sof t s t ra tegy was 
a chal lenge for the Communists of West Bengal who put forward 
a view that t he i r par ty would not engage i n the e l ec to ra l 
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p o l i t i c s . While on th i s i s sue they eould not secure strong 
support, never the less , t he i r pa r ty won a t o t a l of 38 seats in 
tbe l e g i s l a t i v e assembly i n West Bengal, which made i t the 
second l a r g e s t pa r ty . The following index ind ica te s d i s t r i c t -
n i se pos i t ion of the par ty in West Bengal* 
INORX No* i f 
Ms t r i e t Contested Won Percentage 
Bankura 
Birbhum 
Burdwan 
Ca lcu t t a 
Cooch Behar 
Dar j ee l ing 
Hoogly 
Howrah 
J a l p a i g u r i 
Midnapur 
Murshidabad 
7 
4 
5 
9 
2 
. 4 
7 
6 
2 
15 
1 
2 
0 
2 
4 
0 
1 
4 
2 
0 
6 
1 
10.8 
8 .2 
8 .4 
12 .1 
7 .1 
22«6 
1 7 . 1 
8 .3 
5 . 1 
12.9 
0 ,5 
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Nadia 
Maid a 
24 Pargana 
P u r u l i a 
West Dinajpur 
1 
3 
19 
2 
1 
0 
1 
8 
2 
0 
2.9 
X^* • O 
14.6 
2.7 
O # *£ 
* Percentage of the t o t a l va l id votes i n tbe West Bengal 
polled by the p a r t y ' s candidates . 
The r e s u l t s of the e lect ions discredi ted the po l ic ies 
of the extremists of West Bengal and diminished the i r appeal 
for revolut ionary a c t i v i t i e s . 
The 3ino-India border clash of 1959 became the source 
of confusion among the Communists, p a r t i c u l a r l y when the 
Soviet Union gave i t s support to the Indian stand point against 
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a communist country. The conviction of Ghosh that a communist 
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country l i k e China could not commit an aggression was 
weakening in i t s v a l i d i t y and by th i s support eventually, he 
diverged from his previous thes is and demanded tha t the 
Chinese should put an end to aggressive a c t i v i t i e s and 
ineurs ive a t t i t u d e towards Ind ia . The Communists of West 
Bengal branded the statement of Ghosh as represent ing the 
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sentiments of only a sect ion of the par ty . 
In addi t ion, i n September 1960 the Central Executive 
Committee of the CPI, in i t s reso lu t ion without mentioning 
China by name, took the s ide of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union. The strong minority group attempted to r e fu te 
the reso lu t ion on the ground that i t did not represent tbe 
4A 
unanimous view of the committee members. However, the 
d i s s iden t grcxip fa i led to do what i t ac tua l ly wished. After 
unsuccessful attempts i t s members ca l led a meeting of the West 
Bengal Unit on October 21, I960, i n which they not only 
demonstrated antagonism against the cen t r a l leadership of the 
party but they a l so put forward the p r o t e s t reso lu t ion which 
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was then published in the Chinese p r e s s . 
The gulf between the cen t ra l leadership and the West 
Bengal S ta te Par ty Unit became widest i n 1960 when one of 
i t s members, Hare Krishna Konar, without the p r io r permission 
of the Central Executive Committee, v i s i t e d China. The 
Central Executive Committee asked him to explain why 
d i s c i p l i n a r y action should not be taken against him. A reply 
to th i s not ice came from the par ty un i t tha t i f any action 
was taken against him, i t would be understood to be a 
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censure of the en t i r e West Bengal State Unit of the pa r ty . 
Consequently, the cen t ra l leadership would not censure him. 
Now the time had arr ived when the i s sue of the 
"Dange* s l e t t e r s " was expected to be discussed i n the Cpi !s 
National Council on April 11, 1964, where Dange refused to 
accept the demands of the par ty members. As a r e s u l t the 
par ty un i t of West Bengal adopted a rebe l l ious a t t i t u d e 
towards him, and, Promode Das Gupta, Secretary of the West 
Bengal Unit, declared that whis organizat ion" owed no 
a l legiance to the 'rump' National Council and refused to 
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recognise Dange's leadefship . 
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After t h i s statement the cen t r a l leadership of the 
CPI sent Bhawani Sen Gupta to Calcutta i n order to find 
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a so lu t ion , but he could not make any progress . This 
inc iden t led the cent ra l leadership to take act ion as the 
l a s t r e s o r t and, eventually, the West Bengal Unit was 
suspended by tbe Central Executive Committee. A new 
Secre ta r i a t was establ ished under the Secretaryship of 
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Bhawani Sen Gupta. 
I t was a t a conference of delegates of the CPI(M) 
a t Calcutta on October 31, 1964 that the pa r ty elected a 
Presidium of three members cons is t ing of Jyo t i Basu, 
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A.K. Gopalan and T. Naggi Reddy, and declared tha t the 
meeting i n fac t represented the Seventh Congress of the 
r e a l Communist Par ty of Ind ia . Thus the s p l i t within the 
Communist Movement i n India was completed and the CPI(M) 
was formally launched. 
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Chapter II 
THE NAXAUTE MOVEMENT 
1. Origin 
a. Geographical area 
The Naxali te ffovesaent in West Bengal was launched 
fro© a s t r a t e g i c a l l y located t e r r i t o r y cal led 'Naxalbari% 
1 
a sob-division of Barjeeling Dis t r ic t* This northern 
port ion of State of West Bengal i s s i tua ted some 50 to 50 
miles from 1ikkimf Tibet and Bhutan in the North, from 
l e p a l in the West and from Bangla Besh in th* East* Before 
1971, l a s t Pakistan (now Bangla Desh) was the eastern mug 
of Pakistan and, obviously! i t was governed by Islamabad 
u n t i l i t achieved independence^ 
The s t r a t e g i c s ignif icance of Haxalbari area of about 
100 square miles l i e s in the fact tha t i t i s precise ly 
located at the point of Ind i a f s narrowest corr idor , 15 to 14 
miles mde which connects the main portion of lndia*s land 
mas«5 with i t s nor th-eastern states and t e r r i t o r i e s of %«?amf 
North-'Sast f ront ie r Agency (NEFO, Nagaland, Manipor and 
Tripora. 
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There i s suff ic ient evidence to es tab l i sh the fact 
that t h i s area had a t t rac ted the a t t en t ion of external 
powers and adjoining s t a t e s who wished to c rea te d i f f i cu l t i e s 
for India ex terna l ly as well as i n t e r n a l l y . 
Me sha l l take up, in the f i r s t instance^ the ro le of 
Pakistan government in encouraging tbe Maoist revolut ionary 
s t ra tegy in West Bengal. We can understand the in ten t ions 
and motives of the government of Pakistan by v i sua l i s ing the 
war s t ra tegy of 1965. This area was s t r a t e g i c a l l y and geo-
p o l i t i c a l l y so important that i t became a par t and parcel 
of Pakistan's war plans in 1965. The plans of this government 
were tha t should Indian forces at tack on the western border 
of Pakistan she would open a b a t t l e front on the eastern 
border. In the eastern s ide two p o s s i b i l i t i e s were expected 
by these mi l i t a ry s t ra tegy makers. F i r s t l y , the Pakistan 
forces would be in an easy posi t ion to receive Chinese aid 
against India , and secondly* the Pakistanis would be able to 
cut the Indian t e r r i t o r y i n t o two par ts at the narrowest 
corr idor exactly in the Iaxalbar i area* The leaders of Pakistan 
were sure that these developments would open the bargaining 
talks between the two countries on several i s sues , including 
2 
the Kashmir issue* 
4lthough these plans of Pakistan did not mate r i a l i se 
due t o the differences of opinion and controversy between 
President Ayuub Khan and his Foreign Minister, Zulfiqar Alt 
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Bhutto, the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of executing th i s plan of Pakistan 
against India did not rewain remote* The Moslem ideo log ica l ly 
oriented s t a t e made every possible ef for t to find out weak 
points in l n d i a f s defences* In view of t h i s , i t began to 
support and continued helping Naga and Figo rebe l l ions in 
Assam and Uagaland, and shor t ly thereafter in West Bengal* 
The support of Pakistan, a Moslem 1ta te , for the communist 
movement was surpr is ing because while the Chinese theories 
were a twinkling and guiding s t a r , their implementation was 
coming in West Bengal through the Extremists of the East 
Pakistan and lepal* Though the l a x a l i t e armed agrarian revolution 
was launched in the f i r s t week of March 1967, some clues i nd i ca t e 
that i t was in fac t developing as early as 1965. However, i t 
would not be wrong t o say that while the revolut ionary l a x a l i t e 
movement in the Iaxalbar i ar^a became c l e a r l y v i s i b l e only %n 
1967, as a rad ica l ideology i t had had a long h is tory , 
While dealing with the h i s t o r i c a l aspect of the movement 
we have to remember tha t ear ly in 1965 the Indian o f f i c i a l s 
seized Indian currency of more than Hs^ l , 000 .00 at the 
Raxaul check post fro© a Tibetan which was intended to 
4 
a s s i s t the extremists in !*fest Bengal* But this was not the 
l a s t case, on grounds of so l id evidence, that the Indian 
In te l l igence Bureau informed the Indian government that the 
extremists in West Bengal were being guided by the Chinese 
fro© the t e r r i t o r y of l epa l and had been provided with arms 
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manufacturing f a c i l i t i e s there- Because of t h i s , the Indian 
government took precautions and firm measures a l l along the 
f ront iers* 
I t -was on March 50, 1966, that the In t e l l i gence 
Bureau provided evidence that l a rge quant i t i es of arms and 
amunitions had been smuggled i n t o West Bengal through the 
6 
t e r r i t o r y of l a s t Pakistan, The Indian government t r i ed to 
solve th is problem on the governmental l eve l through diplomatic 
notes by requesting cooperation, but this did not serve the 
purpose^ Hovever, a reply came on Radio Pakistan in Urdu 
language broadcast on July 2, 1967, which in fact sought to 
encourage the subversive a c t i v i t i e s of the Naxalites by 
saying that wthe time has come ¥hen the Indian people ^ould 
make the i r ru le r s stand in the criminal box and would 
l i b e r a t e themselves from s lavery, The areas in r evo l t had 
7 
separated themselves from the r e s t of Indiafl* In the meantime, 
another report came i n t o possession of the Indian government 
that the Naxalites bad established strong contacts with the 
Maoists In l e p a l . Consequently, Nev Delhi informed the 
government of l epa l that the l a x a l i t e s were u t i l i z i n g the 
pr iv i leges concerning the crossing of the common border In order 
to smuggle arms i n t o West Bengal through Nepal's border^ The 
Nepalese government, as a r e s u l t , directed i t s d i s t r i c t 
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o f f i c i a l s to prevent any movement of i l l i c i t arms across 
8 
i n t o India- I t i s , however, doubtful whether these 
p ro tes t s and precautions intended to put a check and 
r e s t r i c t such movements, had any tangible r e s u l t s . Thus 
the external and i n t e r n a l extremists continued to have 
frequent contacts to the detriment of India 1 s secur i ty , 
Ineffect iveness of Indian measures can be judged by th i s 
cases When Ranu lanyal was ¥snted by the West Bengal 
pol ice on charges of having taken pa r t in the Naxalbari 
Uprising in 1969, he escaped from West Bengal and was 
9 
given refuge in Jhapa by the Nepali Maoists, a place 
s i tuated beyond the Indo-Nepali border* 
&• Reasons for the emergence 
CD Tribal unrest 
The t r i b a l people, pa r t i cu l a r ly In the Naxalbari 
area, and general ly in West Bengal have been engaged in 
using unsc ien t i f i c methods of cu l t iva t ion technical ly known 
as "shifting cul t ivat ion1 1 . Under th i s system ¥hen a piece 
of land i s se lec ted , tbe t rees or bushes are cut dovn to 
a ce r t a in extent , allowed to dry and then set on fire# Tn 
the area which i s thus cleared seeds are sown in l i t t l e holes 
dug in the ground, or they are scattered^ No plough i s used 
10 
and no animals are employed* All Is done by human labour. 
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These pr imit ive methods of cu l t iva t ion have l e f t the 
t r i b a l s economically far behind in comparison with other 
peasants of West Bengal. Day by day the gap was becoming 
wider and wider, causing f rus t ra t ion among the backward 
t r i b a l people* The only method to achieve be t t e r prosoeets 
in l i f e was to ¥eicome Maoist revolut ion under the leadership 
of r ad ica l Communists, who promised prosper i ty and j u s t i c e . 
I t was in 1949 that the Communists focused the i r 
a t ten t ion in a l a rge measure on these disgruntled t r i b a l 
people^ They goaded the t r i b a l s to take an ac t ive part and 
play an effect ive ro le in building op a glorious future 
for themselves by eliminating economic d i s p a r i t y . The 
extremists emphasised the creat ion of a mi l i t an t force to 
curb the au thor i ty and reduce the i l l - g o t t e n gains of the 
landlords . The t r i b a l s were urged to take par t in the 
revolut ionary dr ive against the landlords in West Bengal* 
Needless to say, the f rus t r a t ion among the t r i b a l 
people came to the fore in West Bengal when a la rge number 
of t r i b a l s became the followers of the extremists on the 
assumption tha t the l i n e adopted by the r ad ica l s was the 
only cure for the i r economic maladies* The t r i b a l s and 
other backward people s ta r ted launching violent at tacks on 
landlords i n order to se ize stocks of food grains and 
governments warehouses in the 'State. 
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The Congress government had never been unconscious 
about the p o l i t i c a l developments in the State* The government 
enacted land reform l e g i s l a t i o n In order to improve the 
conditions of the weaker sections and provide proper 
opportuni t ies to the backward t r i b a l s who were ba t t l i ng 
with untold misery. The West Bengal Es ta te Acquisition Act 
12 
of 1954 i s one such example. Through th i s l e g i s l a t i o n the 
tea planting lands were exempted from the ce i l i ng of 25 acres* 
The main occupation of t r i b e s , p rec i se ly in Terai area, had been 
the tea growing p lan ta t ion . However, while the government 
was Implementing i t , the Communists branded i t a pro-landlord 
l e g i s l a t i o n which would not be helpful to the t r i b a l people* 
The people whose condition i t sought to improve would remain 
In the same condition as had existed bpfore the enactment 
of t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n . The na t iona l i sa t ion of fores ts in the 
State l e f t the t r i b a l s with very nominal p r iv i l eges , and 
meagre resources, and r e s t r i c t e d their r ight to co l l ec t 
forest produce as well as to c u l t i v a t e land without obtaining 
pr ior sanction of the government, In these circumstances, 
the fa i th of these t r i b a l s in the government was constantly 
on the decl ine , while at the same time the Communists were 
15 
s t ead i ly penet ra t ing in to the fold of t r i b a l s . 
Meanwhile, the in tens ive efforts of the rad ica l 
Communists bore f ru i t and the t r i b a l people became 
63 
increas ingly more conscious of the i r need to asse r t 
their p r iv i l eges and r i g h t s . I t was in the year 1959 
tha t the landlords contemplated tha t i t would be an 
appropriate time to design defensive t a c t i c s i n order to 
do away with the h o s t i l i t y of the t r i b e s . They found out 
one solut ion to water down the i n t e n s i t y of t r i b a l demands. 
They began to evic t them from the lands, which were 
a l l o t t e d to t r i be s and peasants as "Bakhshish Khet". for 
pr iva te use of the workers on p lan ta t ions in reward for 
se rv ices - I t was qui te c lear that the evict ion would crea te 
open conf l i c t s between the landlords and the tr ifeals . 
Once again, the government t r ied to play the r o l e of 
a mediator i n the conf l ic t s of landlords and the t r ibes and 
to give a concrete programme of ass i s tance to the l a t t e r . 
When the government o f f i c i a l s in t e r fe red in the a f fa i r s of 
the landlords and the t r i b e s , they discovered that the land 
records were not properly maintained by the landlords . The 
most s t r i k i ng feature was tha t the t r i b e s were not aware of 
14 
the i n t r i c a c i e s and implicat ions If land l e g i s l a t i o n . 
Coming back to our i n i t i a l d iscussion, the government 
o f f i c i a l s also noted t ha t the t r ibes were under heavy 
burden of debt borrowed from the landlords a t e x o r b i t a n t 
r a t e s of i n t e r e s t , which i t wasbeyond the capaci ty of the 
poverty s t r iken people to pay back. The landlords a lso 
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refused t o ' r e t u r n mortgaged land a f te r the expiry of a 
s t ipu la ted period, which meant untold hardship for the 
poor people* p a r t i c u l a r l y the t r i b a l s * While the e n t i r e 
peasantry was groaning under tbe burden of th^se hardships, 
the t r i b a l people and the landless labourers rea l i sed the 
need for launching a land-grab movement i n the Iaxalbar i 
area which eventually spread to other par ts of the State 
l i k e wild f i re* 
Cii) Quest for land 
The immediate concern of tbe government wis to solve 
the exis t ing problems which were the main source of mounting 
unres t in t h i s region* Consequently, the West Bengal 
government t o * urgent steps to adopt measures for the 
betterment of the economic conditions in these areas• The 
government took s t r ingent measures to take over e^ce^sive 
lands from the landlords ten the recommendation of the Tea 
Advisory Board of 1964. i s has been pointed out i n the 
preceding pages, the landlords were not prepared to r e l i s h 
tbe idea of land reform l e g i s l a t i o n in respect of their 
lands* Instead of welcoming the ce i l i ng laws they were 
engaged in safeguarding their own i n t e r e s t by c i re invent ing 
and s ide tracking the provisions of tbe law* They considered 
I D 
Benaai transactions to be one way of solving their problems. 
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(Benami t ransact ions meant the i l l e g a l t ransfer of land 
to r e l a t i v e s to escape the 25 acres ce i l ing imposed upon 
the ownership of l and) . Thus the Krishik Saul tee (Peasants 
Organisation of the Communist Party) which was busy a l l the 
time in organising poor peasants, ag r i cu l tu ra l labourers and 
16 
t r i b a l s against the exploit ing landlords s ince 1951, considered 
the year 196? to be a su i t ab l e time for launching fu l l scale 
17 
Moist revolut ionary movement. A massive campaign for occupying 
lands was s t a r t ed by the Krishik Samitee. In the beginning , 
the land grab movement did not pose any danger to the l i ves 
of the landlords . Though forc ib le means were employed by 
the leaders of the land grab movement, they could not go 
beyond ce r t a in l i m i t s . The members of the Samitee began 
making a survey of the lands of those landlords who were 
s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y engaged in indulging in the Benami t ransact ions 
and if they found out such eases they demonstrated in front 
of the i r homes. Up to this s tage such demonstrations were 
peaceful and harmless. Occasionally, however, the members 
of the Samitee used t o se ize stored food grains and, whenever 
they found a piece of land lying vacant they grabbed i t , 
began to plough i t or fel led a few t rees or s i i p l y stuck 
18 
the red f lag i n t o the grabbed land. 
A s ign i f ican t departure from the exis t ing s i t ua t i on 
took place when the Samitee members were demonstrating against 
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the landlords on May 23, 1967, and when a small force 
of twenty constables led oy a Havildar (head of the group) 
arrived at a small populated area of U l l g u r i B i s t r i c t . 
The vanguard of tbe demonstrators consisted of women and 
chi ldren , while the Moist revolu t ionar ies stayed behind. 
The mob s t a r t ed shouting such slogans, as V i c t o r y to tbe 
red f3ig". The po l ice had no orders to open f i r e . 'Snatch 
the guns' came the c a l l from the crowd'. S t i l l the pol ice 
did not open f i r e ; but when an arrow from tbe mob wounded 
19 
the Havildar the pol ice opened f i r e . 
This inc ident provided the best opportunity for the 
Maoist revolu t ionar ies i n West Bengal. They t r i ed to 
convince the people that s ince independence the pol icy of 
the government had been to subserve the i n t e r e s t s of the 
landlords . The recent orders for sending tbe po l ice against 
them were given by the United Front Government, in which 
the por t fo l io of pol ice was held by the UPI(M), who took 
the ul t imate decis ion . This incident compromised the 
pos i t ion of the par ty , and tbe leadership of the CPI(K) 
soon rea l i sed tha t a blunder had been committed by the 
United Front Government, which would have long-range 
repercussions on the uni ty and s o l i d a r i t y of the p a r t y ' s 
cadre . These new developments in the s t a t e created favourable 
circumstances for the Maoists who thrived amon,: the poor 
peasantry. The land se izure dr ive rapid ly spread from one 
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d i s t r i c t to another. A stage had been reached when the 
land grab movement became m i l i t a n t and v io l en t . Up to 1968 
tbe Krishik Samitee was successful i n c rea t ing a force of 
one thousand volunteer auxi l ia ry groups a t the v i l l a g e 
20 
l eve l and each of them consisted of f ive to ten m i l i t a n t s . 
Apparently, the purpose of these groups was to a s s i s t and 
acce le ra te the a c t i v i t i e s of peasants against the landlords . 
Their function was also to watch the a c t i v i t i e s of landlords 
and the behaviour of the po l ice . There was a s i m i l a r i t y 
between the approach and a c t i v i t i e s of these groups and 
those of Moist guer i l l a squads which w i l l be examined i n 
the pages tha t follow. 
As far as the success of the land grab movement was 
concerned, t he Samitee members, i n a shor t period of time 
u n t i l 1969 had grabbed 60,000 acres of land i n Midnapur 
D i s t r i c t , 12,000 acres of land i n Ja lpaigur i H . s t r i c t , 
8,000 acres of land i n Gooch-Behar D i s t r i c t and 8,000 acres 
21 
of land i n Dinajpur D i s t r i c t . 
2 . Programme of the l a x a l i t e s 
(a) Influence of Peking 
Tbe Chinese Communist Party l e f t no one i n doubt 
about i t s a t t i t u d e towards the l a x a l i t e movement. From 1967 
to 1970 a s e r i e s of a r t i c l e s was published in the People 's 
68 
22 
Daily as well as the Peking Review. On July 14, 1967, 
the Peking Review came out with an a r t i c l e en t i t l ed "Spring 
Thunder breaks over India**. In th i s a r t i c l e the Chinese 
severely attacked the CPZ(K). The at tack was also supported 
by broadcasts from Chinese Radio. 
Quite understandably, the Chinese support to t h e i r 
cause made a tremendous impact on the leaders of tbe 
Naxalbari movement. They wese now inc l ined to endorse the 
suggestions in which the Chinese said tha t the revolut ion 
should be r u r a l i n character , with peasants as i t s main 
component; the armed s t ruggle in the country s ide should 
eventually enc i rc le the c i t i e s which would be conducted 
according to the thoughts of Chairman Mao Tse-tung. They 
further s t ressed the need for studying the guidel ines l a id 
down by Mao while de l ibera t ing over the s t ra tegy of armed 
upr is ing and the theory of Revolutionary Base. The Indian 
Mao Tse-tung, Charu Mazumdar, ra i sed the slogan to the 
effect that the "Chinese Chairman i s our Chairman, the 
23 
Chinese Path i s our Path". The Naxali te leadership was 
busy in spreading the Chinese oriented revolut ionary t ac t i c s 
in West Bengal. In India , d i r ec t ives to the l a x a l i t e were 
given by Mazumdar, Mao's thought was published and 
c i rcu la ted by Kanu Sanyal, who was convinced that the masses 
must be motivated for bringing about armed revo lu t ion . 
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Keeping this i n mind, he t rans la ted and published Mao's 
works i n l a rge quant i t ies and d i s t r ibu ted them amongst 
the peoples of West Bengal. Drawing thus upon Mao's theor ies , 
the leaders of the l a x a l i t e movement were laying emphasis 
on the establishment of the revolut ionary bases in the 
country s ide as a f i r s t step to capture p o l i t i c a l power. 
(b) Theory of the Revolutionary Base 
The leaders of the Naxalite Movement f e l t tha t the 
pockets of armed r e s i s t ance must be establ ished i n the 
country s ide , because some 70 to 80 per cent of the people 
had been l i v i n g the re . The c red i t for such a s t ra tegy 
goes t o Mao's teachings, and to the Chinese mass media which 
seemed to function cease less ly to bring about a new zes t 
among the r ad ica l s of West Bengal. I t has been observed 
i n the foregoing pages that while the Chinese were pleading 
the urgency of the establishment of tbe revolut ionary 
bases i n the country s ide , the Naxalites did not make any 
delay i n carrying out these d i rec t ives and es tabl i sh ing 
such bases . From these revolut ionary bases they would be 
s t r a t e g i c a l l y i n a pos i t ion to launch f ron ta l a t tacks on 
the enemies of the peasantry and the backward c l a s s e s . They 
would be thus deal ing with c l a s s enemies, i . e . , the pol ice 
and i t s informers, the landlords and money lenders who 
were considered the arch enemies of the people by the 
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Naxal i tes . These revolut ionary bases would be e n t i r e l y 
under the control of tbe peasants , where these Raxali tes 
would be having greater freedom and be t te r opportunit ies 
of meeting together, uoobserved by the po l i ce and the i r 
stooges, and s t r i k ing at the opportune moments. This 
s t ra tegy was t r ied out with success in China i t s e l f from 
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1920 onwards. Having a complete possession of the 
revolut ionary bases, the Haxalites would be launching 
at tacks on la rge v i l lages and, eventually, guer i l l a at tacks 
uoon c i t i e s . The encirclement of and entry in to the c i t i e s 
would i n i t s e l f mean a great v ic tory of nationwide importance. 
I t was obvious that the appl icat ion of tbe theory 
of Revolutionary Areas met with a limited success within 
some areas . However, i t was qu i te c lear that c e r t a in 
areas de f in i t e l y came under the control of the Haxal i tes , 
and s t a r t ed to function as "l iberated a reas" . They did not 
allow the pol ice or other government o f f i c i a l s to enter 
these " l ibera ted a reas" . They had the i r own armed squads 
which control led the administrat ion, schools and other 
public a c t i v i t i e s in these l o c a l i t i e s , and People 's Courts 
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were administering j u s t i c e . In the l ibe ra t ed areas , i t 
was the usual p r ac t i c e tha t Naxalites used t o come to tbe 
houses of t he i r c l ass enemies and take them to unknown open 
f i e l d s . Here the Haxalites assembled as a People 's Court, 
brought charges against tbe kidnapped persons and when these 
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so cal led crimes were 'proved* these 'enemies' were 
slaughtered i n fu l l public view. The next day the 6ead 
of the slaughtered person was hung at a market or other 
crowded place as a warning to other members of the c lass 
enemy. These methods of taking decisions and these ru th less 
p r a c t i c e s , became the main cause of the i r unpopulari ty 
and led t o the u l t imate f a i l u r e of the movement, i n addition 
to their ine f fec t ive s t r a t egy . 
(c) Strategy of the Armed Uprising 
Charu Mazumdar, who had assued the r o l e of Indian 
Mao Tse-tung in the eyes of the Haxali tes , formulated the 
Strategy of the Armed Uprising i n an i ssue of l i be r a t i on . 
This s t ra tegy consisted of the following elementst 
1. Complete secrecy must be observed i n forming 
a gue r i l l a u n i t . Mo inkl ing of such an a c t i v i t y should 
be revealed even in the par ty meetings. The cooperation 
should be between individuals on a person to person b a s i s . 
2 . The g u e r i l l a un i t s must be small, wel l -kni t and 
mobile cons is t ing of about seven members capable of 
destroying the enemy by a sudden at tack with t r a d i t i o n a l 
weapons. 
3 . I t i s necessary to keep every uni t under a 
Commander. 
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4 . We should arouse the hatred of the majority 
of the loca l peasants against a pa r t i cu la r c lass enemy 
marked out by u s . 
5 . Guided by the wi l l of tbe majority of our people 
we should launch an attack on our enemy at best su i t ab le 
time and p lace . 
6. Special care should be taken in making arrangements 
for safe she l t e r of the g u e r i l l a u n i t s . Tbe^e she l t e r s 
should be separated and located in d i f ferent v i l l ages far 
removed from the place of ac t ion . 
7 . Hames of the gue r i l l a , i d e n t i t y of a pa r t i cu l a r 
c l a s s enemy or the place of act ion should be kept s t r i c t l y 
s e c r e t . 
8 . Gueri l las must r e ly on t r a d i t i o n a l weapons such as 
choppers, spears , s t i c k s , s t i c k l e s , e t c . Improved weapons 
snatched from the enemy should be kept i n reserve for future 
use only when tbe quant i ty of such weapons i s su f f i c i en t . 
9 . The gue r i l l a un i t s must come from di f ferent 
d i r ec t ions pretending, as far as poss ib le , to be innocent 
persons and gather a t a previously appointed place, wait 
for tbe enemy and make a decis ive at tack when the r i g h t 
moment comes. 
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10. After the at tack i s launched the guer i l l as must 
be ordered to d i sperse , go to the i r r espec t ive she l t e r s and 
every clue must be destroyed. 
11 . The gue r i l l a un i t s must be v i s i t ed frequently, 
regu la r ly and in a secre t way in order to keep up the 
morale of the f i gh t e r s . 
12. Guided by the advice of tbe masses and relying on 
the Information provided by them, guer i l l a tropps must work 
out plans for fur ther act ion aimed a t the annihi la t ion of 
the enemy. 
The aim of th i s l a x a l i t e s t ra tegy was the annihi la t ion 
of the landlords , money lenders , pol ice and i t s informers 
and those who would be preventing Haxalites from establ ishing 
a stronghold of peasants in the v i l l a g e s | u l t imate ly , th i s 
s t r a tegy would lead to the capture of p o l i t i c a l power in 
the c i t i e s . 
I t was qu i te evident that i n the i n i t i a l stages 
l a x a l i t e achievements were remarkable.The c las s enemies of 
the Kaxalites were feeling insecure and the landlords , money 
lenders and other suspected persons l e f t the v i l l ages for 
29 
fear of murder. Those who remained in the Maxalite dominated 
areas and revolut ionary bases apparently, gave f u l l 
cooperation to the Kaxalites under compulsion.But before long 
the v i c to r i e s of the Haxalites were on the decline.The reason 
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for th is setback was tbe lack of an ana ly t i ca l approach 
and i t s co r rec t appl ica t ion . In other words, they could 
not apply the i r s t ra tegy at the proper time and against the 
r i g h t persons who were the r e a l c lass enemies of the 
Haxal i tes . They soon became divided5 contradic tory opinions 
were expressed as to who were to be considered as the 
c lass enemies. This problem became p a r t i c u l a r l y apparent 
during the period in which they launched a t tacks on pol ice 
o f f i c i a l s i n order t o ann ih i la te them, because of most of 
those who were k i l l e d belonged to lower ranks, l i k e Constables. 
The officers belonging to higher ranks who gave d i rec t ions 
to the lower personnel were spared or were beyond their 
reach . Another draw back of the s t ra tegy was that i t affected 
a l l those persons who refused to give the demanded money 
I r r e spec t i ve of the fact whether the amount was big or small . 
All such persons were annihilated in tbe darkness of n igh t . 
A la rge number of persons who were thus k i l l ed were not 
r e a l l y t he i r c l a s s enemies, and were k i l l ed on grounds of 
personal vendetta or revenge. 
Although Mazumdar emphasised secrecy and uni ty of 
command, secrecy could not be maintained. Also tbe command 
was divided i n t o several indeoendent small groups with the 
r e s u l t t h a t fac t iona l s t ruggle ensued. Moreover, though 
the Kaxalites regarded Mao's thought as worth following, 
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i t s i n t e rp r e t a t i on with d i f fe ren t people was different. 
When Mazumdar inc i ted the stadents and the youth 
to go to v i l l ages to enforce the s t ra tegy and bring 
these ideas in to prac t ice a large number obeyed biau 
But on tbe other side the v i l lagers saw tha t t h i s 
annih i la t ion campaign or s t ra tegy was nothing more 
than the murder of a co -v i l l age r by s t rangers fro® the 
cities* 
$• Social Composition of the Haxalites 
(a) Tribal elements 
Tribes of West Bengal have been dis t inguished 
for t h e i r pecul iar t r ad i t i ona l pa t te rn of l i f e . They 
were divided in to two s ignif icant e n t i t i e s not only 
within the urban sector but a lso in the r u r a l sector* 
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They did not wish to give op the i r d i s t i n c t t r a d i t i o n s , 
According to the census of 1961 the population of 
t r i b e s which was brought to l igh t was (a) Santhal t r ibe 
12,00,000,(b)Oarans 2,97,000,(c)Mandas 1,60,000,(d)Bhufflijas 
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91,000; other small communities, for example Tarai Gurkhas, 
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Gondas, Kajongs came to about 37,904. Tbe same proportion 
existed in the Naxalite area. Thus s ince tbe proportion of 
lan tha l t r i b e was comparatively la rge , the leadership of the 
movement remained i n the hands of Santhal t r i b e . (This point 
wi l l be further elaborated while dealing with the leadership 
pa t t e rn of the t r i b a l people) . Whenever conf l i c t s took place 
within the leadership, they c l e a r l y ref lec ted the differences 
of opinion which varied between the r u r a l and urban values 
and a t t i t udes in ?/!est Bengal. The pecul iar nature of these 
recurr ing conf l i c t s wi l l be dea l t with at the appropriate 
place while discussing the fac t iona l s truggle among the 
Maxalites leadership . 
The foregoing survey i s confined to the boundaries 
of r u r a l areas , more p a r t i c u l a r l y to larbanapur of Birbhum 
d i s t r i c t , but i t holds good for a number of other s imi la r 
eases . I t has already been mentioned tha t the Santhal 
t r i b e s comprised 87 per, cent of the t o t a l population of the 
t r i b e s , and that among these 87 per cent to 89 per eent 
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were d i r e c t l y engaged as agr icu l tu re l abourers . 
The occupation of t r i b e s , more p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the 
Terai area, i s tea cu l t i va t i on , general ly -n the lands of 
the landlords . They could not c u l t i v a t e on lands owned by the 
t r ibes unless they seized those plots of lands forc ib ly 
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and through vio lent means. They could not get enough for 
themselves and the i r families to consume because, desp i te 
the i r hard labour, they got only a share of tbe proceeds, 
which was hardly suff ic ient to keep them even on subsistence 
l e v e l . Under these depressive economic conditions they had 
no a l t e r n a t i v e but to jo in the Maoists who were pleading 
the i r cause and teaching them effect ive methods to emancipate 
themselves and ' to expropriate the exp rop r i a to r s ' . 
(b) Poor Peasants 
Agrarian r e l a t i o n s in Ind ia varied from s t a t e to 
s t a t e because there were no uniform laws governing them 
in the pas t . There wese no uniform customs or t r ad i t ions 
e i the r , and the landlords sweet wi l l determined the economic 
s ta tus of the poor peasants . The landlords were under no 
obligat ion imposed by the Tenancy Acts, 1954; the conditions 
of l i f e for them depended upon tbe weight the i r demands 
ca r r i ed . India i s an agr i cu l tu ra l country where 70 to 80 
per cent of i t s population depends upon pr imit ive tools 
and outmoded methods of production, which produce barely 
suf f ic ien t to keep the bodies and soul of the people 
together . Oat of th i s meagre produce a l i o n ' s share i s 
misappropriated by the i n f l u e n t i a l landlords with the act ive 
support or passive connivance of adminis t ra t ive machinery, 
which i s under the control of r i ch peasants or p o l i t i c a l l y 
i n f l u e n t i a l landlords — the r u r a l e l i t e . Because of these 
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factors the phenomenon which was common in these areas 
was that in th is ag r i cu l tu ra l socie ty the poor peasants 
and share croppers did not draw the a t t en t ion of the socie ty . 
Their i n t e r e s t s were not protected from any quarter and 
they suffered in two ways: ( l ) the misuse of tbe labour 
by the landlords, and (2) i n su f f i c i en t f a c i l i t i e s provided 
by the jud ic ia ry to the ooor peasants against th i s 
33 
exp lo i t a t ion . 
The usual p rac t i ce which existed in West Bengal was 
that the Jotedars (pet ty landlords) cu l t iva ted the land 
of tbe big landlords by leasing i t out to share croppers 
on the contract bas i s , tha t i s , i f the Jotedars would orovide 
seeds, bul l s and plough and manure, half of the production 
earned from tha t p lo t of land would be t ransferred to the 
share croppers and the r e s t would be retained by the Jo tedars . 
There was one more a l t e rna t i ve too, that i s , i n ease the 
share cropper accented only the land and no other f a c i l i t y , 
he would be en t i t l ed to 60 per cent of the harvest for his 
own use. 
The implementation of such contrac ts meant untold 
hardship to poor peasants in so far as there was no ce r t a in ty 
whether the Jotedar would employ the same share cropper 
also for tbe next season. This lack of secur i ty forced them 
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not to see beyond ce r t a in l i m i t s . Moreover, the share 
cropper would be perpetual ly grateful to tbe Jotedar who 
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was considered by him as the one ¥ho would give him the 
means of l ivel ihood as his benefactor* l a the long run, 
the share cropper would depend upon the Jotedar and seek 
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his sympathies i n moments of c r i s i s * Whenever any share 
croppers were faced vith a probleffl at the time of famine, 
flood or drought, the share croppers approached the Jotedar 
for obtaining loans, i n cash or i n kind, and a port ion of 
produce in advance* 
I t ^as considered an easy way for the poor peasant 
to obtain f inancia l ass i s tance at a time ¥hen the multipurpose 
government banks nere not i n eici s tance, as they are no¥# 
In those days they did not operate i n suf f ic ien t mashers 
i n r u r a l areas and i t vas hard to get a loan from the® due 
to complicated formali t ies* As a matter of pol icy or a 
t a c t i c a l move, these Jotedars welcomed these needs of the 
share croppers as they, in th i s way, or on such occasions, 
*posed as the i r saviours* 
The Jotedars of West Bengal f i l l ed three ro les i n 
v i l l a g e economy. F irst ly , they nere absentee landlords; 
secondly, they ^ere money lenders? and th i rd ly , they 
u l t imate ly became p o l i t i c a l l eaders , tn a l l the three 
pos i t ions they could protec t the i r i n t e r e s t s against the 
disgrunt led poor peasants as v e i l as tbe land reform 
enactments of the government* When the harvest was r i p e 
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and about to be cut , the Jotedars were happy and the poor 
share croppers f e l t miserable. The Jotedars went about 
co l l ec t i ng the i r debts with i n t e r e s t in the form of cash, 
seeds and food gra ins , and became prosperous, while the 
share croppers had to pay back the loans with exhorbitant 
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r a t e s of i n t e r e s t and were unhappy. 
I t may also be noted tha t a l l contracts and other 
re levant papers and l ega l documents were prepared by the 
Jotedars . the share croppers being u t t e r l y ignorant . The 
share croppers were made to aff ix the i r thumb impression 
at the place pointed out by the cunning Jo tedar . He read 
out the terms and conditions of these loans and charged 
whatever he wanted. In these circumstances the Jotedar 
became the share cropper ' s master. The Jotedars refrained from 
using f e r t i l i z e r s as they thought i t wa<? not i n the i r 
i n t e r e s t . They wanted to keep the share croppers a t 
subsis tence l e v e l . I t was estimated by the Advisor,Programme 
39 
Administration, i n his tour r epor t , tha t by applying 
Bs. 20.00 worth of ammonium sulphate the re turn of extra 
harvest wo'uld be Hs. 35.00 per acre . I f the share cropper 
was to give away half of this increase as Jo t eda r ' s share, 
he would get a net re turn of Eg.17.50 as an investment. 
The Jotedar considered i t unnecessary to inves t extra money 
which might bring greater prof i t to the share cropper. 
81 
As tbe harvesting time approached in October 1968 
the cleavage between the peasants and the Jotedars and the 
absentee landlords widened. Kazumdar exhorted the peasants 
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"to se ize the next harvest" . The c a l l was enchanting for 
the poor peasants in the depressing atmosphere. A general 
be l ie f among the peasants was that s ince a l l poss ib le 
methods for eliminating d i spa r i ty bad fai led to improve 
the economic condit ion of the poor peasants , and no hopeful 
r e s u l t s were v i s i b l e even In the long run, there was no 
a l t e r n a t i v e to adopting v io len t methods. In view of t h i s , 
there was no barm in accepting Mazumdar's d i r e c t i v e s . 
Apparently, tbe poor peasants were confident of the i r past 
achievements, and therefore they thought that i f fo rc ib le 
methods were used and new methods vigorously launched for 
cu t t ing down tbe resources of r ich landlords and t ransfer r ing 
land to the poor peasants , more benefi ts would acrue to 
them. While these poor peasants h i the r to working on lands 
of the landlords were enriching the t reasury of the 
landowners, t he i r own re tu rn was in increas ing poverty. 
There were no hopes for the future e i t h e r . In th is 
atmosphere, the s t ra tegy of Kazumdar to co l l ec t more 
poverty s t r iken people around the Haxali te movement was 
the only a l t e r n a t i v e remedy. The c a l l tha t he gave was 
that "economic s t ruggle against the feudal c l a s s was 
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necessary not only i n the present but in the future a l so . 
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In these words he gave a long ranged concrete programme 
to the peasants, and no doubt, thus gained t h e i r favour. 
(c) Landless Labourers 
The landless labourers in West Bengal, who const i tu ted 
15.3 per cent of the t o t a l peculat ion in 1968, can be 
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c l a s s i f i ed i n t o two categories* (a) those who were born 
in the landless famil ies , and (b) nominal landholders who 
gave up t h e i r r i gh t s on land under the circumstances which 
have been narrated above in the previous sect ions on t r i b a l 
unrest and poor peasants . These workers could not obtain 
mortgage p lo t s from money lenders or the absentee landlords 
and were engaged on the landlord ' s lands on meagre wages. 
According to the repor t of Agricul tural Labour Enquiry Commission, 
the labourers were mainly drawn from loca l t r i b e s and 
were generally indebted to t h e i r employers from whom they 
obtained loans when they were urgently in need of money. 
The Inquiry Commission also s ta ted i n i t s r epor t tha t some 
employers a l l o t t e d one bigba of land to attached workers 
on the condition tha t they would work in employer's f ie ld 
during the busy season on da i ly wages, which came t o less 
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than f i f t y pa i se (Approx. 5 e e n t s ) . The way in which these 
labourers were t reated inev i t ab ly led them to the acceptance 
of the Maoist revolut ionary s t ra tegy . In t h i s s i t ua t i on 
a new era arr ived in which the conf l ic t s between the 
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rapacious landlords and agr i cu l tu ra l labourers would 
remain no more unresolved* Consequently, the landless 
labourers launched a se r ies of demonstrations* By Angust 
1969 there were 348 separate inc idents of forc ib le 
occupation of land ¥hich were reported to the pol ice in 
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West Bengal* 
The landless labourers ¥ere so desperate tha t they 
did not ¥orry about the d i r e consequences ¥hioh could be 
expected as a r e s u l t of r e s o r t i n g to the Maoist revolut ionary 
a c t i v i t i e s * Tbe basic reason for th is was tha t they thought 
tha t for the® the re was not much to lose* On t h e other hand, 
they ¥ere confident that i n the event of emerging victor ious 
they would be able to acquire lands and redtice the influence 
of landlords and put an end to the i r c rue l deeds* With th i s 
predominant concept i n the i r minds they became a very important 
component of the Naxali te Movement* 
Cd) Students 
Before taking up t h i s topic for de ta i led discussion, 
we should keep in mind the problems of students i n general 
and those of West Ben-al in p a r t i c u l a r . Such a survey 
would help us in appreciating the i r growing i n t e r e s t i n 
the l a x a l i t e Movement. According to o f f i c i a l s t a t i s t i c s 
1,75,000 graduates were unemployed in the countryside in 
West Bengal u n t i l 1968, while another survey revealed that 
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50 to 83 mil l ion youth were jobless in Ind ia . In West 
Bengal out of one hundred, 52 employable persons were 
without work and i n 1971 the number of educated unemployed 
45 job seekers was 3,70,547. 
l o t only was employment not available} the students 
were becoming f rus t ra ted , indulging i n subversive 
a c t i v i t i e s as they had a lo t of time a t t he i r disposal to 
go about taking part in such lawless a c t i v i t i e s out of sheer 
dispondency. What they ac tua l ly f e l t can be perceived by an 
interview which thei r representa t ives gave to tbe press i n 
which they said "How do you expect a s ens i t i ve person to 
remain non-violent i n a s i t u a t i o n where people l i v e and die 
on the s t r e e t s , where laws are made only to be broken, where 
government ex is t s only with the help of ool ice force, where 
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to be a non-conformist i s a s in" . These emotions were to be 
found in the youth throughout India in almost a l l the s t a t e s , 
though they varied in i n t e n s i t y and vigour. Insane s t a t e s 
the students were divided i n t o several groups and among 
di f ferent p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s ; i n West Bengal, where the 
Communists ( l e f t i s t s ) were b e t t e r organised and wielded 
greater inf luence, tbe bulk of the students joined their fold . 
Their main object ive was to find out a solut ion of their 
economic problems which, according to them, was poss ib le only 
through revo lu t ion . They thought tha t by revolut ion they would 
overthrow the present explo i ta t ive economic sy3tera and 
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es tab l i sh a more ega l i t a r i an p o l i t i c a l system on the 
Chinese model. 
The involvement of West Bengal students i n the 
Naxali te movement can be evidently linked with a short 
t r i p of t he i r representa t ives to Nepal i n 1965.The Haxalite 
Movement did not s t a r t in that year nor i s i t a fact that 
the movement was tbe r e s u l t of a sudden upsurge. Some 
students of Calcut ta crossed the border under the leadership 
of Saibal Ki t ra and v i s i t e d Nepal to meet the Chinese 
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.Ambassador. What i s sue was under discussion i s d i f f i c u l t 
to v i s u a l i s e . However, i t must have something to do with 
Chinese ass i s tance i n carrying out the i r mission in Ind ia . 
The Maoist philosophy impressed them great ly and they were 
evidently insp i red by the Kaoist revolut ionary movement. They 
brought back some slogans, such as "Negotiate a boundary 
sett lement with China", "Mao Tse-tung zindabad" (long l i v e 
Mao Tse-tung). Unt i l 1966, the rigorous a t t i t u d e of the 
students and the manner in which they t r ied to d i r ec t the 
a t t en t ion of the au thor i t i e s towards the problem remained 
within the l imi t s of demonstrations, sending deputations to 
the Universi ty administrat ion as well as to the government. 
The s i t ua t i on took a serious turn when in 1966 several students 
of the Presidency College, Calcutta, were suspended or expelled 
for taking pa r t i n a p ro tes t s t r i k e . These students so 
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punished joined the l e f t i s t group within the GPI(M). 
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These revolut ionary students of Calcutta d i rec ted 
thei r a t t en t ion to Debra D i s t r i c t . In t h a t area the 
movement began in the form of economic s t ruggle as ear ly 
as 1967 under the CPI(K) against blackmarketeers and hoarders. 
On the question 'of wages, the ag r i cu l t u r a l labourers joined 
the movement. In 1968 the leadership of Debra D i s t r i c t 
switched i t s a l legiance over to the CPI(K-L), but i t was 
not u n t i l Mazumdar propagated his pol icy of annih i la t ion 
tha t the CPI(K-L) could r e g i s t e r s ign i f ican t progress . 
Meanwhile, Mazumdar, who seemed to be a well-wisher 
of the s tudents , declared that "they should not take par t 
i n the students union elect ions and concentrate on 
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revolut ionary work*1. He did not agree with the exis t ing 
courses and the methods of teaching. He thought tha t the 
prevai l ing system of education and mode of teaching would 
not be helpful for the students in bui lding a prosperous 
future . In his opinion the u n i v e r s i t i e s were giving 
i r r e l e v a n t , u n r e a l i s t i c , wrong and defect ive education. He 
thought that ins tead of wasting energy i n the union e lect ions 
and receiving an education not for building up the nation 
but for developing feudal-bourgeoisie mental i ty against 
the poor masses, they should go to the v i l l ages for the 
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dissemination of Mao's thoughts the re . A large number of 
students shif ted the i r a c t i v i t i e s to the v i l l ages and 
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i n s t i g a t e d the v i l l age r s so as to bring them i n t o the 
fold of Maoism. 
ill i n t e r e s t i n g phenomenon of th i s migration from 
c i t i e s to v i l l ages was that the propagators of Maoism were 
not confident as to the nature and future of Maoism. The 
Haxalites themselves were not sure of their stand, and a 
survey made in th is regard made i t c lear that very few 
of them bad ever read Mao's works. Out of the 300 cases of 
Haxalites examined by the pol ice , 20 per cent were col lege 
s tudents , and about 16 per cent were dropouts; only 7 per 
cent were of 30 years of age, and half of them were below 
20. I t was also revealed by po l ice reoor ts that 27 per cent 
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of them had previous criminal records . There was no mature 
guidance along with vigorous effor ts on the par t of the 
youth engaged in these revolut ionary a c t i v i t i e s . The r e s u l t 
was that the energies which could be u t i l i s e d for construct ive 
purpose were di rected i n t o des t ruc t ive channels and not 
much was achieved by indulging in misguided enthusiasm. 
Since there was lack of proper guidance, enthusiasm t i l t e d 
towards des t ruc t ion of l i f e and proper ty . 
While there were several factors which contributed 
to the decl ine of the movement, the pa r t i c ipa t i on of the 
urban Haxalites had contributed to a l a rge extent to the 
gradual downfall and the u l t imate disappearance of the 
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movement. When these urban youth i n f i l t r a t e d i n t o the 
v i l l ages and operated in tbe countryside, they carr ied 
aiongwith them the i r urban s t y l e of l i v i n g . They could not 
mix well with the i r r u r a l counterparts and lacked that 
revolut ionary zeal and habits of hard l i f e which were essent ia l 
for making any movement succeed. Moreover, they came from 
diverse soc ia l groups, varying c l a s s background and dif ferent 
p o l i t i c a l a f f i l i a t i o n s . Kence they were finding i t very 
d i f f i c u l t to adjust themselves to rigorous v i l l age l i f e . 
The v i l l age r s were get t ing modernised but the pace was slow 
and ha l t i ng . The pace of progress towards modernisation 
i n the c i t i e s was comparatively f a s t e r . Hence tbe cleavage 
between the urban and r u r a l sectors of Indian soc ie ty . In 
these circumstances the urban Haxalites were becoming 
completely segregated, i so l a t ed and al ienated from tbe r u r a l 
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peasant-oriented Naxali te movement. The r e s u l t was that 
when they got poor response from the v i l l ages they withdrew 
to the c i t i e s and launched the movement i n Gopi Ballavapur 
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on August 21, 1969. From ear ly 1970 the teenagers joined 
the s tuden ts . They launched a se r ies of at tacks on the 
memorials of na t iona l l eaders , smashed G-andbi Centre i n 
Jadavapur Universi ty and k i l l ed the Yice-Ohancellor. They 
even destroyed the labora tor ies and openly went about shouting 
that Chairman Mao says tha t "If you read more you become 
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more foo l i sh" . The Haxalites disturbed the peaceful 
atmosphere of the educational i n s t i t u t i o n s and repeatedly 
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cal led the youth to go on s t r i k e . Most of the Naxalite 
students abstained from appearing at the examinations, and 
believed i n Mazumdar's d i rec t ion and shouted the slogan 
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"Boycott the examinationsB. The professional criminals 
who l ived along the railway l ines chose th i s opportunity 
for the i r nefarious a c t i v i t i e s . When they broke open railway 
wagons and committed a t t r o c i t l e s they shouted tbe slogan 
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"Mao Tse-tung Zindabad (long l i ve Mao Tse-tung). 
Tbe above survey es tabl i shes the fac t that the 
Naxali te movement in the c i t i e s was the movement of a n t i -
soc ia l and criminal elements ra ther than tbe Maoist oriented 
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sect ions of soc ie ty . I t was based upon self i n t e r e s t and 
not on the i n t e r e s t of the masses. The Kaxalites general ly 
indulged in lawless a c t i v i t i e s . Looting, arson and violence 
were the i r da i ly rou t ine . Innocent persons, sometimes, bore 
the brunt of the i r nefarious a c t i v i t i e s . Whenever the 
Haxalites considered i t opportune they threw home-made bombs 
on tbe innocent groups of people busy in the i r normal dai ly 
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chores, leading to senseless loss of l i f e in cold blood, 
and thus d is turbing the peaceful l i f e in Calcutta. Such 
a c t i v i t i e s al ienated the sympathies of the common man, and 
t h e i r p o l i t i c a l or ideologica l screen was too thin a cover 
to conceal the criminal nature of the i r misdeeds. They 
indiscr imina te ly threw bombs on the busy markets, cinema 
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houses and crowded s t r e e t s without rhyme or reason, 
only i s order to weak vengeance on the owner or show 
the s t rength of t he i r movement. They would s tab a 
shopkeeper a f te r a heated argument, or k i l l a t r a f f i c 
constable on duty, because he represented the author i ty 
of the go¥eminent* 
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Chapter I I I 
FORMATION OF THE C .P . I . (K-L) 
1 . All India Coordination Committee of 
Revolu t i onari es "** 
The idea to form a Maoist Revolutionary p o l i t i c a l 
pa r ty occurred to the Naxali te leaders on r ece ip t of a 
message of greet ings from the Communist Par ty of China 
addressed to the revolu t ionar ies i n s i d e the CPI(M). The 
message said t ha t the revolu t ionar ies should u n i t e with a 
view to spreading the flame of armed revolu t ion among the 
peasants . The great task of completing th i s process would 
be poss ib le with the formation of a "genuinely revolut ionary 
pa r ty of Marxist-Leninist and according to Mao Tse-tung's 
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thought. 
The impact of Chinese ideas was evident i n a plenary 
session of the Central Committee of the GpI(M), which was 
held a t Burdwan (West Bengal) from April 6 to 11, 1968. 
In th i s session one separate document brought in by the 
Naxali te leaders condemned the po l i c i e s of the CPI(M), 
but they fa i led to get the i r document approved by the other 
2 
members of the sess ion . The Haxalites of West Bengal 
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continued to group themselves under a s t a t e - l e v e l 
Coordination Committee of the Revolutionaries within the 
3 
GPI(M), and eventually i n May 1968 changed i t s t i t l e to 
the All Ind ia Coordination Committee of Communist Revolu-
t iona r i e s (A.I.C.C. G.B.) which s ignif ied a complete break from 
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the CPI CM). Nevertheless, the Committee did not change 
i t s e l f i n t o a fullf ledged par ty even though i t urged upon 
the r evo lu t iona r i e s , who believed i n armed revolut ion, to 
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u n i t e with the object ive of forming a Maoist Party i n I n d i a . 
On May Day 1969, ( tha t day being the one hundredth 
b i r thday of Lenin) a la rge procession congregated to ce lebra te 
Lenin's bir thday i n Maidan Park, Calcut ta . At t h i s public 
meeting, Kanu Sanyal announced the formation of the th i rd 
communist pa r ty i n India , namely tbe Communist Party of 
6 
India (Marxist-Leninist) which would propagate and incu lca te 
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Maoist thought among the Indian people. He announced tha t 
"when our pa r ty (CPI M-L) was born the h i s t o r i c 9th na t ional 
Congress of the great Communist Party of China was i n session 
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under the personal guidance of Chairman Mao Tse-tung. 
2. P o l i t i c s of CPI(M-L) 
The newly born Communist Par ty iof India (Marxist-
Leninis t ) re jec ted the parliamentary procedure for a t t a in ing 
p o l i t i c a l power. In an i s sue of "Liberation", Mazumdar 
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said tha t "today the revolut ionary Marxist-Leninist pa r ty 
cannot opt for the parliamentary road to achieve p o l i t i c a l 
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power". Thus ins tead of e lec t ions , class-war was emphasised, 
and ins tead of b a l l o t s , bu l l e t s were proposed to be used 
according to Mazumdar* s Manifesto, as Mao Tse-tung had 
asserted i n his famous saying, "Power eomes out of the ba r re l 
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of the gun". The CPI(M-L) declared tha t the Congress Party 
cannot d i f f e r e n t i a t e between the United Front of West Bengal, 
which betrayed the nat ional freedom s t ruggle to serve i t s 
own narrow reac t ionary c lass i n t e r e s t s by becoming an 
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impe r i a l i s t agent for ru l ing the eountry. As far as the United 
Front government in West Bengal was concerned, the CPI(M-L) 
speculated tha t while the Congress Par ty was the main p o l i t i c a l 
par ty of the ru l ing c l a s s , i t could no longer deceive the 
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masses. The CPI(M-L) cal led the Halted States of America an 
impe r i a l i s t and the U.3.S-B. a s o c i a l - i m p e r i a l i s t , and said 
both were t ry ing to f i t India i n to counter revolut ionary 
m i l i t a r y s t ra tegy , to harass and weaken China and put out the 
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flames of agrarian revolut ion i n I n d i a . 
Our attempt to find out tbe economic po l i c i e s of t he 
pa r ty bore no f r u i t . No clear conception on t h i s i s s u e 
existed i n the pa r ty manifestos or programmes. The approach 
was e n t i r e l y sloganish and emotional. In other countr ies 
of the world p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s survive and t h r i v e on t he i r 
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socio-econosdc programmes, more p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the under-
developed and developing count r ies . The CPI(M-L) did not 
offer proof of any such r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I t s r e a l object was 
confined t o a v io len t , subversive movement having i t s goal 
se t upon the se izure of s t a t e power. 
I t would be more aopropriate to say that the CPI(M-L) 
was a pa ra -mi l i t a ry organization and not a p o l i t i c a l par ty ; 
tbe reason i s tha t the use of p o l i t i c a l s t ra tegy and economic 
reconst ruct ion on the one hand and of the gun on the other 
hand and are two opposite and contradic tory means to gain an 
object ive; both are appropriate modes but i n two d i f fe ren t 
f ie lds* Their purposes were a lso d iamet r ica l ly opposed to 
each other . Moreover, CPI(K-L) re jec ted outr ight the u t i l i t y 
of Trade Unions' pa r t i c ipa t ion in the movement. I t proclaimed 
tha t in the i n i t i a l stages the worker's s t ruggle i n India 
would be continued on two l ines? (a) the conventional l i n e 
under the leadership of the r e v i s i o n i s t s (CPI and CPI-M) 
and the so-cal led s o c i a l i s t s , and (b) on new l ines under 
the leadership of CPI(M-L). I t repeatedly asser ted that for 
the purpose of accomplishing revolut ion the par ty wi l l take 
the road of re ly ing on peasants, es tab l i sh ing base-areas i n 
the countryside, of p e r s i s t i n g i n protracted armed s t ruggle 
and of using countryside to enc i rc le and f i n a l l y captured 
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the c i t i e s * But what economic po l i c i e s i t would adopt a f t e r 
the establishment of the Maoist type of government in India 
was not declared by the leadership of the par ty , because 
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the leadership i t s e l f was vague and uncer ta in on th i s 
very important po in t . I t manifested the i iaaa tur i ty and 
wavering object ive? of the pa r ty . When i t r e j ec ted the 
value of even the Trade Unions, i t showed tha t the par ty 
did not have concrete economic po l i c i e s a t a l l and, therefore , 
was incapable of making any progress towards bringing 
p rosper i ty to the common pan. 
3 . Leadership 
We have seen i n the foregoing survey t h a t the most 
important and dominant component of the Naxalite Movement 
i n West Bengal were t r i b e s , peasants and s tuden t s . A la rge 
sect ion among them were young and energetic but lacked 
maturi ty, organisat ion and d i s c i p l i n e . The leadership , 
however, was confined to these elements, the young 
disgrunt led and f rus t ra ted en thus ia s t s . 
However, one outstanding leader was Kanu Sanyal, a 
t r i b a l of Naxalbarl area, who a f t e r spending several months 
in pr ison along with many other left-wing Communists for 
the i r pro-Chinese sympathies af ter the 1962 border war 
with China, joined the newly formed CPI(10 af te r the CPI 
s p l i t i n 1964. Original ly Kanu Sanyal, who belonged to a 
r i ch peasant family of West Bengal, decided in 196? a t the 
age of 35 years , to re l inquish his claim to his ances t ra l 
109 
15 
property* His s ac r i f i ce s gained for him the ample support 
and admiration from the t r i b a l s and the downtrodden poor 
peasants® This Brahmin peasant leader remained act ive i n 
t h i s area since 1359. eventaal ly becoming the Chairman of 
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the newly formed Kaoist par ty , namely CPI(M-L) in 1969. 
Later on he organised meetings of the revolu t ionar ies 
i n West Bengal, and l«d many demonstrations against the 
government and landlords , together with several other close 
assoc ia te , saeh as was Jangal f the l a t t e r being a professional 
mi l i t an t from Santhal t r i b e . Sanyal contested several e l ec t !om 
as a candidate of the Columnist Party for the West Bengal 
1? 
Assembly9 bat was -always defeased, which apparently 
became the cause of mounting f ru s t r a t i on i n his mind and 
diminished his f a i t h i n parliamentary means for winning power* 
He was, l i t e r on 9 found gu i l ty of violence and dacoity and 
sentenced to seven years of rigorous imprisonment i n April 
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1968, when the State was under the P res iden t i a l Hole; the 
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second United Front government released him in 1S69* 
While lano Sanyal was the oncrowned king of tbe 
Iaxalbar i area f Kazumdar, the second most important leader 
of the movement9 became leader at tbe sob-divis ional levels 
Although h is reputa t ion did not t r ave l beyond the l imited 
area f he soon became a pol icymaker of tbe ifaxalites* He 
was a d i f f i c u l t leader to deal with* He coold not carry on 
with other prominent leaders doe to his r ig id a t t i t u d e s , 
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in f l ex ib l e views and obst inate approaches t o tackle 
complicated issues^ Like Sanyal, ha came from a well- to-do 
peasant family and rel inquished h is r i g h t s t o his ances t ra l 
20 
property* From the i n i t i a l s tages of the movement his role 
was remarkable* He made a great contr ibut ion i n organising 
peasants 3nd spared no e f fo r t s i n party building i n S i i l i g o r i 
and Ja lpa igur i towns, s i tuated i n the northern Bart of 
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West Bengal* 
The t h i r d most prominent l eader , Ihokan Mazumdar9 was 
a member of Moslem peasant family, which had migrated from 
Bar isa l Di s t r i c t of l a s t Pakistan (now in Bangla Desh) to 
Barjeeling D i s t r i c t before 194*?* Since the time of h is 
a r r i v a l i n West Bengal, he was associated with revolut ionary 
groups* In his e a r l y boyhood he had worked as a ward-boy 
i n a hospi ta l i n Darjeeling, but he was dismissed i n 1948 
due t o his revolut ionary a f f i l i a t i ons* Prom that time onwards 
he joined Sanyal and cooperated in che work of peasant 
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organisat ional a c t i v i t i e s * 
The other important l eade r s , Ashim Chatterjee and 
Santosh Hana, represented student pa r t i c i pa t i on i n the 
l a d a l i t e movement* They were excelled from the Presidency 
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Collage, Calcut ta , i n 1966 and subsequently i n ea r l^ 1967 
joined the Naxalite group within the CPI(M)# fhey gave a 
good account of themselves by organising and ac t iv iz ing 
24 
l a x a l i t e movement i n Debra and Gopiballavpore• 
I l l 
Another student leader who was involved in the 
l a x a l i t e revolutionary a c t i v i t i e s was Sushi ta l rioy Ohoudhry% 
He was a member of the West Bengal State Committee of 
Revolutionaries with Ot-l(H) but l a t e r on, with the formation 
of All - India Coordination Committee of the Communist 
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Eevolut ionaries (A.I.C.C.C. - ; • ) , became i t s convenor* 
The above survey goes t o show tha t the l a x a l i t e 
leadership consisted of moderately educated young men who 
were f rus t r a t ed i n one way or other , came from wel l - to-do 
peasant famil ies and cast t he i r l o t with the poor and down 
trodden peasants of the area* They thr ived on slogans and 
did not have any well defined p o l i t i c a l or economic programme* 
4* Factional Struggle 
Prom 1969 onwards some cont rovers ia l i s sues had 
cropped up within the leadership of the CPI(M-L)* I t has 
already been observed tha t they did not have any c lea r ly 
defined programme or well defined object ives which they 
intended t o achieve through Maoist revolutionary strategy. 
Their methods of achieving t h e i r aims ware so confused 
tha t even the inner cadre of the Kaxali tes was not sure 
of t h e i r objectives* They did not have any concrete 
economic programme fo r improving the condition of the 
masses, and i t appeared to the common man tha t t h e i r 
a c t i v i t i e s were an exercise i n futility.VFben they f a i l ed t o 
launch a successful Maoist revolutionary movement i n 
West Bengal, they s t a r t ed blaming t h e i r colleagues. Inner 
bickerings earns to surface anr^  mutual incr iminat ions 
s t a r t e d , which are revealed by tbe statements of Ashim 
Chat ter jee . '-/hen he was arrested by the police in July 1972 
be i s said t o have remarked: "I t I s a great p i t y tha t ve 
had not been able to f in i sh off tha t man", meaning Charu 
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Kazumdar. 
One of the main causes of the mounting r i f t was the 
27 implementation of the theory of ann ih i l a t ion . Asit ien 
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and h is supporters had branded i t as Guevarism, tha t i s 
individual te r ror ism which would not receive the support 
of the masses who consider i t as sense less , causing the 
death of innocent people and serving no purpose. But 
kazutadar disagreed with his colleagues and defended h i s own 
views on the annih i la t ion programme and contended tha t whereas 
Guevara was waging h is s truggle with the support of pet ty 
bourgeoisie , i n t e l l e c t u a l s and weapons, tbe Haxali tes 
r e l i ed on tbe cooperation of the masses for the success of 
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t h e i r endeavours. Such an approach can be character ised 
as an i n f l e r i b l e one and an immature way of thinking because 
there was v i r t u a l l y no 3oeial l ink between the Nexali tes 
and the masses l i v ing i n the Kaxalite dominated a reas . Charu 
Mazumdar's t h e s i s on the annih i la t ion programme was a l so 
character ised by 3ushi ta l Hoy Ghoudhry as "indiscriminate 
i»Xti 
killing". He, however, also agreed that though he did 
not subscribe to i t he can only go to the extent of 
suggesting tha t i t should be confined t o three c lasses 
of the enemy, tha t i s , the money lenders , the landlords and 
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the pol ice and t h e i r informers. 
The second i ssue which came up for discussion within 
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the ranks was the c a l l for n tbe boycott of e l e c t i o n s " . 
fhe West Bengal l a x a l i t e s did not have contradic tory views 
on t h i s i s s u e , bat the Andhra Haxali tes were divided i n t o 
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two groups on t h i s i s sue . While one group held tha t the 
parliamentary procedure might be helpful i n some circumstances 
for the achievement of o o l i t i e a l power, the other did not 
agree and preferred violent annih i la t ive a c t i v i t i e s . 
The t h i r d i s sue re la ted t o the prospect of giving 
pa r t i c i pa t i on to the t rade unions in the Haxalite Movement. 
Mazumdar was s t r i c t l y opposed t o the idea of giving any 
place t o the t rade unions in the revolutionary movement 
of the Kaxali tes on the ground tha t (a) the l a x a l i t e 
movement was so le ly based on the agrar ian revolut ionary 
movement, and (b) i t was not t h e i r task t o organise t rade 
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unions or worry about t rade union e l e c t i o n s . Mazumdar's 
asser t ion i s s ign i f i can t , and deserves our a t t en t ion , 
because i t was introduced by the General Secretary of the 
E l e c t r i c i t y Board Employees TJnion, Primal Dasgupta, who 
belonged t o tbe CPI(M-L), and believed in the i n t r a - p a r t y 
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organisat ion of the Trade Unions. This shows tha t there 
were con f l i c t s among the Kaxali tes leadership on t h i s i s s u e , 
and that there was a section which rejected Mazumdar1s 
t he s i s on e l e c t i o n s . The resu l t was that Primal Dasgupta 
along with an assoc ia te , Pramode Sen Gupta, formed a r i v a l 
committee, Maxalbari Krishik Sangram Safaayak, He a lso 
c r i t i c i s e d the CPI(K-L) leadership in a document for ignoring 
the e i t i e s and for refusing to grant p a r t i c i p a t i o n t o tbe 
t rade unions in the movement, and supported Asit Sen's view-
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point on the theory of ann ih i la t ion" . I t was Asit Sen who, 
among o thers , c r i t i c i s e d Mazumdar and announced the formation 
of a new organisat ion cal led Maoist Communist Centre i n 
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Hovember 1969. 
The l i b e r a t i o n movement in Bangla Desh i n 1968-70 
brought in an addi t iona l controversy between kazumdar and 
Astaim Chat ter jee . While Mazumdar v isual ised tha t the 
l i b e r a t i o n movement i n Bangla Desh could be transformed 
i n t o an armed s t ruggle under the leadership of Mohammad Taha 
(a Maoism leader of Bangla Desh), Ashim Chatterjee denied 
i t and said tha t the l i be r a t i on movement was an imper ia l i s t 
conspiracy t o have yet another anti-China base in the 
Indian sub-continent . Actually, the assessment of Chatterjee 
was based upon the speculation tha t the government of 
labya Khan was having f r iendly r e l a t i ons with the Chinese 
government and tha t any drive for a separate s t a t e would in 
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fac t harm the Ohiaese i n t e r e s t s i n the sab ^continent. 
Furthermore, the Haxali tes in West Bengal and the Maoists 
i n 3ast Pakistan would lose the p r iv i l eges nhich they 
¥ere enjoying under the she l te r of fr iendship between the 
two count r ies . Sticking to his standpoint , Ohatterjea 
t r i e d to convince Kazumdar of the urgency of giving the 
l a x a l i t e support t o the Pakistani mi l i t a ry Junta i n t he i r 
e f fo r t s to suppress the independence movement i n Bangla Desh# 
But Mazumdar did not agree vitta the viewpoint of Ghatterjee# 
Eventually, Ashim Cbatterjee formed a p a r a l l e l organization 
named the CPI(M-L)s West Bengal Bihar and Orissa Ssgional 
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Committee* 
5. Impact Upon the CPI and the CPI(K) 
After tbe formation of the l a x a l i t e Movement, the 
Cpi (H) faced tbe problems of re ta in ing i t s oun influence 
over the membership which CPI CM) took away from tbe CPI a f ter 
the s p l i t i n 1964, While the CPI(K) regarded the Cpi as 
r e v i s i o n i s t , the l a z a l i t e s in turn regarded the CPI(M) 
as neo - r ev i s i on i s t s , betraying the pos i t ions hsld by the 
Marxist-"Leninist s* CM the other hand, the l a x a l i t e movement 
¥as considered by the CPI a danger for the Indian Communists 
movement and a sheer wastage of revolutionary energy in 
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useless activities* 
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The formation of the Naxalite Movement had a profound 
effect upon the maternal body, the OPI(K), and as a r e su l t 
the main theses and po l i c i e s came under review, liareover, 
CPI(M)'s leadership was busy i n endeavouring a reconc i l i a t ion 
with the r ad ica l s to r e t a in the uni ty i n the cadres without 
which i t s effect iveness i n the United Front Government in 
West Bengal could not be achieved. In order t o maintain the 
unity i n the rank and f i l e membership, the leadership of the 
CPI(M) allowed the ifaxalites t o remain within the fold of 
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the par ty . Throughout the year of 1967 and up t o 1969 
frefuent t r i p s to S i l l i g u r i had been made by the Party leaders 
and t h e i r agents during which tbey t r i e d to convince the 
Haxali tes tha t the revolution can be successfully accomplished 
only under the leadership of CPICM) and i n the cooperation 
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with the p r o l e t a r i a t . The CPI(M) leadership condemned 
the pol ice act ion which was taken i n the Iaxa lbar i area on 
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May 1967. But simultaneously tbe CpI(M) leaders launched 
a propaganda campaign within the par ty through journa l s , 
pamphlets and inner par ty discussions against the extremist 
43 
approaches to seize power. The reason for such a step was 
to demonstrate the sympathy of the party with the peasan t ' s 
cause, while on the other hand to f i x a ce r t a in l imi t for 
the Haxalite a c t i v i t i e s so tha t these might not go beyond 
the p a r t y ' s con t ro l . 
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In August 1967 the leadership of the CPI(M) had 
admitted tha t 4,000 to 8,000 party members were backing 
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the l a x a l i t e movement. To c u r t a i l the influence of such 
a big number of the l a x a l i t e supporters i n the par ty the 
leadership issued a statement which, while favouring the 
agrarian movement i n West Bengal, they t r i e d t o ignore the 
slogans ca l l ing for seizure of power, which created fur ther 
dilemmas for the par ty . For example, i f the pol icy of the 
immobilization of the police would continue there was a 
r ea l danger of a police revol t and, eventual ly , of a break-
down of the United Frong Government in which the CPI(M) was 
the leading f ac to r ; in f ac t , t h i s danger became a r e a l i t y 
in 1969. The pol ice could no longer t o l e r a t e p a r t i a l 
po l i c i e s against the insurgents and on July 31,* 1969 a 
group of 500 policemen entered the State Assembly where they 
smashed fu rn i tu re , broke microphones, destroyed papers and 
shouted slogans against the United Front Government, 
e spec ia l ly against the Deputy Chief Minister and Home l-iinister, 
Jyot i Basu and b is po l i c i e s of not intervening more 
e f fec t ive ly i n the Naxalite Movement. This, however, he 
could not do, because he was attempting t o win the l a x a l i t e s 
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t o re turn to the parliamentary road. 
In the meantime, the CPI(M) was attempting t o resolve 
the new complex developments. They considered i t an 
opportune time and a sui table occasion to regain t h e i r l o s t 
118 
influence over tbe masses which were slipping under the 
influence of the Haxalites. Consequently, they declared 
in a resolution of 1969, that the GFI(M) was adopting the 
weapon of physical annihilation for achieving political power 
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as a tactical move.. But in fact, the annihilation policy 
had already been launched by the Haxalites and the resolution 
came too late. 3y the time the CPI(K) resolution was 
finalized, the formation of the CPI(K-L) had taken place 
and its objectives of armed struggle could be no more 
influenced. 
The formation of the Opl(M-L) had a profound impact 
upon the two other Communist Parties, the OPI and CPI(M), 
which began confronting each other on tbe issue of the 
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Naxalite movement. The organs of these two parties, lew Am 
48 
and People's Democracy, were placing the responsibilities 
for assassination of their party workers on the shoulders of 
each other, which was in faet a form of competition to win 
the support of the Maxalites. However, the laxalite leader-
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ship was adamant and all issues of the Liberation, the 
Naxalite organ, asserted that both Communist Parties had 
stabbed the workers and peasants in tbe back at a time when 
they were facing fierce attacks from tbe capitalists and 
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landlords, thus paralysing all their revolutionary activities. 
The mutual bickering between the two parties, the CPI and 
the CPICM), made it possible for the iaxalites to pursue a 
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terrorist and ruthless movement in West Bengal. Though 
both parties were making a determined effort to win 
tbe Haxalites to their side, none of them received any 
acknowledgment from them. 
In the meantime, the popular support for the 
United i'ront Government in West Bengal was declining. 
Because of this, and also because the Front could not 
effectively deal with the agrarian unrest fomented by 
the Kaxalites, the Central Government dismissed the 
United Front Government on March 16, 1970. While the 
elections were held in 1971, no party individually, or 
in coalition with others, was able to form a new and 
stable government, and therefore, barring a small interlude, 
the President's Bule continued in the State. Eventually, 
in the elections of March 1972 the Congress Party obtained 
an overwhelming majority and formed a new stable 
government in West; Bengal after many years of turmoil. 
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Chapter IV 
UA'ITgD FBQHT GOVEaHMM IK WIST BSHGAL 
1. Split of Congress Party in 
West Bengals 1966 
The strained political relations between two Congress 
Party leaders in West Bengal and followers of Gandhian 
ideology, Ajoy Mukherjee and Atulya Ghosh, came to the fore 
1 
in July 1965. Apparently the differences in the views of 
these two leaders represented the protest of a large number 
of party members from Midnapur, which is the second largest 
district of West Bengal. It bad the second largest number 
of tbe elected members in the State Assembly as well as in 
the Central Parliament, who disagreed with the manner in 
which the pro-Ghosh members were being enrolled in the 
Congress party. Ajoy Mukherjee, as President of the Congress 
Party in West Bengal, dismissed its Secretary General 
2 
Hiramlendu Be, a close associate of Atulya Ghosh. However, 
Atulya Ghosh was so deeply entrenched as the party boss in 
West Bengal and also as an influential member of the powerful 
3 
Syndicate of tbe Congress at the central level that he 
could never expect that such a decision would be taken against 
h i s close a s soc ia t e . In r e t a l i a t i o n , Atulya Ghosh moved a 
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anti-Mukherjee r e so lu t ion , censuring the President of the 
Par ty a t the meeting of i t s Executive Committee, which was 
adopted. But Mukherjee did not accept t h i s decis ion, as 
he was confident tha t the cen t ra l leadership would favour 
aim because of his value for the p a r t y ' s f u t u r e , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
in Midnapur D i s t r i c t , and refused to res ign . The State 
Congress Sxecutive Committee passed a new no-confidence 
motion on January 20, 1966, by 296 to 40 votes , ca l l ing upon 
him to resign from . . of f ice . Once again he refused to 
accept the decision of the Committee and was consequently 
4 
expelled from the p a r t y ' s membership. 
2
- Mergence of the Bangla Congress 
One phase of s truggle and competition ended with the 
purge of A. Mukherjee, but i t marks the dawn of a new era 
in West Bengal p o l i t i e s . Party p o l i t i c s in the Sta te 
5 
entered i n t o a new phase whieh was t o t a l l y unexpected. 
A. Makherjee began a statewide tour and made e f fo r t s to 
convince h i s sympathisers as t o the i n j u s t i c e s done to 
him by the Congress Party. Ee placed before the people the 
fac t s and f igures regarding the malpractices of the Congress 
Par ty . He a l so claimed tha t he bad exposed i t s wrong food 
po l i c i e s with whieh he disagreed, and t h a t was h is only 
f a u l t . According to him, the Congress Party did not remove 
X *5<? 
these malpractices and placed no importance upon the 
suggestions made by him. He claimed to be the first person 
who brought to light these shortcomings of the Cbngress 
Party and placed them before the public. 
Within a short span of time Mukherjee realised that 
in view of the uncertain political environment a new political 
party could be formed which might protect the interest of 
the section to which he himself belonged. The landlords 
and raillowners were not happy with the oolicies of the 
Congress Party which favoured heavily the poor peasants and 
small farmers and workers. These landlords and millowners 
found a genuine leader who would protect their existing 
interests. When the support of these two classes was certain, 
Makherjee did not ignore the poor peasants too. lo newly 
emerging party could afford to neglect the peasants who 
accounted for the majority of tbe population. Midnapur 
District appeared as a citadel, and as a territorial base, 
for tbe prospective political party. Eventually, on 
July 15> 1966, Mukherjee announced the promotion of this new 
6 
party in West Bengal, to be known as tbe Bangla Congress. 
3. Elections of 1967 and 1969 in West Bengal 
These two general elections (1967 and 1969) in West 
Bengal had a significant impact upon the vicissitudes in the 
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post-independence history of West Bengal. On the one hand, 
the Congress Party had lost its dominating position and 
was not able to form a new government in this state, contrary 
7 
to its victories in 1952, 1957 and 1962 elections. On the 
other hand, the parties which were claiming to be socialist 
and communist in policies and programmes, had now got a 
8 
chance to translate their manifestos into practice. It was 
difficult for the people to decide during the elections as 
to which party should be in a position to meet their requirements 
and fulfil their demands and carry out their promises without 
any further loss of time. 
Under the inspiring leadership of Ajoy Mukherjee and 
Humann Kabir, who represented the Bangla Congress, it was 
evident that the elections of 1967 would prove quite uncomfortable 
for the old Congress whieh would not be able to secure an 
absolute majority as easily as heretofore. Consequently, the 
CP1(M), the Bangla Congress and some other parties which had 
already come closer to each other through several mass struggles 
carried out jointly during the preceding years. The negotiations, 
however, failed due to the intransigence of the Bangla Congress 
and the exaggerated claims made by the CPI(M). 
After the failure of negotiations for the proposed 
grand alliance, the opposition parties in West Bengal 
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divided themselves into two broad camps* one dominated by 
the CPI(M) and the other by the Bangla Congress and the CPI. 
Finally, two leftist fronts emerged for the purpose of the 
contesting elections of 1967. The United Leftist Front(U.L.F.) 
included seven parties, viz., the Communist Party of India 
(Marxist), Kevolutionary Socialist Party, Samyukta Socialist 
Party, Socialist Unity Centre, Peasants Workers Party, 
Revolutionary Communist Party of India, Forward Bloc (Harxist). 
The second electoral alliance, the People's United Leftist 
front (P-aU.L.F.), included the Communist Party of India, 
Bengals Congress, Forward Bloc, Praja Socialist Party,Gurkha 
League, Lok Sevak 3angh and some independent candidates. 
With the announcement of the results of the elections 
the Congress Party had not merely ceased to be the dominant 
party in West Bengal, but for the first time since independence 
suffered the most devastating and humiliating defeat at the 
polls, llany a head which previously counted rolled in tbe 
dust, even the Chief Minister, P.C. Sen, and tbe top party 
boss, Atulya Ghosh, most unexpectedly lost to their rivals. 
Index I (Appendices) shows the position of U.L.F. and P.F.L.F. 
While the Congress Party was still the single largest 
party in the Assembly, it announced its decision to go into 
the opposition in view of its having failed to secure an 
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absolute majority. But if we go deep into the matter and 
closely examine the causes of this decision, we would 
be able to find that it was a long-term decision of the party. 
If the Congress Party had formed any third coalition, or 
joined either the TJ.L.F. or the P.II.L.F., then it would 
be sharing the responsibilities for the policies of the new 
government whieh eventually caused its downfall, a course 
which would have profound effect upon the elections of 1971 
and 1972 by diminishing the chances of Congress to return 
to power. The victorious parties immediately forged a 
workable alliance in order to fora a coalition ministry. 
The crushing defeat of the Congress Party candidates, the 
huge victory processions and the wild scenes of joy and 
enthusiasm were taken to be a clear expression of electorate's 
verdict in favour of the non-Congress government. 
On February 1967, leaders of the two left fronts and 
independents met in a conference in Calcutta and formed 
a United Democratic Front (U.D.F.5 of 14 constituent parties 
and Ajoy "ukherjee was elected leader of the U.3.F. The 
U.D.F. leader then addressed a letter to the Governor, 
Padmaja Naidu, informing her of its absolute majority in 
the Assembly and its ability to form a non-Congress 
government in the State. As a result, Ajoy Mukherjee was 
invited by the Governor to form such a new government on 
March 1, 1967,(the composition of which can be seen in 
x10 
tbe Index II - Appendices). 
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In November 1967, this United front Ministry was 
dismissed by the Governor on the grounds, inter aliaT that 
11 
it had lost its majority. The United Front started a 
resistance movement, including a programme of civil 
12 
disobedience against the verdict of dismissal. 
Ultimately, in February 1969, a raid-term election 
took place in the State with the result that the United 
Front secured an absolute majority in the Assembly and 
formed a government in West Bengal. Index I (Appendices) 
shows the number of seats won, percentage of votes, number 
of ministers; and Index II (Appendices) shows the names 
13 
of fLnisters, their parties and portfolios. 
4. Formation of the United Front and Its Policies 
After assuming the charge of the office, a guide-
line of policies was adopted by the United Front on 
14 
March 11, 1967, entitled as the "Eighteen Point Programme". 
in this declaration the government recognised the 
right of workers, peasants, teachers and employees of all 
categories to form unions and associations with a view to 
voicing their just demands and grievances. Furthermore, 
it assured that it would not suppress democratic and 
legitimate struggle of the people. 
13? 
However, the new coalition government made quite clear 
that it did not have any intention, whatsoever, to rely 
solely on the administrative machinery for implementation 
of its policies and programmes, and that it would be seeking 
active cooperation and association with the people in all 
matters. This was more than manifested by the United Front 
Government* Indeed, it was for the first time that an attempt 
was made by the State government to redoes the indispensability 
of the highly capable and knowledgeable boreaaeratesf even 
though the newly elected members of the loose and nominated 
ministers were quite ignorant of the nature of their jobs* 
They, boweverf needed the help and assistance of highly 
qualified experts to tackle the complicated administrative 
problems* The United Front1s intention to do away with the 
sapport of the bureaucracy and not to rely on these experienced 
and qualified people was beyond all comprehension, lo 
democracy, however representative and competent it might be, 
can afford to undervalue the role of bureaucrats* 
After its first breakdown, and when the United Front 
alliance returned to office as a result of mid-term poll of 
February, 1969, it adopted, comparatively speaking, more 
radical policies, particularly in the three politically 
crutial areas of food supply, land reform and labour welfare* 
These radical policies were reflected in a declaration, made 
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at a public meeting by %kherjee, to the effect that, ftthe 
kisan (peasant; who produces food and the workers whose 
two hands turn out goods for the people must be given their 
due. The landlords and the capitalists must recognise 
15 
these inalienable rights of the workers and peasants11* 
In April 1969 the Chief Minister, A. Mukherjee, had 
instructed the police that it should not intervene in the 
labour disputes without prior consultation with the Minister 
16 
concerned* In order to reduce the dominance of the police 
force the United Front government reduced tbe total budget 
17 
of the police by Rs.4.8 million. It also declared that it 
would make every possible effort to stop the eviction of the 
peasantsf and promulgated an ordinance on Hay 10, 1969, 
requisitioning unused land for the cultivation of food grain. 
Thus the government could take possession of any cultivable 
land left unused by its owners for one year* In the first 
instance, such land would be taken for one agricultural 
season, but the government was entitled to hold it for 
three consecutive years, during which 25 per cent of the 
produce of such land would go to the owners, 10 per cent to 
IS 
the government and the rest to the cultivators. 
When the administrative machinery was discouraged from 
interfering in land and labour disputes, the peasants became 
free to launch land recovery movement in the entire state»?he 
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State government became helpless as the administrative 
agencies were thus paralysed. The consequences of this 
lack of authority on the part of officials was that the 
peasants started a land grab movement* Through this unrestrainec 
activity the peasants seized 60,000 acres of land by July 
1969, am within two months this figure reached 300,000 
19 
acres* The government of Mast Bengal itself distributed 
only 230,000 acres of this benami land among poor peasants 
and families belonging to landless labour, free of cost, 
and granted remission of land revenue or holdings of three 
20 
acres and less* While efforts to bring about the implemen-
tation of these policies on a larger scale remained however 
on paper, the Ordinance opened out fresh avenues for the 
constituents of the United Front to penetrate deeper into 
the countryside and gather the support of the peasantry* As 
a result, new confrontations started to take place between 
the constituent parties, each of them considering itself 
as gaining a great support from the countryside an! making 
renewed bids to surpass the other* Thus a polarisation 
within the United Front was taking place on account of this 
competitive activity among the peasants from its very 
inception* 
5* Polarisation Within the United Front 
In addition, soon after taking over the charge of 
government many issues, such as distribution of portfolios, 
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enlargement of ministries, law and order situation in West 
Bengal, and varying attitudes towards the laxalite movement 
in particular, was bringing about a sharp polarisation 
between the different constituent units of the United Front. 
The 3SP which had one minister in the cabinet gave an 
ultimatum to the United Front that it would withdraw from 
the ministry unless a member of the Scheduled Pastes was 
included in the cabinet by June 10, 1967* The threatened 
rejection, if it came about, would topple the coalition 
government* After prolonged deliberations the United Front 
decided in favour of expanding the cabinet to 19 by including 
one member of the Scheduled Castes* It is, however, worth 
recording here that despite all internal dissentions and 
stresses and strains, no coiBtituent unit of the United Front 
really appeared willing to quit the alliance, or stretch 
their differences to the breaking point* They seemed 
determined to fight from within, and if necessary, from 
without, to retain the advantages of offices* In such a 
political environment the Central Government had imposed 
President's rule and dissolved the Assembly en Hovember 21,1967, 
The declaration of the President said that sinae no party, 
or coalition of parties, had the majority and was in a 
position to form a government, the President's Bule was 
called for* 
After the mid-term poll of February 1969, the first 
controversy which cropped up was about the party which 
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should hold Chief Minister's office. Both the CPI(M) 
and Bangla Congress were equally desirous of having the 
office of the Chief Minister. Somehow tbe conflict -was 
settled when both parties agreed that the Chief Minister 
would be from the Bangla Congress in lieu of soae important 
21 
portfolios to other constituent parties. Another 
22 
controversy took place on tbe appointment of Bhartaa fira 
as Governor of West Bengal. The Deputy Chief Minister 
Jyoti Basu (CPI(M)), and Somnath Lahiri (Forward Bloc) 
complained that they had learnt of the appointment of 
Dharma Vira from the newspapers, even though the Chief 
Minister admitted that he had been consulted by the Central 
23 
Government. 
To avoid such bickering in future, to maintain 
unity and to take uniform decisions, all the constituent 
parties of the United Front sat together and adopted a 32 
point programme on February 23, 1969. The main purpose 
of this programme seemed to have concerned itself with 
the Naxalite movement and the ways and means whereby the 
constituent units could assist the peasants to achieve 
24 
their objectives. low with the help of the 32 point 
programme, the CPI(K) was in a fortified position to 
advance its own policies with its own interpretation of 
that programme. In light of these considerations the CPI(M) 
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emphasised c lass s truggle of the landless and poor 
25 
peasants* 
In drier to accomplish this task, the GPI(M) 
Land and Land Revenue Minister, H.X.Konar, felt tbe 
necessity of enlisting active help from the landless and 
poor peasants for searching out the Benami lands• Me 
can here recall the first speech of the Chief Minister 
after forming tbe second United Front Government in which 
26 
he expressed his views regarding injustice to the peasants* 
27 
But divergence of opinion emerged between the Chief 
Minister and the Land Ee¥enue Minister, when the latter 
expressed the vien that the CPI(K) was working towards 
building a broad and strong base in the villages for 
28 
bringing about revolution in the near future. In response 
to this* the Chief Minister disapproved his policy and 
said that a real change could be brought about by peaceful 
means based upon Gandhian teachings* The rest of the 
parties of the United front wold not agree to the policy 
adopted by the CfXC>i) and, therefore, launched their land 
grab movement under their o¥n leadership* Had these 
parties launched tbe land grab movement under the banner 
of the CPI(M), it would have been difficult for them to 
secure support among the peasant masses, especially at the 
time vben their political future depended on practical 
nork in tbe rural areas• 
X^acO 
It is worthwhile recalling here that while the 
Bangla Congress was avoiding the support of landlords and 
^illowners, Mukherjee attempted to tackle the problem 
without losing th*^  favour of these powerful groups* In 
this way he posed as real admrer and true follower of 
Gandhian ideology* He tried to handle agrarian problems in 
the light of Gandhian doctrine of Trusteeship* Subsequently, 
when the OPI(M) began to implement the land grab movement 
expecting that this would open a road to the revolution^ 
Mukherjee tried to place obstacles* He asserted that if 
such lawlessness as was inherent in the land grab 
movement were not stopped*. the Bangla Congress would be 
forced to build OD resistance movement on Gandhian lines 
30 
to end this intolerable situation* This statement of 
Mukherjee ^as regarded by Jyoti Basu not only as a 
non-cooperative gesturef but one that would likely to 
cause immense damage to the interests of the landless and 
poor peasants* Jyoti Basu could not appreciate the 
arrogance revealed in his assertion that each and every 
constituent party was obliged to accept all decisions 
which came from the CP1(M), the largest component of the 
31 
United Front* Thus when the CPlCM) vigorously launched 
its own land grab movement irrespective of the wish of 
the other constituent units of the United Front, the CPI, 
Bangla Congress, Forward Bloc and Socialist IFnity Centre 
mounted their own movements too* However^ the Bangla Congress 
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changed its course soon and started to protect the landlords. 
Consequently, several clashes took place in the rural 
areas between the Bangla Congress on the one hand and the 
?2 
CPI, Forward J5Loc and oocialist unit Centre on the other. 
This infighting weakened the tempo of the movement. The 
clashes ^ hich were taking place in the rural areas could 
not regain confined to the villages and countryside, and 
their repercussions could be seen in the Assembly,particularly 
when *4ikherjee declared that the United Front was an 
uncivilised and barbarous government* In fact* Mukherjee 
said that if Jyoti Basu could not make the police end the 
looting and seizure of land, he should resign from the 
government, and further observed that the portfolio was 
gi¥en to Jyoti Basu for running the administration prooerly 
55 
and not for raising party funds by looting f paddy1 . Thus 
these and similar statements which the Chief Minister made 
from time to time, sometimes in public meetings and sometimes 
at different places and on various occasions, strained the 
32-point programme which was formulated by the unanimous 
consent of the constituent units of the United Front 
governments Basw retaliated by saying that "the Chief 
Itinister should not criticise the government -without the 
36 
prior consent of the cabinet or the United frontft* 
This process of ooiarizatlon amongst the partners of 
United front reached its climax on March 16, 1970, ¥hen 
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once again the Central Government imposed President's 
Hule upon the State on the plea that tbe United Front 
had lost its majority in the Assembly and therefore could 
not continue to function as a coalition governments 
6, Split of the QPI(M) and the Merger of 
the Left Wing with the Haxalites 
In the second half of 1966 the national leadership 
of the CP1(M) decided that the party should launch a 
campaign for the elections to take place in West Bengal in 
1967* Although the declaration of the intention to 
participate in the forthcoming elections ¥as binding upon 
all State Committees of the GPI(M) in the country, a 
notable amount of disagreement over the question of vhether 
to participate or not was exhibited anong the aetabars of 
the Meat Bengal Copnittee* 
The leading figure in this controversy was Kanu Sanyal, 
who ¥as representing within the CPt(y) in West Bengal 
the Krishik Samites (Peasants1 Organization) of Darjesling 
38 
district* He spoke for the Left Wing of the party, which 
demanded that tbe party implement a Hevolotionary Strategy 
based upon peasant masses. However, because the leadership 
of the State Committee would not commit itself to this stand, 
the Krishik Samitee organised a separate contention in 
March 1967, in which the State Unit of GPI(M) was not 
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represented. Under leadership of Kanu Sanyal, this 
Convention decided that the Left Wing would follow 
revolutionary methods in spite of the fact that these 
were contrary to the views of the majority of the CPI(M), 
xn the Convention Mazumdar and Stashil "Hoy Ghoudhry jointly 
circulated a document criticising this majority stand and 
demanded that the CPI(K) should not take part in the 
40 
electoral process and instead follow revolutionary strategy. 
They were not alone in holding such views inside the 
CPT(M). i'roa its very inception the CPI(M) contained quite 
a good nuiber of members who wanted the party to commit 
itself to the Communist Party of China in its battle with 
the Communist Party of Soviet Union and to adopt a programme 
which would reflect the views of tbe Communist Party of 
41 
China or in Indian situation. Bat when the central leadership 
of the CPI(M) refused to lake any concession, it became 
disappointed. 
After this Convention, the CPI(M) in West Bengal 
was making efforts to bring back the leftists to the party's 
fold. It pledged in an 18-point programme of the United 
Front ministry "to recognise the rights of workers and 
peasants to voice their just demands and genuine grievances", 
not to. suppress the democratic and legitimate struggles of 
the people", and that "the United Front will not depend 
upon the centrally appointed administrative machinery". By 
14? 
these formulations the Cfl(M) intended to make the d i s s iden t s 
understand tha t the par ty \ias not e n t i r e l y opposed to 
the revolut ionary approaches* Ho¥everf these attempts 
¥ere not successful , as i s evident from the fac t that 
the membership of tbe Darty went down from 22f000 to 
42 
17f000 at the end of "lay 198?* Simultaneously, however, 
the iieiibership of the Krishik Samittee leaped fro® 6,000 
t o 40f000# Sone 15,000 to 20f000 peasants were working f u l l 
time t o transform peasants1 Committee in to armed Village 
43 
Defence Groups* As a r e s u l t , the l e f t fac t ion of CPl(M) 
s p l i t away to fora i t s o¥n group nhich, eventual ly , formed 
a new revolat ionary Communist Party claining to represent 
genuine I^arxism^Leninlssi as contained in the thoughts of 
Mao Tse-tung. 
The confrontation between the leftists and the 
leadership of GPI(M) took place at a Plenary Session of 
Central Committee of CPI(M), which was held at Burdwan 
(West Bengal) from April 6 to 11, 1968. The leftists 
submitted their own document in which they severely criticised 
the OPI(M) and said that its leaders had been adopting 
neo-revisionist policies; however, this document of the left 
45 
faction was rejected by a large majority of votes. 
With these new developments the GPI(M) leaders 
seriously engaged themselves in finding out some formula 
148 
by which they could maintain t h e i r influence over the 
en t i r e Krishik Samitee* Promode Das Gupta, Secretary 
of the West Bengal Committee and a member of p o l i t i c a l 
Bureau of the CPI(M), in a conference of West Bengal 
I r i s h i k Samitee (which was held from June 6 to 8, 1969 at 
Cantai), said tha t ftthough tbe extremists Mere vociferous 
^abowt agrarian revolution they very s ign i f i can t ly avoided 
48 
the question of i t s leadership;1 He fur ther remarked 
tha t ,fthe r e v o l u t i o n i s t s do not want the working c lass 
47 
to lead the revolut ionn 9 4 suggestion nas given by bin 
to the extremists to the effect tha t the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of 
success in revolut ion would be much grea te r if the agrarian 
c lass would subnit to the leadership of the working c l a s s • 
Here Krishna lonar , Minister of Land and Land Heventie) 
observed tha t the United Front Government of 1969 during 
i t s brief tenure of off ice helped the deprived peasantry 
to stand erect for the f i r s t t i n e and? consecraently, the 
United front was voted in to off ice again by peasant support 
48 
in 1969* The purpose of t h i s statement was to suggest 
tha t the JW(M) fs pos i t ion concerning the parliamentary means 
of s t ruggle bad been receiving support froa a l a rge number 
of peasants* In these circumstances, revolut ionary s t ra tegy 
had a very l i t t l e support aaong the peasants and a sna i l 
chance of success* 
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Despite all these efforts, the leadership of the 
left wing wooId not listen, as is evident from the 
statement of a peasant leader named 1L 3anerjee who 
belonged to Nazalbarl area. He said that he tried to 
impress nhe CPI(M) strategy upon Kami Sanyal1 s group by 
pointing out that the strategy based upon Maoism was 
wrongf but the leftists did not pay any heed; they put 
their faith in the leadership of lanu Sanyal, only to 
•3;*? 
reap treachery later* 
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Chapter ? 
IgSPOlSl OF TEB ClMfBAL GOVBBHMSHT 
1# Presidents Hole Imposed Upon 
West Bengal 
"Svantually, after the break dowa of the second United 
Front on March 16, 1970, it was a most appropriate tiae 
for the Central Government to promulgate the President1 s 
Hale over West Bengal again* Consequently, on larch 19,1969, 
the nineteenth promulgation since the operation of the 
Constitution of Indian Republic, case into force within a 
period of 20 years* As Article 356 of the Constitution 
provided, the Central Government proclaimed that since no 
party nas in a position to present a majority sufficient 
to form a government, the Central Government was constrained 
to take over the administration of the State* The State 
Legislative Assembly ¥as suspended as a result of this 
proclamation and all legislative and executive powers were 
taken over by the Central Parliament* S.S* Dhawan,the then 
1 
Governor, became an agent of the Central Government* The 
new administration was approved by the two houses of the 
Central Parliament on March 30 and 31, 1970.Moreover, the 
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Parliament gave its assent that legally and constitutionally 
2 
the President Bule may continue up to ?!arch 18, 1973. The 
Governor became solely responsible for the establishment 
and maintenance of law and order in the State* 
The Governor consulted the military authorities 
as to the ways and neans of suppressing grave incidents 
of lawlessness• The deteriorating law and order situation 
was causing genuine anxiety to the civil as well as 
military authorities. To deal with massive violence whieh 
disrupted tbe law and order situation and vitiated the 
peaceful life in the State only the army could be used 
effectively* But the military authorities suggested that 
for thea it would be difficult to deal with the Maoist 
elements with their limited powers* The Governor,therefore, 
considered the feasibility of reviving the Act of 1932, 
namely the Bengal Suppression of Terrorist Outrage Act, 
which provided that all literature which was calculated to 
encourage the extremist activities will be banned* Any 
person infringing the laws could be taken in the police 
3 
custody for 24 hours for interrogation* Since the approval 
of the President was necessary for reviving the bill and 
bringing it into force, the Governor sent the draft of 
the bill to the President for this purpose-
On November 22, 1970, tbe President gave his assent 
after the bill was duly altered and amended to suit the 
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new s i t u a t i o n . The amended b i l l provided tha t any person 
found Indulging in or i n s t i g a t i n g v io lence , promoting an 
ideology to overthrow or overawe the government established 
by law or bringing about a change in the Const i tut ion, 
would be l i a b l e to severe punishment. Hot only t h i s , i f 
a person had previously been found gu i l t y , he would be 
t r i e d and awarded punishment and j a i l e d for a period of 
4 
three years . The Governor proclaimed the imposition of 
Section 144 Or.P.J . and 107 Jr .P.O. to take severe action 
against the Maoists. 
4s a r e s u l t of these act ions and in a short span of 
time more than 70,000 suspected persons were on the l i s t 
wanted by the po l ice . But only 7,000 suspected Haxal i tes , 
and several Marxist members of the State Assembly, were 
5 
a r re s t ed . As a matter of f a c t , there was no proof tha t 
a person taken in to custody on mere suspicion was r ea l l y 
act ive in the Naxalite movement, because the f igure of 
suspected persons l i s t e d by the Police was 70,000, while 
the t o t a l membership of tbe Krishik Samitee was fa r below 
6 
t h i s number. Moreover, not a i l nembers of the Samitee were 
Maoists. Sven if we include the l e f t i s t s s tudents , the 
f igure would not reach 70,000. Most probably, the same 
ca lcu la t ion was made by the p a r t i e s in the opposit ion, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y in West Bengal. The Oosntaunists in the S ta te , 
and o the rs , s t a r t ed c r i t i c i s i n g the Central Government 
161 
al leging tha t the pol ice was a r res t ing a l l the c r i t i c s 
of government p o l i c i e s . The a t t i t u d e of the Central 
Government towards West Bengal was considered undemocratic 
and d i rec ted towards crushing the leg i t imate r igh t s and 
freedom of the people* But the au tho r i t i e s of the Central 
Government were confident tha t act ions taken by them were 
fu l ly j u s t i f i e d , although the Home Minister, Mr«Y,B. Shaven, 
in a statement, c l ea r ly a d ^ t t e d the fac t that some of 
7 
those arres ted may not be Haxalites. 
l e t us look in some d e t a i l at the po l i c i e s pursued 
and the pol ice s t ra tegy adopted by the West Bengal 
government, under the d i r ec t ion of the Central Government, 
and the extent to which they were successful* 
2m
 ^ l i t a r y and Police Operations 
Tinder the Pres idents Rule the f i r s t a t t en t ion was 
given to the pol ice budget, which had hem reduced by the 
8 
second United Front Government in 1969, In 1970 the Central 
Government doubled the expenditure keeping in view the 
need for additional police force and tbe presence of the 
amy in West Bengal* Again in 1970-71, there was an increase 
9 
of more than As.10 million* This enhanced expenditure was 
incurred on account of nine battalions (each battalion 
consisted of 900 personnel) of the Border Security ^oroe 
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10 
and State's own police force numbering about 71,000. These 
additional forces were working in two spheres. Firstly, 
the bulk of the 3order Security Force was posted on the 
borders of West Bengal. Secondly, a large portion of the 
police force was posted in key points in the city areas and 
villages which were considered to be the main trouble spots. 
More arms were supplied to the police stations in the State. 
As far as Calcutta was concerned, 18,000 military and 
police personnel were posted there. 
According to these statistics one policeman was oosted 
12 
for every 600 persons only in Calcutta city. Ihese forces 
started combing tbe area froa all directions in the northern 
part of West Bengal on March 19, 1970. Their operations 
showed some degree of success when in August 1970 two prominent 
Haxallte leaders, along with some of their colleagues, were 
arrested in Singijobora Tea Estate about 18 kilometers from 
13 
Siliguri. Here we amy recall that Kanu Sanyal was released 
14 
by tbe second United Front Government on April 9, 1969. 
In the Debra-Gopiballabhpure, in Midnapur District 
which was the Naxalite belt, the local people whole-heartedly 
supported the police in these operations. With the help 
of the local people the police arrested the top ranking 
leader of the area, Gundhar Ma rum, along with 550 other 
15 
Haxalites on April 30, 1970. 
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Usually the police launched operations very 
carefully, in fact tactfully* Wherever they intended to 
raid, they surrounded tbe area, before making house to house 
search, without giving even the slightest indication*Broadly 
speaking, the raids of police ware comparatively well planned 
as compared to secret raids of the Haxalites under the 
16 
command of Oharu Mazumdar. Bat as a result of such 
carefully executed operations the police unearthed hundreds 
of bombs and other weapons, the estimated value of which 
1? 
was nearly half a million rupees, and a weapons factory in 
18 
Calcutta* The most significant achievement of the police 
campaign against tbe Haxalites, and an irritrieveable set-
back for the movement, was on July 16, 1972# On that day 
^haru Mazumdar was arrested in his house in Intally, a 
Calcutta suburb* In this raid the police recovered some 
most important documents which subsequently guided the 
19 
police towards the arrest of other Naxalites* 
Some attempts were made by the police to arrest the 
20 
Naxalite students of Jadavpur University on July 24,19?0# 
This campaign was led by the University students, who had 
opposed the movement from its very beginning, but were in 
21 
a weak position to do anything about it* When the police 
entered the University with the intention of arresting the 
Naxalite students, a strong resistance took place* The 
police then resorted to Lathi-charge (beating by sticks), 
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22 
and when this proved ineffective, opened fire on tbe students. 
On August 10, 1970, another Naxalite leader, Jangal 
Santhal, was arrested in the village of 3hapra in West 
Dinajpur. While these operations were continuing, the 
CPI(fl) leaders demanded that the police must end its ruthless 
activities, and that an enquiry commission should be set 
up to investigate police excesses and the cause of firing 
at Jadavpur University. These demands were rejected on 
October 28, 1970, when West Bengal administration decided 
not to hold any enquiry into police operations for at least 
24 
three months. The administration believed that any 
enquiry at that stage would reduce the efficiency of the 
police in maintaining the law and order in the State, 
even though the Home Minister of the Centre confirmed that 
all the victims of the police operations naay not have 
25 
been laxalites. 
Thousands of Haxalites were behind the bars, faany 
died, but many remained free. It is alleged that so® 
Maxalites were killed by the police when in the middle of 
night they were pasting pro-Mao posters or painting slogans 
26 
and pictures on the walls in Calcutta. Although costly in 
huaan terms, the police operations were remarkably successful 
in political terms and soon the Haxalites started to paint 
slogans in oraise of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi instead 
27 
of Mao Tse-tung. 
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3. Agrarian Beforras 
While the police operations continued, in order to 
meet the challenge of the Maoists in West Bengal, the 
Central Government had set up a Central Land Heforms 
Conmittee in 1970 to defuse the tense situation in the 
countryside. Its Chairman was Fakhruddin Aii ihmad, the 
Union Minister of Food and Agriculture. The basic purpose of 
the Committee was to review the progress of the previous 
land reform measures, to identify the weaknesses and gaps 
in the land laws and their imolementations and to make 
28 
recomaendations for improving land policy. Cn the 
recommendations of this CowLttee the Central Government 
approved "The West Bengal Land Heforas Act of 1970" on 
January 28, 1970. The Hew Land Reform Act laid down that 
ceiling would be imposed on ©ore than 12.4 acras of land 
in irrigated areas and 17,3 acres in other areas. It would 
not apply to individuals but to families. The holdings of 
a husband, wife, minor sons and unmarried daughters would 
be considered as family holdings, but their number should 
not exceed five. Special provision was made for relaxing 
the ceiling in cases where the number of family members 
would exceed five. Nevertheless, there would be an overall 
liiait of 17.3 acres in irrigated areas and 24.13 acres in 
other areas. If the sole surviving adult person were unmarried, 
he would not be entitled to keep in bis possession more 
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than 6.2 acres of irrigated land and 8.62 acres of land 
in other areas. The government also declared that any 
person, or group of persons, would not be permitted to 
take forcible possession of any plot of land. It proposed 
to undo the forcible occupation of land seized by the 
laxalites in the following three types of categories? 
Ca) where the persons who forcibly occupied the land held 
more than two acres of land and it did not belong to the 
eligible category, (b) where forcible occupation of vested 
land had displaced and ousted another persons genuinely 
belonging to the eligible category who had been cultivating 
the land under a government licence, and (c) where the 
land occupied belonged to an individual who had been holding 
it peacefully within the existing ceiling, 
In tbe first two cases the government had decided to 
take immediate action under the appropriate law for the 
eviction of the tresspassers, but in the third case it would 
set the law in motion to redress the wrong done to them, 
It was also proclaimed by the government that the 
sharecroppers who provided necessary inputs would be 
entitled to 75 per cent share of tbe crop as against 60 per 
cent which they were entitled to in the past. ¥here the 
shareeropper contributed only labour and other inputs were 
provided by the land owner, the earlier share of 60 per 
cent would continue. 
16? 
4* Problems of Implementation of Land Reforms 
There were gaps in this land legislation and defects 
in its implementation, and the purpose of the land reforms 
coold not be achieved if these loopholes were not plugged* 
In the following pages we will highlight the defects of 
this legislation and the shortcoming in its implementation, 
and show how these laws served the purposes of the landlords 
instead of providing some benefits to the poor peasantry 
and the sharecroppers» 
In the previous land reform legislation the tanks 
and fisheries -were exempted from the ceiling limits upon 
land holdings* The result was that the landlords surrepti-
tiously converted thousands of acres into fisheries in order 
29 
to evade the ceiling* Moreover, the land legislation did 
50 
not give any hard and fast rules for the family holdings, 
and under the elaase in which tbe number of the members 
of the family was enhanced the landlords soon entered into 
31 
benaml transactions in favour of their unborn babies. An 
incredible ease was brought to light in whieh a leader of 
the Congress Party, a member of the West Bengal Legislative 
Assembly, kept property in the name of one Fatik whieh turned 
32 
oat to be the name of his horse# In the Statesman of 
July 18, 1970, it was reoorted that one landlord had 
55 
registered 75 acres of land in the name of his dog* If 
the community had surplus land, soeb steps cotiid be taken 
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by landowners with some justification, but when the 
pressure on the land -was high and the people were living 
much below poverty line such vagaries were most unjust 
and the evil doers should have been taken to task. Again, 
much confusion arose due to lack of precise definition 
of the family. There were complications also due to lengthy 
procedures in the court of law -where these disputed cases 
were to be decided. Nearly 1,000,000 acres of agricultural 
land was locked up in 68,000 civil suits pending in the 
lower courts of West Bengal. Until these cases were finally 
decided no steps could be taken to distribute the surplus 
land among the landless and poor peasantry by tbe State 
Governments 
Moreover, it was quite obvious that no land reform 
was possible without the efficient working of tbe adminis-
trative and judicial machinery, The blame for inefficiency 
coold not be pot exclusively on impersonal boreaocracy# 
The reason is that quite a few high ranking and inflyential 
bureaucrats sat tightly on the files and would not allow 
the machinery to move, because they served the interests 
of the landlords* Self-seeking politicians also contributed 
their share in making the land reform a failure* Snob vested 
interests were in abandance and clogged the progressive 
realisation of the land reform This was admitted by the 
Congress Minister of State for Hone in West Bengal %then? 
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in a public meeting, he said tha t f llt vas bureaucracy 
vhieb helped corrupt landlords as well as some police 
o f f i c i a l s who had been placing obstac les in the nay of 
35 
implementation of land reforms "• Another important 
representa t ive of the Congress Government, Mr.3.3ubrataaniam, 
former Finance Minis ter of the Union Government of Xndis^ 
said i n the lok Ssbha on August 4 , 1975, tha t he painful ly 
56 
agreed tha t the money-lenders have been using unfair 
37 
means to promote and protect t h e i r se l f i sh i n t e r e s t s * 
Insp i t e of the ru les and regula t ions in t h i s regard the 
money-lenders were craf ty enough to exploi t the poverty 
s t r iken masses# This was frankly afimtted by the government, 
and l e f t i s t s admitted i t s helplessness in t h i s regard* 
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Chapter VI 
HSA30N3 FOR THE FAXLWRS OF THB KAXALITB MOYMBHf 
! • Harrow Soc ia l Base of t h e Revolu t ionary 
Mgveiaent 
We have seen in the preceding pages that the 
revolutionary activities began in a narrow area in the 
north of West Bengal^ in Iaxalbari region, from which it 
bears its name. A summary of the reasons for the failure 
of the movement is outlined below* 
The entire revolutionary movement was characterised 
by exaggerated expectations which were not borne oat by 
actual achievements* This is a common trait of ail features 
of Indian polities, but it is much more marked in the 
Naxalite movement* The Naxalite leaders presented an 
unrealistic and exaggerated picture of their activities and 
achievements* The growth of the movement was not eve% while 
the discontent of the militant cadres became increasingly 
intensive* As a natter of fact, the cadres did not fully 
realise the extent to which the peasantry was not prepared 
to participate in such activities* The synpathisera were 
very few, the active supporters even fewer. The villagers 
were not wholly in favour of participating in sach a 
hazardous novement•They were afraid of the hostile environment 
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and thought that they were not at all prepared to face 
the mighty political and administrative machinery which 
was opposed to then. The Haxalites thought that whatever 
they achieved was sufficient to bring about agrarian 
revolution in the countryside, but the brutal violence 
which accompanied them isolated them in fact from the 
masses. As Kanu Sanyal said, nour failure in establishing 
the revolutionary political power and in carrying out 
revolutionary land reforms blunted the edge of class 
1 
struggle". He also expressed his doubts about the 
2 
prospects which future had in store for them* 
Another glaring iiistake committed by the Saxalites 
was that they confined the first stage of their revolution 
3 
to the countryside, and believed that because the class 
enemy in villages was unprotected it would be possible to 
defeat hi a. They forgot that the traditional kinship, 
particularly in the villages, has a significant status 
with the result that the relatives of the class ene<ay who 
were members of the movement would not tolerate any harmful 
action against their relatives. Consequently, when 
liazumdar launched his annihilation strategy the Haxalites 
divided themselves into several groups over this issue. 
Xn the meantime, however, the class enemy reorganised 
himself, or began to seek help from outside, which permitted 
the heavy interference of the government machinery in the 
17? 
s t raggle against the Naxalites. Through the mass media 
the peasants were aroused against the Kaxallte a c t i v i t i e s 
and i n d i r e c t l y supported many repress ive measures of the 
government. 
At the time when the Central Government s t a r t ed 
i n t e r f e r i n g i n the so-called l ibe ra ted areas* the l a x a l i t e 
leadership was ra ther over-confident that the untrained 
personnel of the People 's l i be r a t i on Army equipped with 
60 r i f l e s and 200 pipe-guns would c rea te so*ie dent in the 
4 
well-*trained and well-equipped government forces . Moreover* 
while the cen t r a l leadership decided to keep t h e i r 
a c t i v i t i e s s t r i c t l y secret* and the par ty apparatus was 
to remain underground, i t was not so i n fact•The preliminary 
conferences of the oar ty took olaae openly and the b i r th 
of CPI(K-L) was publ ic ly announced at a meeting held a t 
Calcutta Ilaldan on %fey l f 1969 • 
Moreover* emphasis should be appropr ia te ly placed 
upon the romantic and dramatic aspects of the l a x a l i t e 
l eader s . These fac to r s made them pedantic* and as has been 
observed ea r l i e r* u n r e a l i s t i c in t h e i r approach and 
exaggerated in t he i r claims* which in fac t antagonised the 
majority of the peasants«This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y c lear fro® the 
boastful statement of Ghana Mazumdar that flfroot the foot 
of the Himalayas in the north to the r iver Estuary in the 
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south and the sa l f o r e s t s in the south-west, Mast Bengal's 
countryside was resounding with the foo t - s teps of brave 
5 
peasant g u e r r i l l a s f,» Within two years of the proclamation 
Mazumdar1s foot-s teps* his movement lay in ruins* his 
Peoole* s Liberation Ar*iy not on %arch on the sprawling 
6 
p la ins of West Bengal by beginning of 1971* if not in 1970*1* 
The enclosed map indica tes the extent of the movement 
in 1S69* According to Gupta* out of 56,000 v i l l ages of 
8 
India* only 200 v i l l ages were in the grip of the movement* 
They were spread over a vast area* without any regular 
f a c i l i t i e s through which the Haxalites could convey t h e i r 
messages e f f i c i e n t l y without being in te rcep ted hj the 
government* While the ftaxallte leaders believed that the 
secret i n s t ruc t ions would be t ransmit ted c l e a r l y from person 
to person, the fac t was that these i n s t ruc t ions were not 
complete and were frequently confusing* In many cases wri t ten 
plans were disclosed in the course of transmission from one 
place to the other• These documents then became imaensaly 
helpful to tbe pol ice to nount successful operat ions in 
whieh many Haxali tes were rounded up or weeded out# 
2#
 Pac t ional Struggle Within the Movement 
While the areas under the influence of the Naxalites 
shrank* within the brief span of f ive years the leadership 
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s p l i t in to several fac t ions such asi CD Asit Sen1s Maoist 
Communist Centre; (2) Swadesb Mi t ra f s Lai Jhanda Dal; 
(S) Par inal Bas ^upta*s P ro le ta r ian Party; (4) Araulya 
Ganguli !s Communist Group; and (5) Ashim Chat ter jaa fs 
CPlCM-LVs Regional Committees of West Bengal, Bihar, 
Orissa for launching Maoist s t ra tegy in the country. 
Although there were several i ssues which divided 
these groups* the most c ruc ia l was tbe question of forcing 
a party* One view was that a par ty should develop na tu ra l ly 
fTom below and should not be imposed from above• I t should 
be based upon the day to day experience of the Kaxalites 
in ac tua l struggle* But the formation of the CPI(M-L) in 
May 1989 apparently marked the v ic tory of those who 
opposed a loosely organised movement* When c r i t i c i sm of 
the Mazumdar1s po l ic ies became severe* he r e t a l i a t e d by 
saying tha t today many groups pay only " l ip - se rv ice to 
9 
Chairman Mao Tse-tung and even t o the ifaxalite movement f,« 
Another i s sue which divided the revolu t ionar ies was the 
question of s t ra tegy of annihi lat ion* Furthermore* a good 
deal of confusion arose with regard to pol icy towards 
t rade unions and elect ions* On these cont rovers ia l i s sues 
Mazuodar fought his r i va l s vigorously* warning then tha t 
the various groups tha t have united to oppose his t fbatt le 
10 
of ann ih i la t ion by using the name of Chairman Mao11* are 
bound to f a i l in their a t tempts . 
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As we have mentioned earlier* instead of fovulating 
a united and effective strategy on how to defeat their 
class enemy* tbe laxalite leaders hatched plans to do 
away with those sections of the movement which opposed 
them* They were thus frittering away energies and wasted 
resources in annihilating rival factions Instead of the 
class enemy* They thought that the survival of one group 
depended on the weakening of the other• One faction wanted 
another faction to wither away and leave the arena 
exclusively to the disposal of the former* fhus, the onset 
of the factional struggle narked the turning point in the 
laxalite movement• These developments were more than 
enough to dislodge the leaders from their strongholds* and 
toppled the organization of the laxalites in a very short 
time. Thus* the avowed objective of the laxalites was not 
only the achievement of political power but also the 
removal of the other Maoists from the revolutionary 
movement* It is significant tb?t Ashim Chatterjee went to 
the extent of expressing his grief that be could not perform 
the important task of annihilating Mazumdar. This self-
defeating spirit of revenge did not only open the road 
for the government to interfere effectively with the 
movement* it also placed insurmountable barriers in the 
way of the land grab movement, for all practical purposes* 
the onset of internal rivalries signalled the beginning 
of the end of the movements 
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5* Land-Grab Movement Misfired 
The Land-Grab Movement was positively the most fruitful 
activity of the laxalites* But the success of the movement 
was not entirely due to the operations launched by the 
laxalites, nor was it the consequence of the achievements 
of the Maoists* In fact* it was the result of the reasonable 
demands made by tbe poor peasantry from time to time which 
created in turn a general political climate of pressure 
conducive to the effectiveness of such a movement* This 
movement exercised pressure on the government* which had 
no alternative but to pass the land reform laws and thus 
partially accept the demands put forward by the laxalites 
with regard to distribution and redistribution of land* 
As a result* significant changes were made by the Central 
Government also in the land reform policies in favour of 
poor peasants* 
However* the central question to be answered is why 
did the Land-Grab Movement of the laxalites misfire when 
the circumstances were so favourable? Perhaps* the main 
reason was that the laxalites functioned as a house divided 
against itself• The infighting among the Naxalite leadership 
increased the effectiveness of the already mighty power 
of the government and continued to weaken the movement* 
Consequently* they could not decide as to who was the class-
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enemy and ¥hat was the appropriate method to deal with 
him# Because of th is* they recrui ted in to t h e i r ranks 
many people - vho ^ere in fact hidden enemies* Moreover* 
the peasants i^ ho ^ r e soc ia l ly under the influence of 
t r a d i t i o n a l r u r a l e l i t e s refused to accept the leadership 
of the urban l a x a l i t e * The students who entered the 
v i l l a g e s under the d i rec t ion of Mazumdar re ta ined t h e i r 
¥h i te co l l a r habi ts and could not become popular* The 
v i l l a g e r s did not subscribe to the idea of ann ih i la t ion 
of t h e i r co^v i l l agers , and henc^ did not cooperate with 
the urba-oriented youth from the c i t i e s who were rea l 
s t rangers to them. Gradually* a la rge number of peasants 
and t r i b a l s d i ssoc ia ted themselves from the land-grab 
operations* vhich was a contr ibut ing fac tor to the f a i l u r e 
of tbe mo¥ament» This deser t ion by poor peasants provided 
s t rength to the argument of the government that in f ac t 
i t s purpose was merely to el iminate cr iminal a c t i v i t i e s , 
crush a n t i - s o c i a l elements and el iminate violence ¥hicb 
had taken inca lcu lab le t o l l of l ives of innocent people* 
The Times reported tha t under t h i s p re tex t the government 
rounded up some 3*000 peasants on charges of indulging i n 
i l l e g a l and an t i - soc i a l a c t i v i t i e s which jeopardised the 
12 
peaceful atmosphere of these a r e a s . I t ¥as s ign i f i can t 
that a l l charges brought against them ¥are proved by the 
government and tha t evidence ¥as published to make sure tha t 
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the people would not consider them innocent and glorify 
their misdeeds* Thus the people san eye to eye with the 
government, which spelled the doom of the laxalites* 
4
- Collapse of the United Front 
Government 
After examining the two short periods when the tvo 
United Front Governments ^ere in power, one should note the 
vast difference in their attitude towards the laxalite 
Movement* While in the first period the movement ¥as 
sympathised with and ^as allowed to flourish as a popular 
mass movement ¥hich championed the cause of the downtrodden, 
during the second term it t^ as suppressed as a pernicous 
aberration which specialised in terrorism and violence 
and thus forfeited the confidence of the peasantry* The 
cold-blooded and indiscriminate murder of the many innocent 
people gave rise to the suspicion that these trigger 
happy laxalites were concerned mom nith grabbing political 
power for themselves than grabbing land for the poor^ 
Although the most important portfolio of Police and Home 
Affairs was assigned to tbe OPI(M), the United Front 
Government did not relish the idea of murder of political 
opponents• nor did it agree to the deviation!st approaches 
of the Haxalites* Throughout tbe tvo United Front regimes 
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there nas no ban on laxalite literature or its organisational 
activityf but its moves were closely Hatched ana those nbo 
were found guilty of penal crimes were severely dealt vith* 
It may be recalled that all political parties in 
the United Front were responsible for perpetual intricacies 
and intra-party clashes vhioh significantly intensified 
particularly ¥hen the CPI(M-L) started the Land-Grab 
Movement* Apparently, the motive of each constituent party 
vas to enlarge its own bases in rural areas and thus 
enhance its sphere of influence* Initially, they did not 
even criticise or oppose the laxalites in the areas inhere 
these parties wielded some influence, and in fact provided 
shelter to the laxalites revolutionaries* 
Curiously enough, up to March 18, 1970, even the 
Chief Minister Ajoy Mukherjee, a Gandhian leader and a 
believer in the theory of non-violence, nas tolerating all 
violent activities in the State* He simply said that 
he would resign from his post if these violent activities 
mm not stopped by the Communists* In the meantime, he 
vas engaged in consultations with other parties, including 
the Congress Party, as to how to replace the United Front 
Government by an alternative coalition so that he might 
quit office* These efforts of Ajoy Mukherjee continued 
untill such time as the lav and order situation had gone 
completely out of the control of the United Front Government* 
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On the eve of his resignat ion he explained why he was 
constrained not to qui t office e a r l i e r , j u s t i fy ing his 
staying in of f ice by saying tha t he was not a t a i l prepared 
to allow China to take over the administrat ion of the State 
during chaos created by the l axa l i t e s* 
After the d i sso lu t ion of the United Front Government 
due to the promulgation of the Pres idents Bale by the 
Central Government on March 19, 1969, the ever increasing 
lawlessness doe to the f ree hand of tbe l a x a l i t e s came 
under check* While the l a x a l i t e s who took she l te r under the 
umbrella of d i f fe ren t p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s were now i so l a t ed , 
i t did not taean that a l l Naxalite a c t i v i t i e s came to an 
end* After the declara t ion of the P res iden t ' s Bile the 
l a x a l i t e s shif ted the i r scene of act ion from the countryside 
to the c i t i e s , but now t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s were l imited to 
s s a l l areas where they could be ea s i l y tackled* 
5. Effective Measures of the Central 
Government 
One of the reasons for the debacle of the l a x a l i t e 
Movement was the timely in tervent ion of the Central Government, 
With the promulgation of the President*s Hole on March 19, 
1969, the Bordir Securi ty Force, the Central Eeserve Police 
and West Bengal1s own pol ice force walked into the so-cal led 
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•Liberated Areas1 in massive strength* In a very short 
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period of time the hold of the laxalites over the few 
pockets was crushed* The Link described the harsh measures 
taken by the police to crush lawlessness in these areas 
in these wordss tffou do not know when there will be carfew 
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and you may be hit by a police ballet % when you would 
be coming hotie* In this battle against the lawless elements 
thousands of laxalites, or those suspected as such, were 
taken into custody on alleged charges of looting, arson, 
murder and dacoity* 
While they were in jail, the most prominent and 
active leaiers who opposed the non-violent ^eans started 
seriously examining and reviewing their previous stand. 
A change was witnessed in the attitude of leaders like 
lanu Sanyal, Jangal Santhal, Kadam Maliok and Mujlbur 
Rahman* In contrast to their previous revolutionary strategy 
they adopted the Gandhian strategy of hunger strike in 
order to get first class treatment, previously given only 
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to very important political prisoners* Thus the Maoist 
strategy was replaced by the non-violent Gandhian strategy 
with the only difference that Gandhi had never struggled 
for selfish ends or personal benefits as the ifsxaiite 
leaders were now doing* This remarkable change became soon 
apparent everywhere, particularly when those Haxalites 
who were f ree and not j a i l ed replaced the slogan of ffLong 
Live Miao Tse-tung11 with the slogan "Long Live Indira Gandhi tf* 
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Moreover, the Haxalites lost almost ail their 
leading personalities* While Sadhan Sanker* the Secretary 
of the Maoist faction and Ashlm Chatterjee were in jail 
with Saroj Butt, M i tor of Liberation^ Br* Eoy and 
A* ttokberjee, the latter three leaders were suspected 
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to have been killed there* But the movement received its 
gravest shock when lharu Mazumdar died* This loss totally 
broke the backbone of the laxalite movement* 
6* Reforms 
As soon as the police operat ions defeated the 
insurgency and when the United Front Government had 
collapsed on March 16, 1969, and was replaced by P r e s i d e n t s 
Bale9 the next important task for the Central Government 
was to sa t i s fy the large sect ions of peasantry which were 
economically backward and l ived much below the poverty l ine* 
In order to achieve t h i s purpose, the government devoted 
i t s e l f to introducing reforms both in urban and ru ra l spheres* 
The s t a t i s t i c s given by the Chief Minister of West Bengal, 
3.3* Boy, In an interview to the Mnk show the following 
p ic tures 
tfIhe government had d is t r ibu ted land amongst 799,745 
a g r i c u l t u r i s t s of whoa ^ 2 , 0 0 0 belonged to the Scheduled 
Caste, 273,000 to the Tribes, 129,000 to Moslems and 
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215,000 to others* Further he said tha t the t o t a l area 
of the land d i s t r ibu ted was 662,023 acres , out of which 
homestead lands have been d i s t r ibu ted amongst 269,434 
homeless families* Of these 120,000 families belonged to 
Scheduled Caste, 46,000 f a i l l e s to Tr ibals and 44,000 
Moslem families* 
According to a sample^survey conducted by the Bureau 
of Applied Economies and S t a t i s t i c s of the Government of 
West Bengal, the Central Government i n i t i a t e d a special 
employment programme in 1972-73, with generous ass is tance 
from the Central Government* In the f i r s t period i t was 
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lis* 21*8 mill ion, to be increased in subsequent years* 
In the case of those educated unemployed who preferred 
to work in p r iva te or j o i n t en t e rp r i se s , or other sea l -
government i n s t i t u t i o n s , the government agreed to provide 
them with st ipends to acquire s k i l l s , Anyhow, though the 
st ipends would not be too a t t r a c t i v e , the person concerned 
would have acquired the r equ i s i t e s k i l l so that he might be 
a useful hand in case some vacancies occurred* Thus the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of imparting s k i l l and providing the job 
would now be equally shared by the government i n the form of 
st ipends and by the i n s t i t u t i o n s in tbe form of providing 
t ra in ing and experience and giving f i r s t preference i n job 
openings to such qual i f ied hands* The employment programme of 
1972-73 
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provided relief also to those person who would like to 
be engaged in their own business. It provided additional 
incsntive to the people to undertake self-employment in the 
countryside in the form of private small business and cottage 
industry* It was hoped that this would increase production 
and in turn provide more job opportunities and contribute 
to the thriving of the economy* It was decided by the 
government to finance those desirous to employ themselves 
in small industries with loans amounting up to ten per cent 
of the financial outlays, while the banks would provide 
loans up to 90 per cent* Under this programme i^any people 
in the State were enabled to establish cottage and small 
scale industries and create employment avenues for a large 
number of educated unemployed* It was stated that the 
disgruntled unemployed youth would thus be diverted from 
fruitless and destructive political activity to more 
constructive economic channels, increasing the productivity 
of the country on the one hand and improving their own 
economic condition on the other* The government established 
2,128 units in the underdeveloped areas to supervise the 
progress of work in this field so that there might be 
increased returns due to better supervision and coordination* 
Further, the West Bengal suffered from a poor 
transportation system* The government formulated and adopted 
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a transportation scheme which, besides providing additional 
employment and job opportunities, improved the transportation 
facilities in the State# Through this scheme a large 
number of auto-rickshaws, mini-buses and buses and trucks 
were put on the roads with financial assistance from the 
government* It provided Job opportunities to 23,861 
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unemployed youngmen in the State* It gave them self** 
confidence and discouraged them from indulging in lawless, 
destructive and violent activities* 
7* Green Revolution 
The government of various states adopted scientific 
tools and techniques for bringing about Increased rate of 
growth and maximum production of foodgrains. They were 
largely successful. This process was known as the Green 
Resolution* The Punjab and Harysna were the pioneering 
states in bringing about such a revolution* These states 
were largely successful because they had highly developed 
system of irrigation and the rivers neither overflowed 
causing floods in the rainy season nor did they create 
a situation of drought in the summer^ The farmers did not 
have to depend entirely on treacherous and uncertain 
monsoons because the 3tate built dams and reservoirs which 
kept the supply of water steady and well regulated throughout 
the year* Tbe farmers were quite prosperous and in a 
position to purchase the necessary items in order to increase 
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output . Moreover, the land was f e r t i l e and the peasants 
were hardy# 
Examples of these tw> s t a t e s tempted the farmers 
of West Bengal to adopt the same methods* They b u i l t up 
high expectations and were convinced that the adoption of 
ne¥ s c i e n t i f i c techniques ^ould be instrumental in ensuring 
higher production* The r e s u l t of t h i s would be tha t economic 
d i s p a r i t i e s bet-ween the r ich and poor farmers ¥Ould 
eventual ly decrease. 
But soon af ter introducing these s c i e n t i f i c methods 
and new s c i e n t i f i c techniques they rea l ised that the r e s u l t s 
¥ere not very encouraging* The basic reason for t h i s f a i l u r e 
¥as tha t 64 to 70 per cent r u r a l population was l iv ing 
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below the sntnlraaai subsistance l eve l and in poverty* The 
people depended upon monsoons and r ivers and did not have 
a v e i l regulated system of i r r i ga t i on* The farmers faced 
floods in the rainy season ani nere a f f l i c t ed v i th droughts 
in the summer» They did not have suf f ic ien t funds to 
provide inpu ts , 
Some other i l l - e f f e c t s of the ant ic ipa ted Green 
'Revolution nere that the advantages of the high yielding 
v a r i e t i e s flowed in the d i rec t ion of r ich farmers* O^ing 
to increased p ro f i t s accruing to the big farmers, more and 
more lands nere brought under t h e i r ovn cu l t i va t i on , thus 
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depriving the snail peasantry of these advantages by 
rendering them jobless. It caused widespread unemployment 
and eviction of the agriculturists* Because of ne¥ 
techniques and labour saving devices, the small farmers 
became tenants, the tenants became agricultural labourers 
and agricultural labourers became unemployed vlllagers• 
Having visualised the grave economic repercussions 
of the Green Revolution in West Bengal, Kr.Y.B. Chavan, 
former Union Home Minister, observed that "unless the 
Green Revolution is accompanied by a revolution based on 
social justice, 1 am afraid the Green Revolution may not 
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remain Green11* Such views expressed by the colleagues 
of the Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, and others had great 
impact on the Central Government vhlch %?as obliged to 
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design some other solution of the West Bengal problem* 
The most important problem, according to them, ^ as the 
development of the rural sector and need to provide 
employment to the evicted labourers, for this purpose the 
Central Government allocated fiupees 80 million, which 
would be spent on exploring new job opportunities for 
the labourers So affected* 
Apart from providing financial aid, the government 
launched a campaign against the elements who played a 
considerable role of misusing their power, authority and 
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influence# They wielded great power by virtue of the 
fact they served as linkages between the higher strata 
of the government servants and the farmers. The government 
discovered that in certain cases the officials who were 
assigned this function played a dirty role* One example 
was the construction of a canal in a village which was 
supposed to have been dug under the supervision of local 
self-government authorities* When the Divisional Officer 
was on tour in the area and inquired about the canal and 
checked the records, he found that additional funds had 
bean spent on closing some wrongly dug canal* In fact, 
the canal was newer dug and the old canal was never covered 
up* It was one case among many cited by the Congress 
Government ministers from time to time, some of which have 
been referred to in the foregoing pages* Although actions 
were taken against the guilty, in a number of cases these 
were not prompt or effective enough to put a stop to such 
activities* Severe punishment was also provided against the 
adulteration of food by a strict application of the Pood 
Adulteration Act of 1954. Though life imprisonment with 
a fine of Hs*5,000»00 was provided for those caught in 
the act of selling adulterated food injurious to health 
25 
and likely to cause death or grlevious hurt, there were 
only a few actions actually taken under this law. 
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Large areas of land were brought under irrigation 
and cultivation by providing water supply in unirrigated 
areas. The State Irrigation Minister proposed more effective 
measures by introduction of additional and more diversified 
targets and more inputs into the production* To attain 
these objectives a Central Monitoring Organisation for 
irrigation projects was proposed to be set up, and the 
State Government was asked to initiate urgent action to 
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set up similar monitoring cells at the State level* 
The Green devolution could not be effective and 
fruitful without massive supply of fertilizers. This job 
was taken up by the Central Government and 30 per cent 
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more fertilisers were rushed to West Bengal, to be 
distributed by government agencies, like Rural Development 
Banks• The Field Officers of JLB*B* would personally 
contact the farmers on their farms and find out the amount 
of fertilizers which they would be needing and the way they 
would be profitably utilised* 
It is clear from the above discussion that instead 
of discouraging the use of tools and material for bringing 
about the Green Hevolution, the government was taking 
every possible step to remove obstacles from its way and 
aid and assist the farmers* It is obvious that the Green 
Revolution is now becoming a reality and making the farmers 
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more prosperous and progressive, fhe t o t a l produce 
in the country has increased, making the economy 
s e l f - r e l i a n t ; i n fact , India has become se l f - su f f i c i sn t 
in food g ra ins , which i s a major achievements 
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Is Armed Revolution Possible i n India? 
In the foregoing pages of our study we have presented 
the funct ional approach for analysing the socio-economic 
complexity in Indian r u r a l society* While our problem i s 
flThe Origin and Fa i lu re of the Maoist Bavolutionary Strategy 
for which ^e selected the most s t r a t e g i c a l l y located 
s t a t e of the country named West Bengal, the main purpose 
of discussion i n t h i s conclusion i s to explore tbe future 
prospects of the revolut ionary s t ra tegy in the d ivers i f ied 
c u l t u r a l s e t t i ng i n India* 
The M i a n c i v i l i s a t i o n has a long^ continuous and 
chequered h is tory of nearly 5,000 years* I t has, i n the 
course of i t s long h is tory , absorbed elements from s e t t l e r s 
l i k e the Aryans, the Greeks, the Moslems and the 3 r i t i s h f 
and presents a r i ch va r i e ty of regional cu l tures in the 
process of adjustment and change through the ages* The 
t r a d i t i o n a l cu l tu re of the people hasjbeen a product of 
cen tur ies of co-existence of *aany fa i ths; i t has been 
enriched by a constant process of give and take at a l l 
levels* In the pas t , on account of paucity of communication 
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regional cu l tu res ttere la rgely diversif ied* But today 
the people have a close and ef fec t ive cotnuni cat ion through 
©ass-media as v e i l as dependence upon each other* I t i s 
becoming increas ingly d i f f i c u l t for an ind iv idua l or a group 
of ind iv iduals to l i v e in segregation, separated from 
others* Mutual dependence, p o l i t i c a l as v e i l as economic, 
i s t h e order of the day* These ne¥ developments are not 
diminishing the fir® convictions of the various people of 
India in matters of belief» but are opening avenues of 
mutual understanding of the i r respect ive cu l tu res in a 
dynamic society* I f p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s or soc io log is t s 
s t i l l bel ieve tha t Indian society presents the type of 
p lu ra l socie ty %thich cannot harmonise, i t i s a urong 
assumption which demonstrates a lack of understanding of 
the i n f r a s t ruc tu re of tbe Indian society• A thorough 
exaiaination of the various face t s of the present day Indian 
socie ty would reveal tha t there are examples of i n t e r - c a s t e f 
i n t e r - r e l i g i o u s and i n t e r - r e g i o n a l marriages• In a number 
of cases the married couples do not change t he i r r e l ig ion , 
customs and t r a d i t i o n s , t he i r mores, usages and the i r lores* 
The only phenomenon which places an accent upon the 
r econc i l i a t ion between tvo or more than two fac to r s i s the 
economic status# If the people are economically well-off 
the socie ty would remain a p lu ra l socie ty without conf l ic t s 
and resu l t an t chaos* 
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It would be worthwhile that while discussing the 
background of the developments in India one takes into 
account the peculiarities of Indian culture* One cannot 
ignore the genesis of the Indian scene before independence, 
as the present is mostly the continaum of the past. The 
hallmark of Indian struggle for freedom was that it was 
peaceful* The two main features which characterised the 
freedom movement weras 
a) to retain the separate entities in India without 
attempting to blend than together, and 
b) to promote the economic development in the 
country peacefully* 
These developments could be attained by subscribing 
to the view of an omnibus political party named tbe Indian 
Kational Congress, which was for decades in absolute 
majority* The Congress Party claimed to be egalitarian^ 
socialistic, secular, democratic and liberal in its approach* 
The Communist Party of India, which splintered from the 
Congress, formed a part of the socialistic bloc It desired 
quick changes in the economic conditions of the poor and 
down trodden by peaceful means if possible^ or by means of 
violent revolution'if necessary* They took inspiration fron 
local conditions under the guidance of local ideologies and 
Soviet intellectuals. Breznevfs visit to India in 1971 had 
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a great impact on the CFI,making the Party give up i t s 
opposit ion to the Congress* The th i rd important par ty was 
the Jan Sangh which was shor t -s ighted and communal in i t s 
approach and! preferred ftAkhand Bharat11 (United India) and 
Baoia Ra.l ( the Kingdom of God)* I t did not bel ieve in 
Gandhian non-violence as to thera i t was outdated* I t did 
not su i t the philosophy of the Jan Sangh, which considered 
the Gandhian way of l i f e too secular to be pract icable* Nor 
did the Communist ideology t o t a l l y su i t the^ f as i t was 
a n t i - r e l i g i o u s , extremist , revolut ionary and therefore 
a l i en to Ind ia 1 s genius* 
fro® 191? onwards the Indian society divided i t s e l f 
Into two major carapsi (a) Pro-Congress a f f i l i a t i o n s , and 
(b) Pro*Communist a f f i l i a t i o n , on the bas i s of socio-economic 
s t r o t i f i c a t i o n f However, soon af ter independence, the 
Congress Party began s t ress ing i t s secular po l i c i e s as well 
as economic p o l i c i e s , and tbe s t ruggle was diver ted towards 
the feudal-cum^capital is t c la s s . The weaker sections of 
the society coold no longer a t t r i b u t e t h e i r t r i a l s and 
t r i b u l a t i o n s to the exp lo i t a t ive behaviour of the B r i t i s h . 
i l s o the Communists changed and s ta r ted showing the i r l ik ing 
for parliamentary processes and economic development 
through democratic methods* Due to these p o l i t i c a l changes 
the prospects of revolut ion receded in the Indian subcontinent* 
The people were convinced of peaceful changes through 
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cons t i t u t i ona l devices* While the Communists promised to 
continue t h e i r s t ruggle for the welfare of the weaker 
sect ions through parliamentary methods, the Congress 
launched schemes of planned development, na t iona l i sa t ion 
of key indus t r i e s and increase in par cap i ta income so 
as to ameliorate the condition of the r u r a l poor* fhus 
the chances of armed conf l ic t among the r i ch and poor 
dwindled and with t h i s the p o s s i b i l i t y of bloody revolution 
becaae remote* 
Indians have, by and la rge f a doci le nature f I t i s 
very d i f f i c u l t to arouse them to action* Their r e l i g i o n s , 
customs and cu l tu re keep the® reconciled to f a t e and 
i l l - l u c k ; they prefer an atmosphere of contentment* fhey 
have lived in the surroundings of poverty for centuries* 
fhey are not accustomed to 'despera te remedies1 . Ifahatms 
Gandhi exorted them to remain non-violent even in the most 
provocative of s i tua t ions* They thought tha t i f they could 
perform the f ea t of achieving freedom by peaceful means and 
snatch p o l i t i c a l power from such a mighty empire by the 
weapon of non-violence, they can snatch away economic power 
a lso fTom the c a p i t a l i s t s and the feudal ar is tocracy* The 
p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , including the CPI a f te r 1958, did not 
adopt v io l en t devices* The p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , e l e c t o r a l 
processes and the parliamentary system which they preferred 
kept them fa r a^ay from vio len t tools and revolutionary 
devices* 
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The CPI(M) and the Haxalites were neither so powerful 
nor so well-knit as to create an atmosphere in which 
revolutionary devices could thrive* fhe laxalites were 
ill organised and scattered and could not make a common 
cause with the peoples fhey ca^ ie from so ©any diverse 
elements, castes, tribes and social strata that they could 
not unite to withstand the onslaught of tbe mighty power 
of the state, with its modern devices of detection and 
coercion* ^ven the laoist strategy failed to create any 
dent on their eneiy, i*e*, the feudal lords and capitalists 
who were better organised and had the unswerving support 
of the government and the sympathies of public opinion 
which hated the nurder of innocent persons* 
Moreover, the sympathisers and supporters were 
unevenly distributed throughout the country^ When in 1987 
some parts of West bengal became strongholds of the Maoist 
revolutionary strategy and peasants began to assemble under 
the banner of tbe laxalites, these peasants failed to 
understand that the laxalites lacked cohesion and had 
nothing in common with the peasants with regard to religion, 
culture and language so much so that the language of the 
urban laxalite elite and the rural people differed 
profoundly* It was not true only for West Bengal* The 
laxalites were active in Eastern Utter Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, 
Mhar, Northeastern area of Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and 
Jafttmu and Kashmir* Bit their position was weak in Western 
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Uttar Pradesh, Hlmachal Pradesh, Delhi, Panjab, Bajasthan, 
Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Orissa, Assam, Manlpur 
and Nagaland* In all those areas, where the economic 
condition of the people was better, the influence of the 
Maoist revolutionaries was very weak* 
fhe utmost that the West Bengal Maoist revolutionaries 
could do was to exercise influence on the government on a 
11 sal ted scale* The plural nature of the rural society and 
its infrastructure! tensions made it very doubtful that 
any consistent and abiding change in the outlook of the 
peasants would cone about, hence the policies of the 
government against the laxalites were successful* The 
government machinery was perturbed and the -nasses were 
disturbed at the cold-blooded murders of not only innocent 
people, but also of those involved in the economic 
emancipation of the poverty striken rural population* 
When the revolutionary activities were in full swing 
in West Bengal and some other states in 1989, the ruling 
Congress Party was engaged in futile intra^party conflicts. 
k large nuaier of party members were not willing to make 
any concessions to the lawless elements, because such a 
policy would be inconsistent with the democratic rights 
of the other people* Eventually, the Congress Party was 
divided into two separate parties known as the Congress 
Party (Old - Organisation) and tbe Congress Party (NewK 
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Almost all prominent members of the party opted for the 
Congress (0), while the young and those disillusioned by 
outdated out-look joined the Congress (N). It was evident 
that the ruling party was losing its hold over the country, 
and even though it still held power, its position had 
weakened considerably to enforce any leftist programme 
effectively^ 
It is thus clear from the foregoing survey that all 
said and done, a leftist revolution would not be possible in 
the prevailing Indian situation, through the Congress or 
the parties of the left* The leftist parties could do little 
as they were a house divided against itself* They have no 
sense of direction and, in those circumstances, no revolution 
was even remotely possible* 
The Congress Party, though totally adverse to a 
violent revolution because in its opinion it would do more 
harm than good to the Indian masses, was prepared to draw 
up policies which would any way bring about a profound 
social change* It preferred a strategy of change to be 
attained through amendments of the constitution and changes 
in laws. The abolition of Privy Purses and privileges of 
the princes, the nationalisation of 14 banks and General 
Insurance business, more and sore development programmes, 
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all these affected those sections of the society who were 
economically dominant* Buring the discussions in the Lok 
Sabha these programmes and policies were criticised by the 
Congress (0), the Jana Sangh and ihe Swatantra Party, while 
they were enthusiastically welcomed by the general public* 
The result was that in the general elections of 1971 the 
Congress secured a most significant victory, while the parties 
opposing its programmes and policies suffered serious losses. 
The Indian electorate did not only reject the 
policies of the rightist parties, like Jana Sangh and the 
Swatantra, but also rebuffed the leftist extremists wedded 
to foreign ideologies and hence unpalatable to the majority 
of people who take pride in their indigenous ©odes of 
thinking and ways of life* 3y and large, they did not 
appreciate the Marxist or Maoist way of thinking whatever 
the source or channel might be. The majority of Indians 
preferred peaceful and constitutional methods to achieve 
their aims and unequivocally and categorically abjured 
violent means* In these circumstances it was quite obvious 
that a large scale revolution based on Maoist ideology 
was neither feasible nor possible. 
Apart from the inherent belief of the Indian elites and 
their commitment to constitutional reform through parliamentary 
processes, the increasing financial assistance in the form 
20? 
of loans and subsidies weaned away the rural population 
from adopting violent methods* In 1950-51, the short 
and medium term credits for the peasants had bean no more 
than Rs* 24 million, but in 1971-72 the figure had gone 
1 
up to 608 million* All these factors contributed in a 
significant way towards defusing the social pressures 
which lead to the creation of a revolutionary situation. 
lew Legislation Against 
Landed Aristocracy 
Besides this, the government took steps to enact 
legislation against landlords* Abolition of bonded labour 
was one of the significant acts of the Congress Government, 
and now the landlord will have to refrain from this inhuman 
exploitation* la case he did it, he was to be punished 
2 
severely* After the adoption of this legislation the money-
lenders and the landlords started returning the property 
to the tribals and the peasants voluntarily which they had 
mortgaged against loans advanced to them on usurious rates 
3 
of interest. 
But whether these steps will be adequate to abolish 
poverty, which was the main cause of revolutionary unrest, 
is an open question* In spite of these reforms the problem 
is whether the peasants would take advantage of them and 
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make them effective* In order to resolve this problem 
the Central Government issued comprehensive instructions 
to the States to expedite the development of the tribal 
4 
and poor peasant areas* The long-term aims of such plans 
werei (a) to narrow the gap between the levels of 
development in tribal and other areas, and (b) to improve 
the standard of life of the tribal cotniunities# The States 
have been asked to select senior officers to be in charge 
of the programme in tbe State as a whole* Qualifications 
prescribed for the posts in tribal areas have been revised 
with a view to affording more opportunities to local 
people to gain employment. These programmes were intended 
to suppress the evil designs of the landlords in the areas 
concerned and thus indirectly reduce the social unrest and 
revolutionary tendencies of the tribals# 
Legislation Against Social 
Disabilities 
Besides such legislation which the government passed 
in order to ameliorate the economic condition of the 
people, their social disabilities were sought to be removed 
by schemes of social reform# Under fresh policies for 
more rights for women the government took steps to encourage 
widow remarriage, even though their religion and society 
prohibited it. Those unfortunate women who lost their 
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husbands a t a young age and were l e f t without any means 
of support, and had no des i re to remarry, would be given 
5 
f i nanc i a l ass i s tance from the government sources, so tha t 
they might stand on t h e i r own l egs . 
Legis la t ion against chi ld marriage was another soc ia l 
reform. I t was general ly the p rac t i ce that chi ldren were 
uni ted i n wedlock even before the i r b i r t h . Small chi ldren 
were married even before they knew the implicat ions of 
marriage. This had s ign i f ican t implicat ions i n the p l u r a l 
soc ie ty of the country. I t had a two-dimensional effect 
upon the backward comnunityj (1) t h i s p rac t i ce was against 
tbe wishes of the persons concerned who would be compelled 
to pass t he i r future l i f e together , and (2) i t was one 
of the main causes of f a i l u r e of the pol icy of family 
planning i n Ind ia . The government, therefore , enacted 
l e g i s l a t i o n against these malpract ices . The i n t e r m i n i s t e r i a l 
panel recommended that the Child Marriage Eegis t ra t ion Act 
should be amended to r a i s e the age of marriage for g i r l s 
6 
to 18 years and for boys to 21 years . 
The socio-economic reforms would be incomplete if 
the pol icy makers do not have the capacity to mobilise 
public opinion in favour of reformatory s t eps . Keeping 
t h i s f ac t i n view, the rul ing par ty launched a se r i e s of 
debates on these e v i l s of the socie ty . The custom of dowry 
was one such e v i l , besides the unbearable expenditure on 
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marriage ceremonies* The ill-effects of these customs 
were obvious* Laws were enacted to prevent the expenditure 
7 
on a wedding from crossing the limit of As. 6,000* Dowry 
was completely banned* The stern action of the government 
provided relief to a large number of people, but the custom-
ridden society could not be cured of these evils so easily. 
Loans on usurious interest were taken from the MahaJans 
and landlords to meet the surreptitious demands made by 
greedy parents of tbe bridegrooms* The meagre lands were 
mortgaged in this process, and the parties, particularly 
the family of the bride, bad to bear the brunt of it for 
the rest of their lives* 
The question now arises as to why the government 
became so sympathetic towards the poverty striken masses* 
The motive was mostly political. They wanted to blunt the 
weapon of the revolutionaries by declaring themselves as 
the saviours of the poor masses* Moreover, it was not only 
a social problem* The major issue of the law and order 
was also involved* If the government abstained from launching 
multipronged attack on the revolutionaries, the law and 
order situation would be worsened and no government could 
hope to survive unless it tackled the law and order situation 
with a strong hsnd# Moreover, the Congress professed to be 
a socialist party aM was pledged to the provision of welfare 
for the poor# 
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Maoist revolut ionary s t r a t egy was not appreciated 
by the Indians in a big way# They abhorred the murders 
of innocent people and joined hands with the Congress Party, 
which besides being in power was ©ore resourceful and 
well-organised* I t s propaganda machinery was more powerful* 
I t s p o l i t i c a l influence throughout the coontry was much 
more widespread* The impression tha t the l a x a l i t e s had 
e x t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l l o y a l t i e s also went against them, and 
t h e i r f h i t and run1 pol icy brought the® i n disgrace* The 
e m u l a t i v e ef fec t of a l l t h i s was tha t the haxalites l o s t 
the sympathy and support of the people even in ths regions 
of the i r birth, and prospects of Maoist type of revolut ion 
receded^ The CPI(M) a lso adopted parliamentary processes , 
and ultimately won majority of sea ts in West Bengal, through 
the ins t rumenta l i ty of the ba l lo t box# The l a x a l i t e s , who 
were rounded up and j a i l e d a f t e r the declara t ion of emergency, 
became t o t a l l y ineffect ive* Wo finger was ra i sed i n t he i r 
support, a l ienated as they were fro® the CPI and the CPI(M). 
Because the re was no love lo s t between tbe Cofxaunists, 
moderates as wel l as ex t remis t 1 , the bid for revolution by 
the l a x a l i t e s was bound to f a i l . 
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The Haxallte Problem Under 
the Janata Government 
After the victory of the Janata Party in the general 
elections of March 1977 the bulk of the laxalites were 
released on an assurance that they would not resort to 
violent methods. Moreover, the Janata Government declared 
that it would not be vindictive against the peace-loving 
laxalites merely on grounds of their ideology and quest 
for social justice* However, the Janata Government released 
only those Haxalites who were held in jail for political 
reasons but not those who were convicted of murder and other 
common crimes because the government leaders believed that 
many laxalites would change their stance given a chance• 
This expectation was true in many instances* for 
example, Ashin Chatterjee, one of the founder ©embers of 
the CPl(M-L) expressed his views on Hay 21, 1978 at Calcutta 
that Mazumdar1s theory of individual annihilation had caused 
degeneration of the CPI(M-L) into a terrorist party* 
Addressing bis first formal press conference since his 
release from jail on March 4, 1978, Chatterjee, former member 
of the Central Committee of CPI CM-L), stressed the need for 
formation of a new Communist revolutionary party — free 
of the ideology of annihilation — which would be formed 
8 
by honest Communist revolutionaries "• 
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Denouncing the theory of individual ann ih i l a t ion , 
Chatterjee believed that the CPlOl-L), l i ke a l l t e r r o r i s t 
p a r t i e s , f r i t t e r e d away i t s energy by dividing i t s e l f in to 
d i f fe ren t groups and that in fact the CPI(M-L) was not a 
Communist pa r ty a t a l l . i t the i n i t i a l s tages people f e l t 
e lated by murder of some landlords , but the mistake of the 
laxalites was that they failed to realise that this was 
only a passive support of a people suffering from exploitation* 
Iven when the police repressions started and then intensified 
throughout the period of the laxalite movement, there was no 
support of the people. Hot only this, in several instances 
it so happened that the people chased away the CPlCM-L) 
members from their areas* The Naxalite Movement, instead 
of intensifying the class struggle, weakened it# The 
9 
movement was isolated from the people* 
However, not all laxalites were prepared to give up 
the theories and practice of violent revolutionary struggle 
in exchange for release from jail. Thus Miss Sunier lavalka^, 
President of the Worker1s Eevolutionary Council in Calcutta, 
while addressing a press conference at Kalahpur, declared 
that *tbe hard core of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-
Leninist) cadres will not deviate from their chosen path 
of waging a protracted people*s war, notwithstanding the 
recent change of government in the country*1. She said that 
the f people1 s war1 was in essence the peasants1 armed 
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struggle wherein violence is inevitable under certain 
10 
circumstances to usher in an era of real Indian Socialism. 
Miss lavalkar further maintained that the State apparatus 
under the Janata rule was still controlled by feudal lords 
and bureaucratic capitalists and that any let up in the 
resolve of the laxalites would only encourage the imperialists 
(U.S#4#) and social imperialists (B.S*Saii#) to further 
exploit the Indian masses. 
Miss lavalkar was of the view that what the Janata 
leaders wanted was merely to replace Mrs. Indira Gandhi and 
some other individuals and not to change the Congress policy, 
which,according to her, served the interest of bourgeousie, 
big landlords and monopolists. She further remarked that 
Satyanarain Singh and his supporters have now ceased to be 
connected with CPI(M-L) as they had adopted a collaborationist 
and capitulation!st stand. She further said that "Thousands 
of laxalites who for years had undergone torture and 
imprisonment under fictitious criminal charges coold not 
give up four tactical and strategic party line1 for the sake 
9 
of obtaining release from the prison1^ 
In view of this stand, it was, therefore, no surprise 
that hardly 40 of over 2,000 laxalites in West Bengal prisons 
secured their release by giving undertakings to the government 
to abandon revolutionary strategy. 
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Another Important segment of the laxalite movement under 
the leadership of Ham Pyara Saraf took also a hard stand and 
denounced the Communist Party of China as "revisionist" in 
the second issue of tbe quarterly called A 'Revolutionary 
12 
Viewpoint. Saraf presented a 64-page theory under the 
title nXt Is High Time To Challenge The Tide tod Face The 
Storm*1, in Mhich he said that the muj of judging the nature 
of tbe present official Chinese leadership is to look 
seriously both at its theory and practice. It has already 
become clear that the Chinese leadership's sayings and doings 
nere characterised by a big gap nhioh has been and is a 
peculiar feature of revisionism. Obviously, under these 
ne¥ political developments the Indian revolutionaries vould 
most probably not follow those guidelines nhich would be 
given by the present Chinese leadership because their stand 
is further to the left. 
There is, however, no denying the fact that since the 
inception of tbe Janata Government in March 1977 thousands 
of laxalites have been released on one ground or another, and 
that ¥ind has been taken out of their salIs• The sharp edge 
of their opposition has been considerably blunted, and it 
is unthinkable for them to launch violent strategies based 
on Maoist lines as in the past. 
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APPENDICES 
IHEEX I 
The position of the United Fronts and the Independent 
Candidates in the elections of 1967 and 1969 in West 
Bengal 
Slu Political Seats won % of Number Seats won % of Number of 
No. parties in 1967 votes of in 1969 votes ministers 
ministers 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 0 . 
11 
12 
CPI(M) 
B.C. 
CPI 
P . B . 
S @ S @rm 
P . S . P . 
R#S
 #P» 
S
 #U #C # 
G # l # 
R#0@P »I # 
P.W.P. 
P.B.(M) 
43 
34 
16 
13 
7 
7 
6 
4 
2 
-
2 
1 
18, 
10, 
6, 
3 , 
2, 
1, 
2, 
0, 
0, 
0, 
0, 
0, 
,1 
,4 
,5 
,9 
• 1 
,74 
,1 
,7 
,5 
,3 
• 3 
.2 
3 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
-
1 
_ 
80 
33 
30 
£SJL 
9 
5 
12 
7 
4 
2 
2 
1 
19.6 
6.# 
6 .8 
4.5 
1.8 
1.31 
£ . 8 
1.5 
0 .5 
0 .4 
0 .4 
0 .2 
8 
4 
5 
3 
-
-
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Continued p.ii 
( i i ) 
Political 
parties 
Seats won % of 
in 1967 votes 
Seats won 
in 1969 votes 
Number of 
ministers 
S I . 
No. 
Number of 
minis te rs 
13 
14 
15 
16. 
17 
L.S«S. 
Congress 
Jana Sangh 
Swatantra 
Ind. 
5 
127 
1 
1 
11 
0.7 
41.1 
1.3 
0.8 
9.1 
4 
55 
mm 
-
15 
0.7 
40.4 
0.8 
0.1 
9.3 
Total 280 100.0 18 280 100.0 30 
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Vol. XV, No* 14, (April 2-8, 1969), pp. 8855-8854); 
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Bombay, 1968); Sabadhikarl, P*, Populism and Representations 
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and Congress (R) Governments i n West Bengalft, (Lateehead 
University;: Thunder Bay, Ontario, no da te?) . 
INDEX II 
Composition of the United Front Ministry (1967 and 1969) 
in West Bengal 
1967 
S.No, Name 
1969 
Party Portfolio Name Party Portfolio 
1 A. Mukherjee 
2 J. Basn 
3 S. lahari 
4 P.C. Ghosh 
B.C. Chief Minister 
Home Affairs 
General Adminis-
tration, 
CPI(M) Deputy Chief 
Minister, 
Finance, 
Transport 
CPI Information, 
Parliamentary 
Affairs, 
Local Self-
Governraent 
Ind. Food and 
Agriculture 
A. Mukherjee B.C. 
J. Basu CPI(M) 
L. lahari CPI 
K. Bhattacharji F.B, 
Chief Minister 
Finance, Home 
Animal Husbandry, 
Social Sducation 
Deputy Chief 
Minister. 
Constitution, 
Sieetronics. 
General Adminis-
tration, 
Police, Press 
Local Self-
Government, 
Planning and 
Development, 
Housing 
Agr Iculture 
(except the portion 
given to Mukherjee 
of the CPI) 
Continued p.ii. 8 
o 
INMX I I (Contd.) - li * 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15. 
H.K. Basu 
J, Bhattacharya 
N.K. Konar 
I. Bhattacharyya 
N.S. Gupta 
J. Kabir 
S. Banerjee 
S.K. Dara 
3. Mukherjee 
D.P. Rai 
K.K. Maitra 
F.B. 
PWP 
CPI(M) 
RSP 
CPI(M) 
B.S. 
SBC 
B^O
 # 
CPI 
G.L. 
SSP 
Public Works & 
Housing 
Bducatlon 
Land and Land 
Revenue 
Health 
Belief and 
Rehabilitation 
Planning and 
Development 
Labour 
Commerce and 
Industries, 
Community 
Development 
Irrigation and 
Waterways 
Scheduled Caste 
& Tribal Welfare 
B. Mukherjee 
B. Ghosh 
H.K. Konar 
CPI 
FB 
CPI(M) 
N. Bhattacharyya RSP 
N.S, Gupta 
S. Dara 
S. Banerjee 
C.M. Sarkar 
R. Chakraverty 
D.P. Rai 
Small Scale and J. Chakraverty 
Cottage Industries, 
Animal Husbandry 
and Fisheries 
CPI(M) 
B.C. 
sue 
B.C. 
CPI 
G.L. 
RSP 
Irrigation and 
Waterways 
Cottage & Small 
Scale Industries 
Land and Land 
Revenue 
Health 
Relief and 
Rehabilitation 
Commerce and 
Industries including 
Agro-industrie s 
Cooperation 
P.W.S. 
Community 
Development 
Cooperation and 
Social Welfare 
Scheduled C®gte 
and Tribal Welfare 
Parliamentary 
Affairs and 
Chief Whip 
CO 
CO 
(Continued p . i i i ) 
INDBX II (Contd.) iii -
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
&«7 
A. Chakraverty F.B. 
M.N. Kundu PSP 
B.B.D. Gupta MS 
Law and 
Sxcise 
Relief and 
Cooperation 
Panchayat and 
Social Welfare 
-
-
-
-
-
-
MB 
mm 
-
-
-
P. Mukherjee 
B.B.D. Gupta 
sue 
LSS 
J.B.Bhattacharjee PWO 
S. Kumar 
R. Chatterjee 
B. Soren 
S.P. Roy 
A. Rasul 
P.C. Roy 
K. Ghosh 
K.C. Haldar 
G. Yazdani (Supported by 
CPI(M) 
Mrs.R.Chakvarty 
A .R. Khan 
RCPI 
FB(M) 
B#C
 # 
CPI(M) 
CPI(M) 
CPI(M) 
CPI(M) 
CPI(M) 
Ind. 
- CPI 
FB 
Road and Road 
Development 
Panchayat 
Information and 
Public Relation! 
Food & Supplies 
Sports 
Forest 
Education 
Transport 
F i she r i e s 
Labour 
Excise 
Passport and 
Civi l Defence 
Cooperation and 
Social Welfare 
Jud ic ia l and 
Legislature 
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